A Second Front: The Israeli Dilemma

Rebels fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government forces captured a border crossing between Syria and Israel in the disputed Golan Heights. While Syrian forces are attempting to recapture the crossing near Quneitra, the outlook is bleak; Syria also lost the Tabqa airbase in the country's north, the site of a gruesome mass execution of prisoners of war - a war crime from any perspective. The Nusra Front, linked to al Qaeda, participated in the Quneitra battle and represents a wakeup call for Israel as it settles the country's border.

(Source: The Times of Israel)

It is unlikely that the Israelis are interested in a two-front war, having just disengaged from 50 days of warfare in Gaza just a few days ago. This ceasefire itself may only prove to be temporary. The Israelis have fought several two-front wars in their past (1948, 1967, and 1973) and have conducted operations on multiple fronts since; however, handling two distinct conflict zones is not something that is desired.

Israel has largely stayed out of the Syrian Civil War, having only sporadically engaged across the border. However, with alert levels raised and the capture of 43 United Nations peacekeepers charged with securing the Israel-Syria border by rebel forces, reality may become necessity. Both Israel and the West may have to choose the lesser of two evils - Assad or the rebels. The US is not expected to work with Assad, but airstrikes against some of the rebel forces, namely the Islamic State, may come. This could place Israel in a precarious position of both defending itself and not being swallowed in regional conflict.

Building on Trust: Why the US Isn't Getting Very Far in Israel

Israel and Hamas are, by all accounts, at war in Gaza. US Secretary of State John Kerry is in the Middle East, frantically working with Israelis and Egyptians to nail down some sort of halt to hostilities, since the United States cannot work directly with Hamas - a designated terrorist organization. He's not getting very far and it's not entirely surprising. 

(Source: Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images via The National Post)

Kerry next travels to France, where anti-Semitic rioting has flared in recent days, to attempt to gain support for a ceasefire among European leaders. Earlier, the Israeli cabinet rejected Kerry's ceasefire proposal, which the US has since downplayed as a disagreement on final wording - that no proposal was formally put forth. Part of that rejection involves Israel asserting its objective to continue to destroy tunnels during any ongoing ceasefire. Nonetheless, Israel and Hamas have agreed to a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire, beginning at 8 AM local time.

It's not shocking to see Israel and the US disagree lately; there's very little substance to the US-Israel relationship under the Obama administration. In fact, it could be argued that there's likely no trust at all among leadership in the two countries. Just this past week, Kerry was caught criticizing the Israeli operation in Gaza. In backtracking, Kerry could only come up with the something trite: "...war is tough. We defend Israel's right to do what it is doing..." Well, of course. In 2011, at the G20 meeting, President Obama was also caught making an offhand remark about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, suggesting that he was "fed up with him" and perhaps even agreeing with then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Netanyahu was a liar. Earlier in 2011, Obama rebuffed meeting Netanyahu in the US, a surprise given the close US-Israel relationship in the past. The two have met as recently as this past March, with Netanyahu clearly stating that he would do nothing that would hinder Israeli national security. The two have spent more time attempting to lecture one another than to truly discuss options for peace.

The nonexistence of any legitimate relationship clearly undermines cooperative efforts to bring peace to the region. The damage done to the relationship may prove to solely be superficial - something a change in leadership on either side (or likely both sides) may correct. At the same time, the failure to secure any significant gains, not only in Israel, but in the greater Middle East as a whole, is a legacy that the Obama administration does not desire. In addition to the current Israeli-Hamas war, there are wars, on one level or another, in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Mali and political strife in Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Bahrain, and Iran (I'm sure I missed some). The toll in Syria alone may be as high as 160,000, not something that history or the administration can (continue to) easily brush aside.

The only options that remain during Obama's final few years in office are to make significant and serious decisions. The Washington Post suggests disarming Hamas; after all, how many political parties typically have a military wing (though it is important to note that some have in the past, including Israeli ones). Such bold action will not be easy, but any easy solutions have long since passed. It is time to make difficult decisions that bring change. Only with change can there be peace.

Egypt Closing Tunnels to Gaza

The ouster of Egypt's Mohammed Morsi by military coup (or military action in support of popular democratic demand....) has led to an interesting and possibly volatile development in Gaza.

For the past six years, the Egypt-Gaza border crossing has ebbed and flowed from the border crossing blockade under Mubarak to a slightly freer flow of people under the interim military government and Morsi.  Even during Morsi's short-lived rule, however, the border crossing was limited.  For example, the Morsi government limited the border crossing to humanitarian efforts.

