A Second Front: The Israeli Dilemma

Rebels fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government forces captured a border crossing between Syria and Israel in the disputed Golan Heights. While Syrian forces are attempting to recapture the crossing near Quneitra, the outlook is bleak; Syria also lost the Tabqa airbase in the country's north, the site of a gruesome mass execution of prisoners of war - a war crime from any perspective. The Nusra Front, linked to al Qaeda, participated in the Quneitra battle and represents a wakeup call for Israel as it settles the country's border.

(Source: The Times of Israel)

It is unlikely that the Israelis are interested in a two-front war, having just disengaged from 50 days of warfare in Gaza just a few days ago. This ceasefire itself may only prove to be temporary. The Israelis have fought several two-front wars in their past (1948, 1967, and 1973) and have conducted operations on multiple fronts since; however, handling two distinct conflict zones is not something that is desired.

Israel has largely stayed out of the Syrian Civil War, having only sporadically engaged across the border. However, with alert levels raised and the capture of 43 United Nations peacekeepers charged with securing the Israel-Syria border by rebel forces, reality may become necessity. Both Israel and the West may have to choose the lesser of two evils - Assad or the rebels. The US is not expected to work with Assad, but airstrikes against some of the rebel forces, namely the Islamic State, may come. This could place Israel in a precarious position of both defending itself and not being swallowed in regional conflict.

Coming Elections in Syria, Sponsored Today by: Chlorine Gas

Officials claim that Syria has handed over nearly 90% of its chemical weapons stores. Percentages are easy figures when they fail to elaborate on how those numbers are derived. Intelligence has existed for some time that suggests Syria will fail to disclose its full chemical weapons stockpiles and hold on to some instead. Moreover, easily-weaponized agents could be hidden away, particularly if they are not being sought and the world believes Syria has included those in its concessions. Such concerns over dual-use components hover over rogue states like a constant fog. As long as some internal control is maintained, it isn't so hard to imagine clandestine operations of all kinds. Syria has even threatened Israel and other spillover, something that one imagines would be difficult were the government fighting to its last man and materiel for domestic control.

If (nearly) 90% of those chemical weapons are handed over, why is Syria still employing chemical weapons, as the recent chlorine gas attack indicates? Apparently, chlorine gas is not included on the list of chemical weapons Syria is giving up, although it is banned. Who knew that the agreement in Syria allowed for such leniency and compromise as to which weapons it could keep and which it must give up? At the same time, the government continues to direct blame to the rebels, who have less incentive and even less means to launch chemical weapons strikes. It just doesn't entirely add up.

Amid the conflict, al-Assad's government has set a date for new elections -June 3, 2014. That's correct - about six weeks from now, Syrians all across the country are going to go the polls to elect their new leader. That is, except for the over 150,000 people killed and millions who have fled the country as refugees - they won't be voting, but the show must go on. The United Nations has suggested to Syria that it avoid having elections during a civil war. It is unlikely there will be any significant challenger (though a puppet challenger may be brought in). Why even go through the trouble? It is not really all that possible to gloss over this kind of electoral travesty.

Playing Politics at the United Nations

Earlier this month, Iran named Hamid Aboutalebi as its United Nations ambassador, a move that quickly strained US-Iran relations that had been slowly thawing. It is alleged that Aboutalebi was intimately part of the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran, which spiraled into a 444-day hostage crisis. Aboutalebi claims he was merely a translator; however, this role does not detract his contribution to the hostage-takers objectives. Regardless of his specific role or duties, Aboutalebi participated, which makes his appointment instantly controversial and instantly problematic.

With the United Nations building in New York, it is the US who issues visas to ambassadors and staff. There doesn't seem to be a record of an ambassador being denied a visa previously, although lower-level staff have been denied and other applications have been rescinded or plans have changed. One of the higher profile incidents was Yasser Arafat being denied a visa to speak at the UN in 1998. The 1947 agreement establishing the United Nations headquarters in New York requires the US to open travel for UN purposes. However, the US has maintained its right to restrict access nonetheless, and has established the precedents that would allow it to do so. No country has previously elected to test the limits of the agreement or the repercussions.

The US has taken the first step by denying the visa for Aboutalebi on the tail of a Congressional bill that would deny Aboutalebi on national security grounds. At the same time, Iran is standing its ground and refusing to select another ambassador. Domestically, there is fairly strong consensus on the denial.

