Turkey Joins Fight Against ISIS... and Possibly Kurds

Summary
The big news in counter-terrorism circles this week was that Turkey was becoming actively involved in the fight against ISIS.  In part a response to an ISIS suicide bombing on July 20th, 2015, Turkish support will include launching its own airstrikes.  More importantly, perhaps, Turkey will permit the United States to launch airstrikes from the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey.  Although prompted by an ISIS suicide bombing, Turkey's military action in the region will likely include heavy doses of anti-Kurdish activity against both Syrian and Turkish Kurds.

Brief Background
Of course, Turkey's interest in the Syrian civil war has never been straightforward.  The chief threat to Turkey's security over the past several decades has been the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group in Turkey classified as a terrorist organization by NATO and the U.S.  Like the Kurdish populations in Iraq and Syria, the PKK has attempted to create an independent Kurdish state in the region.  Turkey has always opposed these efforts but still entered into a cease-fire with the PKK in spring 2013.

In December 2014, meanwhile, the Turkish parliament authorized military action against ISIS.  At the time, it was not clear if Turkey would take immediate action against ISIS.  Turkey has been committed to toppling Bashar al-Assad and military action against ISIS could effectively keep Assad in power.

Turkish soldiers patrol the border near Syria.  (Source: Wall Street Journal)

Fast forward to early July, 2015.  Kurdish successes against ISIS in northern Syria led to the Syrian Kurdish group Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) controlling a 250-mile continuous area along the Syria-Turkey border.  Turkey did not appreciate this development, given PYD's real or perceived friendliness toward PKK.  These Kurdish gains led analysts to speculate that Turkey will join the fight in Syria -- not necessarily to topple Assad or defeat ISIS, but to prevent the development of a Kurdish proto-state.

Turkey's intervention in Syria turned from speculative to real this week following Monday's suicide bombing by ISIS in the Turkish border town of Suruc that killed 32 and injured more than 100.  On Thursday, Turkey and the United States reached an agreement in which the U.S. can use Turkey's Incirlik Air Base to launch strikes against ISIS.  On Friday and Saturday, Turkey launched strikes against ISIS in Syria but also against multiple PKK facilities in northern Iraq.

Analysis
Turkey has been uneasy about entering the Syrian civil war for multiple reasons.  While it is certainly anti-ISIS, Turkey does not want to empower Assad or the PYD and accordingly has been reluctant to enter the fray.  In short, it recognizes the very real consequences of creating a power vacuum next door.  Turkey's interests in the region transcend borders.  Indeed, Turkey's strike against PKK in Iraq's Kurdistan region is an indication that it will not be deterred by national boundaries.

Of course, while Turkey has been on the sidelines, other groups have been making advances.  Some of the most effective strikes against ISIS have been by the Peshmerga in Iraq and the PYD in Syria.  The Peshmerga's successes in a string of Iraqi military setbacks once again raised talks of a possible push for a Kurdish state.  In Syria, PYD's ability to control a continuous region has made Turkey fearful of a Kurdish-controlled region on its border.  Syrian rebels have made advances as well, though not enough to suggest they're anywhere near the most powerful force in the region.

Turkey may still be looking to hedge its bets -- hence its decision to let the U.S. use its base for U.S. air strikes.  The ISIS suicide bombing in Suruc certainly spurred Turkey into action; it needs to both actually protect its people and also be publicly seen doing so.  On the other hand, Turkey's decision to strike PKK strongholds at the same time as ISIS is an indication that it does not view the battlefront in simple terms of pro- and anti-ISIS groups.  Rather, it recognizes multiple actors that represent threats to its national security and is trying to act on multiple fronts.  This is not unlike the initial U.S. strikes in Syria, where the U.S. launched strikes against al Nusra (al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria) in addition to ISIS.  As yet another country becomes involved in Syria's civil war and the multi-state effort to destroy ISIS, the futures of Syria, Iraq, Kurdish independence movements, and ISIS all remain unclear.  If Kurdish movements continue to fight ISIS and control territory effectively, the Kurdish people of these various states will clamor even more for an independent state.  Syria and Iraq are still struggling to hold artificial states together, and those struggles will likely continue for the next several years without any clear resolution.  While this will result in countless more tragic deaths, there is nothing the U.S. can do to impose its will on the people of these countries.  It will find its use of military force most effective where its national security needs intersect with local security concerns.  ISIS currently provides a common enemy, but even military defeat of ISIS will not bring stability to a region that rarely knows peace.  In Iraq, at least, the fight against ISIS could be transformative if Sunnis had something worth fighting for.  In Syria, the fight against ISIS may benefit Assad in the short term (a consequence Turkey has long recognized).  This may be a necessary consequence, even if it's something the U.S. does not have to accept in the long-term.

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Update, 7/27/15 at 9:40am: On Monday, 7/27/15, reports emerged that Turkey was already launching strikes against Syrian Kurds.  Turkey denied that the Syrian Kurds were a target of their ongoing military operations.

Stopping Home-grown Radicalization in the Internet Age

One of our recent posts addresses the need to develop a better geo-political strategy in Iraq if one hopes to build real and lasting Sunni support in the fight against ISIS.  The threat posed by Islamic extremists, however, is not limited to the foreign battlefield.  Indeed, recent events in the U.S. and Europe have shown the potential to radicalize persons who move about freely in the U.S. or Europe.  ISIS is a media-savvy organization and, indeed, its members often spend countless hours trying to isolate and subsequently convert or radicalize Westerners.