While the official border crossing has remained highly restrictive, the unofficial border crossing has thrived.  Specifically, a complex network of hundreds of tunnels connect Gaza to Egypt; these tunnels are the lifeblood of the Hamas-controlled territory's economy.  For example, fuel and building supplies (primarily steel, cement, and gravel) flow into Gaza through the tunnels.  Basic goods, such as flour, sugar, rice, and fish also enter Gaza primarily through the tunnels.  Of course, the human travel through the tunnels is also a simple way to skirt official attention.  Finally, of course, weapons flow through the tunnels.

Of course, all this has changed with Morsi's ouster (although, even during Morsi's rule, in February 2013 the military flooded numerous tunnels as a likely response to the use of those tunnels by militants fighting Egyptian forces in the Sinai).  First, the Egyptian military cracked down on tunnel traffic.  Now, by way of demolition and the potential establishment of a "buffer zone" no-man's land, Egypt may be closing off access to the tunnels for good.  While the weapons help support Hamas rule, it may in fact be the economic effects of the tunnels' closure that hurts Hamas the most.  Hamas taxes the goods flowing through the tunnels; these revenues constitute an estimated 40% of all government revenue and allow Hamas to keep 45,000 civil servants on the payroll.  The loss of these vital taxes could thus impede the ability of Hamas to secure support through the age-old political tactic: patronage.

Furthermore, the fuel and goods shortages have led to price spikes -- spikes that were, in fact, documented late in the Morsi regime, as that regime began the crackdown that has intensified in the wake of Morsi's ouster.  Whether the twofold revenue loss and price spikes will erode support for Hamas in Gaza, only time will tell.


Pictures from inside the tunnels:
http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1931308_1969736,00.html
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/01/pics-inside-the-2/

Hamas & Fatah to Meet, Rehash Disagreements

Hamas and Fatah, leaders of the governments in Gaza and the West Bank respectively, have apparently agreed to meet in Cairo under the mediation of Egypt's president, Mohammed Morsi. Although ties have warmed of late, Hamas and Fatah remain polar opposites in their approach toward sovereignty,  independence, and Israel. While Hamas refuses to renounce violence or acknowledge Israel's right to exist, Fatah, through the PA, has already engaged Israel for decades and has pushed for recognition through the United Nations. Unfortunately, Fatah's engagement with Israel has not proved beneficial, with many now viewing Fatah as a mere pawn and Hamas as the voice of the Palestinians. Nonetheless, reconciliation can have many benefits, including a possible return to the peace process. As in any process, two significant roadblocks exist: time and trust. Hamas and Fatah have been enemies not only politically, but also on the street. To imagine their peaceful coexistence under the current framework is difficult. Trust will be difficult to build quickly, and time is short, and yet moves ever slowly in the Middle East. Changes in government, policy, and even public opinion in both other Arab countries (including Egypt itself) and Israel can play havoc on the differences that exist between Hamas and Fatah, differences that may not be resolved in time for reconciliation. A two-state solution with contested multi-party democracy in the Levant may continue to be a dream as disagreements continue to resurface.

Gaza: An Opportunity for Israeli-Egyptian Cooperation?

The truth is that neither Egypt nor Israel is particularly pleased with the long-term development of Gaza since Israeli disengagement and less so since Hamas took control. Hamas' access to third-party support, financial and otherwise, outside of its neighbors, largely from Iran, gives it significant leverage to develop activities aimed at destabilizing both. With little to no aboveboard economic activity, Gaza's legitimate ties to its neighbors are nothing more than lines in the sand.

Last week, a brazen attack by militants left 16 Egyptian soldiers dead near the border crossing with Rafah. The goal, seemingly to create security problems for both neighbors, is worrisome. While the attack was into Egypt, one vehicle was reportedly driven into Israel for nearly a mile before being destroyed. Egypt has since arrested several suspects, but it's not clear whether this will truly mitigate a growing problem of lawlessness in Sinai, promoted by Hamas and its supporters (even regional news outlets largely share this view). Nonetheless, the Rafah crossing is under constant attack, putting Egypt on the defensive. The border is not the only issue - the problem stems far into Sinai, as evidenced most recently by the attack on peacekeeping forces at its heart. Since Hamas controls the arms, as well as the smuggling tunnels, in Gaza, is there anyone else to blame for the "militant" attacks?

While it is easy to look at the glass half-empty - another security problem in the Middle East threatening to destabilize the region - it can also be seen half-full - an opportunity for two "new" partners (considering Egypt's recent political transition) to cooperate to secure their shared interests. Egypt and Israel have, in the past, cooperated on improving the Rafah crossing in order to benefit legitimate crossing and to mitigate militant operations. Perhaps it will be clearer now that increased cooperation is needed, to secure the border above the sand, destroy the tunnels beneath it, and even to reassert Egypt's presence in Sinai outside of its periphery.