Internationally, the ramifications can be extensive. Aboutalebi, albeit a potentially minor participant, was still a participant in one of the most significant violations of diplomatic norms and laws of the twentieth century. To make a diplomatic case out of the incident, given his background, would almost be ironic. At the same time, negotiations about Iran's nuclear stores will be strained by this incident. There exists no win-win situation here - someone will need to back down.

Stalled Talks, Grand Confusion in Syria

Given that this story is a few days old, this post will be fairly brief.

The Syrian peace talks have not exactly been going splendidly. Neither side seems to be at the talks for the same reasons and the fighting continues all the while. The talks are practically an exercise in futility.

UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi recently blamed the al-Assad regime for hampering the talks for refusing to discuss a transition of power. This should really come as no surprise. The government came to the talks indicating that it would refuse to discuss regime change. The opposition came only for that reason. It seems as if the talks were doomed from the start. Apart from discussing Syria's future, the talks have never even been on the same page.

It will be impressive if the UN, as well as the two sides who are backed by their respective world powers, can re-energize the talks to really begin to talk about facts on the ground and move toward some sort of path toward resolution and peace, however slow that may be.

A Fundamentalist Divide: Al Qaeda Separates Itself from ISIL

It seems you can be "too much," even for al Qaeda. On Monday, the terrorist group formally cut off its relationship with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). This declaration follows al Qaeda's demand that ISIL remain separate from the al Nusra Front, al Qaeda's branch in Syria, which ISIL has attempted to consolidate into itself over the past year. In fact, it is apparent that ISIL and al Qaeda have been at odds for several years, dating to the mid 2000s. While it is unlikely that the two groups will become equal rivals, it is, at the same time, clear that they may view themselves that way in the near future. In the ongoing infighting of Syria's opposition forces, al Qaeda has propped up its links to the al Nusra Front and ISIL signed a truce with Suqour al Sham. Consolidation in the region could mean less infighting, but could also lead to a severely split opposition, making it more difficult for outside powers to support either side.

(Map of ISIL operations, Source: Red24)

Critically, al Qaeda's declaration may reflect which battle it now envisions as more winnable - Syria or Iraq. While it has made occasional gains in Iraq, al Qaeda forces, by and large, have been continually beaten back. Moreover, the continued presence of American troops and related support hinder operations in Iraq. Syria, meanwhile, has limited Western interference while it collapses - The Economist's "The Death of a Country" piece ran nearly a year ago - leaving a potential vacuum of power in all but al Assad's western strongholds. In the end, this could make Syria's near term future only more violent, a fact that is difficult to imagine given the United Nations' February 4 report detailing the violence there today. 

Syrian peace talks scheduled, peace itself delayed

Amidst the surprising news from the Middle East this week was word that peace talks have been agreed upon by the two opposing sides in the Syrian civil war. Scheduled for late January in Geneva, this positive development is most certainly clouded by its more intricate details.

The first is the purported objective: transition. The opposition has consistently refused talks unless they included Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ceding power. Assad, meanwhile, has refused to cede power under any circumstances. In many ways, this is what the civil war has become all about. Although numerous reports mention that transitional government is a clear goal of the peace talks, it is curious whether both sides see that goal similarly. Assad's camp may view transition as inclusive of current government officials, while the opposition may believe it would completely exclude those currently in power. It would be unsurprising if this would become the main sticking point during the talks, if they actually take place that is.

The second is the question of who is capable of wholly leading the opposition, and, related, whether the opposition is cohesive enough to be led. More extremist groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continue to advance and take control of swathes of territory. Even less extremist groups do not accept the full authority of the political opposition, as clearly exemplified by this quote: Opposition political delegations do not have any power or influence on the Syrian street. On the whole, the Syrian National Council has foreign backing, but limited support within the opposition itself. At the same time, fighting continues in Syria, and its prevalence over the near future will be a testament to both cohesion and preparedness to peace. All of this makes one wonder: will the talks even take place?

There is little objective change in the civil war conditions of late. In fact, the United Nations seems to be spurring the peace talks based mostly on 'hope,' as opposed to more serious developments It is doubtful whether this is the best practice approach and leads to questions over whether the two opposing sides are even in agreement over what the purpose of the peace talks is. The world will know soon enough. In the meantime, it should hope.

Disarming a nation's WMD: not as easy as first thought

Syria's "voluntary" acceptance to give up its chemical weapons arsenal in light of horrific video showing the effects of a gas attack on its own population is, by all means, an unprecedented solution. Even the United Nations admits to as much. It will take well into 2014, at best estimates, to complete the process; even though it is unclear how much WMD Syria even has. One major unknown is that both sides remain locked in a civil war, so there is a disarmament process within a country still at war. Giving up the chemical weapons is certainly a much brighter prospect than being ground zero for the next major international conflict, but in the end, does it solve the problems in Syria, or even help lead to their resolution?