An American in her 20s speaks with the New York Times about ISIS recruitment and conversion efforts (Source: New York Times)

ISIS is not the first Islamic terror organization to utilize the Internet to radicalize Westerners, nor will it be the last.  Indeed, this was already a well-established phenomenon by the time ISIS came on the scene.  The most prominent example was Anwar al-Awlaki, the U.S.-Yemeni dual citizen who was a senior member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) before being killed by a U.S. drone strike.  Al-Awlaki wrote on a blog, posted YouTube videos, wrote for al Qaeda's Inspire magazine, and directly communicated with individuals online, as part of AQAP recruitment and radicalization efforts.  For example, he communicated with Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan online prior to Hassan's actions; recruited the Christmas day "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in person and online; and inspired Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad's attempted car bombing in 2010.  Al-Awlaki, in a sense, paved the way for the current wave of online radicalization that includes the ISIS and/or al Qaeda-inspired Charlie Hebdo attack and the ISIS-inspired failed attack at a Mohammed cartoon contest in Texas this past May.

Internet radicalization -- either by direct communication with vulnerable persons in Western countries or by the ability of Islamic terror's message to inspire lone wolf attacks -- will continue to present a security challenge to Western countries for years to come.  This security challenge is self-apparent: it is much more difficult for a terrorist group to coordinate attacks on U.S. soil than it is for a lone-wolf U.S. citizen radicalized by such a group to carry out an attack.  This begs the question: how do we stop home-grown radicalization?

Part of the solution is tracking the communications.  This has been a touchy political subject in the United States ever since Edward Snowden leaked details of NSA data collection programs to journalists.  Still, data collected in accordance with the 2008 FISA amendments (not the Patriot Act-based surveillance program, which did not specifically authorize bulk data collection and which was ruled unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) led to, among other things, the tracking of emails by an Albanian who sent money to a Pakistani terror group and ultimately was detained trying to travel to Pakistan.  The legality of the 2008 FISA amendments will continue to be litigated even as the U.S. starts conducting its surveillance differently in accordance with the 2015 "FREEDOM Act."

Another part of the solution is stopping the radicalization itself at its roots.  Farah Pandith, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies with years of experience in the National Security Council and the State Department, strongly supports outreach efforts to counter the narrative ISIS and other Islamic extremists are presenting online:

Their narrative pits a monolithic Muslim “us” against a non-Muslim “them,” validating and valorizing the “us” under the veil of religion and purpose. Confronted by this narrative, some Muslim millennials see martyrdom as an attractive job description. Others simply support the extremist team by sporting the bumper sticker, wearing the colors; they’ll alter the cultural landscape so that everyone around them accepts extremism as the norm. 

Yes, we’re waging a military war against ISIS—a war we must win. But ISIS can’t have an army if it lacks recruits. Behind its growing physical army is a virtual army. A viable long-term strategy will devote itself to vanquishing both armies by countering the spread of the underlying ideology.

Or, put more succinctly, she notes that millennial Muslims are "having a crisis of identity [and] . . .[w]e have not flooded the marketplace with alternative narratives to move their minds."

Such efforts at combating radicalization will not be easy to quantify, and indeed, will not have such readily-identifiable benchmarks as cities recaptured or terrorists killed or detained.  However, such efforts may be just as necessary in preventing domestic terror attacks. 

Boko Haram: A New Beginning?

Boko Haram, whose name loosely translates to "Western education is a sin," has been operating in Nigeria since the early 2000's. It was not designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States Department of State until 2013, although there was likely sufficient evidence to make the designation earlier. During those ten years, as Boko Haram and its influence grew, it was sometimes difficult to grasp the organization's potential longevity, though time itself should have been an indicating factor over the years.

(Boko Haram attacks, BBC)

This week, Boko Haram leaders pledged allegiance to ISIS, a move that could reflect a new beginning for the terrorist group. Evidence that ISIS has been influencing Boko Haram has existed for the past few months. It could also simply demonstrate the reach and dominance of ISIS. All in all, the full impact of this 'bayat' are not entirely clear. Increased coordination between different organizations is certainly of concern, reminding nations of similar coordination under the al-Qaeda umbrella. At the same time, Boko Haram could simply be jumping on the ISIS bandwagon. 

A Fundamentalist Divide: Al Qaeda Separates Itself from ISIL

It seems you can be "too much," even for al Qaeda. On Monday, the terrorist group formally cut off its relationship with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). This declaration follows al Qaeda's demand that ISIL remain separate from the al Nusra Front, al Qaeda's branch in Syria, which ISIL has attempted to consolidate into itself over the past year. In fact, it is apparent that ISIL and al Qaeda have been at odds for several years, dating to the mid 2000s. While it is unlikely that the two groups will become equal rivals, it is, at the same time, clear that they may view themselves that way in the near future. In the ongoing infighting of Syria's opposition forces, al Qaeda has propped up its links to the al Nusra Front and ISIL signed a truce with Suqour al Sham. Consolidation in the region could mean less infighting, but could also lead to a severely split opposition, making it more difficult for outside powers to support either side.

(Map of ISIL operations, Source: Red24)

Critically, al Qaeda's declaration may reflect which battle it now envisions as more winnable - Syria or Iraq. While it has made occasional gains in Iraq, al Qaeda forces, by and large, have been continually beaten back. Moreover, the continued presence of American troops and related support hinder operations in Iraq. Syria, meanwhile, has limited Western interference while it collapses - The Economist's "The Death of a Country" piece ran nearly a year ago - leaving a potential vacuum of power in all but al Assad's western strongholds. In the end, this could make Syria's near term future only more violent, a fact that is difficult to imagine given the United Nations' February 4 report detailing the violence there today.