Playing Politics at the United Nations

Earlier this month, Iran named Hamid Aboutalebi as its United Nations ambassador, a move that quickly strained US-Iran relations that had been slowly thawing. It is alleged that Aboutalebi was intimately part of the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran, which spiraled into a 444-day hostage crisis. Aboutalebi claims he was merely a translator; however, this role does not detract his contribution to the hostage-takers objectives. Regardless of his specific role or duties, Aboutalebi participated, which makes his appointment instantly controversial and instantly problematic.

With the United Nations building in New York, it is the US who issues visas to ambassadors and staff. There doesn't seem to be a record of an ambassador being denied a visa previously, although lower-level staff have been denied and other applications have been rescinded or plans have changed. One of the higher profile incidents was Yasser Arafat being denied a visa to speak at the UN in 1998. The 1947 agreement establishing the United Nations headquarters in New York requires the US to open travel for UN purposes. However, the US has maintained its right to restrict access nonetheless, and has established the precedents that would allow it to do so. No country has previously elected to test the limits of the agreement or the repercussions.

The US has taken the first step by denying the visa for Aboutalebi on the tail of a Congressional bill that would deny Aboutalebi on national security grounds. At the same time, Iran is standing its ground and refusing to select another ambassador. Domestically, there is fairly strong consensus on the denial.

Internationally, the ramifications can be extensive. Aboutalebi, albeit a potentially minor participant, was still a participant in one of the most significant violations of diplomatic norms and laws of the twentieth century. To make a diplomatic case out of the incident, given his background, would almost be ironic. At the same time, negotiations about Iran's nuclear stores will be strained by this incident. There exists no win-win situation here - someone will need to back down.

Pakistan's Quagmire an International Concern

Another day, another disquieting incident in Pakistan, home of possibly the world's most dangerous nuclear weapons program. Militants attacked a bus of students from a women's university, and then proceeded to attack the hospital where survivors were being treated. Although this attack garnered little attention outside of minor news blurbs, it included all the facets that Western nations are concerned about: homegrown terrorism, suicide bombers, a coordinated attack, and significant civilian casualties. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a group with links to al-Qaeda.

As with each attack, international concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal surface. Can Pakistan, a country with deep internal divisions, keep itself together? This attack, on the very fundamental elements of reform Pakistan has struggled with - women's rights - comes on the heels of and as a test to the newly elected government of Nawaz Sharif.

Sharif, a political mainstay of Pakistani politics (this is his third term), has a slew of election promises to uphold. While improving the economy will be quite a challenge on the heels of an accelerating US withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan, ending drone strikes in a country that reels from the majority of American targets will be an even more daunting task. Pakistan has been the center of US operations and there is little evidence to suggest that even as the physical American presence on the ground decreases, the threat of the US military will as well.

Attacks like the one this past week are exactly why. A country with fundamentalist, militant opposition, an active military, and nuclear weapons, is a dangerous mix. And concerns nations far removed from the subcontinental neighborhood. It wouldn't be such bad idea if these stories made more than a dent in the international news blotter.

When do we start helping Israel with the Middle East's dirty work?

In 1981, Israeli planes bombed and destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor just south of Baghdad. The operation was vehemently lambasted by the United Nations. At the same time, many believe that the attack set back a developing nuclear weapons program by at least a decade. This not to say that work on weapons of mass destruction halted entirely after the attack, but that efforts to meet those ends were harmed. Even the expansion of those efforts and their hidden nature did not, it seems, bring Iraq back to where it would have been had the reactor remained.

More than 20 years later, in 2007, Israeli commandos and planes destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria. Reaction, this time around, was softer with largely silence throughout the Middle East. Reports quickly confirmed that the destroyed facility was an undeclared nuclear reactor with possible military implications.

Come to 2012, and the question of Iranian reactors lingers. Israel has been repeatedly asked to back off and avoid repeating the 1981 and 2007 incidents. It seems though, that patience is wearing thin. For Israel, the question is not of politics, or even military ability; the question is existential. Will the Israelis carry out a third strike on a nuclear reactor in the Middle East in (just about) 30 years?

This time around, the environment is different. Calculations are more complex. The Israeli public is arguably more comfortable with the international environment and more wary of a war with a (relative) neighbor, or at least one with the missile capacity to rock Israeli cities and towns.

The US, the West, and the UN, have tiptoed around the issue of Iranian nuclear development for years. Perhaps it is time we draw a hard line and help our supposed ally, thereby possibly also avoiding an all-out conflict that could drag in other neighbors, including those with fledgling democratic reforms.