Disarmament is a tricky process. Germany was, in many senses, disarmed between the world wars - that didn't end too well (World War II). The list of nations that have successfully dabbled (armed, not just researched), peaceably disarmed, and then integrated into  international community norms is short. You could make the case for South Africa, but its disarmament was tied to significant sanctions because of apartheid. It was apartheid's end that really brought South Africa within norms. You may say Libya; however, similar sanctions decimated the entire economy (and the energy industry in particular). In addition, Libya under Gaddafi still came toppling down years later. Three former Soviet states inherited WMD (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), but all returned them, having no ability to maintain them long-term and limited capacity to use them. Iraq? Well, that went south years later. No great example exists.

In many senses, Syria is a test case. What will be the effect on Assad's government? How will this affect the Syrian Civil War? What implications exist for the greater Middle East? These are all unknowns that rest on the progress of the chemical disarmament.

Previous Illexum Posts on Syria:

• Unthinkable? No. Unprecedented? No. Ignored. Yes. - Syria Today (September 5, 2013)
• UN good at counting; everything else - not so much (June 13, 2013)
• Foreign Arms in Syria (June 2, 2013)
• Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria) (May 19, 2013)
• The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD (April 28, 2013)
• Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons (March 21, 2013)
• Annan Resigns, Endgame Approaches? (August 2, 2012)

Unthinkable? No. Unprecedented? No. Ignored. Yes. - Syria Today

The disaster that is Syria continues to unfold and capture the world's attention. The United States, led by President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, have begun to use some of the harshest rhetoric of late in describing the calamity there in a bid to garner political support for military action against Syria. The trigger, late in coming, is the all-but certain use of chemical weapons. It is questionable whether the trigger may be too late.

Before touting the latest news, it is important to recognize that this chemical attack would be only the latest atrocity in a civil war that has dragged on and has been ignored. The Economist wrote an excellent piece on the disintegration of Syria as a nation-state and its impact on regional and international affairs back in February of 2013. For a conflict that has already lasted years, the question that certainly arises is: why now? what makes this so different?

Is this the unthinkable? No - there were chemical weapons atrocities throughout the twentieth century, and even during the Syrian Civil War reports as far back as early this year suggested chemical weapons use. In fact, a response in Syria would be the first of its kind, following the Chemical Weapons Convention (of which Syria is not a signatory).This latest attack was simply too public and too brazen to ignore is the line of thinking.

Is the scale of Syria Civil War unprecedented? This is certainly arguable. This is Homs this year:

                                          (Source: Daily Mail)

Meanwhile, this is Hama in 1982:

                                          (Source: Wikipedia)

Recent United Nations reports also point to an approximate two million refugees and massive camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. An addition four million are internally displaced, though this gets much less news much like internally displaced persons get much fewer rights than refugees. While the scale in terms of the total population is much higher, the overall scale is not much different from the Democratic Republic of Congo civil war. This is an all-out war. Whoever wins, it will take decades to rebuild Syria.

What has happened, and what often happens in these situations, is that the entire conflict has largely been ignored from the foreign policy of Western nations. Countries and international institutions have noted their opinions, counted the dead, but not acted. The reality is that no one wants to repeat Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, the US has likely eliminated any considerations of infantry use for the foreseeable future. It is unsurprising that a significant part of the US plan involves improving the Syrian resistance. In itself, this is problematic, with portions of the Syrian resistance being directly affiliates with al Qaeda. Meanwhile, Pentagon estimates suggest it would take 75,000 troops to control the ground in Syria.

None of this paints a pretty picture (nor is it meant to). Is action in Syria needed? Probably. Would it have been more useful months and months ago? Probably. The question now is most certainly - what kind of response will occur. Will it drive Assad out of power, or will it simply lead to a repeat of the two Gulf Wars?


Previous Illexum Posts on Syria:

• UN good at counting; everything else - not so much (June 13, 2013)
• Foreign Arms in Syria (June 2, 2013)
• Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria) (May 19, 2013)
• The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD (April 28, 2013)
• Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons (March 21, 2013)
• Annan Resigns, Endgame Approaches? (August 2, 2012)

UN good at counting; everything else - not so much

A new report from the United Nations (UN) human rights commission indicates that the death toll of the Syrian Civil War stands at nearly 93,000 (Full report here). This is not the first time the UN has released a report on the Syrian death toll. The list only includes those whose names and locations of death are known, thereby all-but guaranteeing that the actual toll of the war is much higher. The UN seems to be great at compiling sources and counting reports of deaths. It is not unimaginable that a team of graduate students could likely do the job (and there are databases of civil war deaths and civilian deaths of wars - example here).

The biggest missing piece is action, or even a call to action. The UN was created to (emphasis ours):

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

That is Article 1, Section 1 of the United Nations Charter. That is the first thing that was considered - the basis of all else. It's spirit is not being upheld. That is not to say how many articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are being outright ignored - to which, surprisingly, Syria voted in favor of.

In fact, the current UN report concludes most irreverently:

"Examining reported killings is an important step in understanding violence in Syria. But it is only a first step. Further analysis is necessary to answer substantive questions about patterns of violence during this conflict."

It seems to completely gloss over the fact that this is not a historical conflict where historical data is being examined - this is happening now - today. The next step is not to answer "substantive questions about patterns of violence during this conflict." The next step is to use this evidence to encourage a stand against the violence and bringing the conflict to an end.

Previous Illexum posts on Syria:

Foreign Arms in Syria (June 2, 2013)

Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria) (May 19, 2013)

To Do What Feels Necessary (May 4, 2013)

The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD (April 28, 2013)

Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons (March 21, 2013)

Israel Bombs Syria, Everyone Stays Quiet (January 31, 2013)

Sri Lanka: Sending the Wrong Message

Lost in the euphoria of ending the brutal 26-year Sri Lankan Civil War is the civilian cost. In countries around the world, the civilian cost is not measured by opportunity costs, economic downturns, or political bickering - it's measured in casualties and lives. Perhaps the cost was not lost then in Sri Lanka. Just... ignored.

Even at the time of its conclusion, information indicated that the end was both bloody and ruthless. Given the treatment of Tamil civilians, particularly those living in LTTE-controlled areas, throughout the civil war, it comes as no surprise that they were simply a pawn in the endgame. Revised estimated suggest upwards of 40,000 were killed in the months leading up to May 2009. Since then, numerous organizations have worked tirelessly to compile evidence of the failure of the international community to act and protect. The claim of war crimes committed by government forces is not new (Amnesty International again, two years later). Although claims now focus largely on government action, it stands to mention that LTTE forces were culpable all the same.

It is a shame that the international community turned away then because an insurgency was being put down; because a terrorist group was, in a rare instance, being wholly destroyed. If the United Nations wishes to investigate war crimes, then it should do so. However, the watered down resolution endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council has turned this event into nothing short of embarrassment today. Four years have passed; it is high time to make clear that actions that occurred in 2009, and some since, do not represent the protocols of the international community.

It seems that every time the international community says "we didn't know" and "never again," but it happens over and over again. If nothing else, the war mentality of Sri Lankan forces is most clear in the unnecessary and blatantly illegal assassination of LTTE leader Prabhakaran's underage son in February of 2013 - nearly four years after the war ended, per the government (he would have been approximately 8 when his father died in 2009).

The time for government inquiries has passed. What evidence exists needs to be passed on to authorities beyond Sri Lanka, and those responsible prosecuted to the extent available. Otherwise, the wrong message is being sent - do what you want, so long as it's against "the terrorists."

Hamas & Fatah to Meet, Rehash Disagreements

Hamas and Fatah, leaders of the governments in Gaza and the West Bank respectively, have apparently agreed to meet in Cairo under the mediation of Egypt's president, Mohammed Morsi. Although ties have warmed of late, Hamas and Fatah remain polar opposites in their approach toward sovereignty,  independence, and Israel. While Hamas refuses to renounce violence or acknowledge Israel's right to exist, Fatah, through the PA, has already engaged Israel for decades and has pushed for recognition through the United Nations. Unfortunately, Fatah's engagement with Israel has not proved beneficial, with many now viewing Fatah as a mere pawn and Hamas as the voice of the Palestinians. Nonetheless, reconciliation can have many benefits, including a possible return to the peace process. As in any process, two significant roadblocks exist: time and trust. Hamas and Fatah have been enemies not only politically, but also on the street. To imagine their peaceful coexistence under the current framework is difficult. Trust will be difficult to build quickly, and time is short, and yet moves ever slowly in the Middle East. Changes in government, policy, and even public opinion in both other Arab countries (including Egypt itself) and Israel can play havoc on the differences that exist between Hamas and Fatah, differences that may not be resolved in time for reconciliation. A two-state solution with contested multi-party democracy in the Levant may continue to be a dream as disagreements continue to resurface.