Earlier this month, Iran named Hamid Aboutalebi as its United Nations ambassador, a move that quickly strained US-Iran relations that had been slowly thawing. It is alleged that Aboutalebi was intimately part of the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran, which spiraled into a 444-day hostage crisis. Aboutalebi claims he was merely a translator; however, this role does not detract his contribution to the hostage-takers objectives. Regardless of his specific role or duties, Aboutalebi participated, which makes his appointment instantly controversial and instantly problematic.
With the United Nations building in New York, it is the US who issues visas to ambassadors and staff. There doesn't seem to be a record of an ambassador being denied a visa previously, although lower-level staff have been denied and other applications have been rescinded or plans have changed. One of the higher profile incidents was Yasser Arafat being denied a visa to speak at the UN in 1998. The 1947 agreement establishing the United Nations headquarters in New York requires the US to open travel for UN purposes. However, the US has maintained its right to restrict access nonetheless, and has established the precedents that would allow it to do so. No country has previously elected to test the limits of the agreement or the repercussions.
The US has taken the first step by denying the visa for Aboutalebi on the tail of a Congressional bill that would deny Aboutalebi on national security grounds. At the same time, Iran is standing its ground and refusing to select another ambassador. Domestically, there is fairly strong consensus on the denial.
Internationally, the ramifications can be extensive. Aboutalebi, albeit a potentially minor participant, was still a participant in one of the most significant violations of diplomatic norms and laws of the twentieth century. To make a diplomatic case out of the incident, given his background, would almost be ironic. At the same time, negotiations about Iran's nuclear stores will be strained by this incident. There exists no win-win situation here - someone will need to back down.
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Monday, April 14, 2014
Wednesday, January 8, 2014
Unrest in al-Anbar and Iraq's Newest Crisis
You may have heard a tiny bit of news streaming out of Iraq this week (more important than the polar vortex) - there is trouble west of Baghdad. What kind of trouble? A group of insurgents, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), conveniently connected to al-Qaeda, took control of Ramadi and Fallujah in the al-Anbar province. Though the connections are tenuous and still not entirely clear, ISIL is also at the forefront of the rebellion in Syria. How far west of Baghdad? Pretty close - say 40 miles or so. Here is a map for reference to show Fallujah proximity to Baghdad:
The battles for Ramadi and Fallujah are remembered as some of the most entrenched, violent, and deadly of the Iraq War. That makes the towns not only strategic, falling on the road to Baghdad, but also symbolic.
Nations with deep interest in what happens in Iraq are not quite sure what to do. The United States has ruled out sending ground forces. The United Kingdom has similarly indicated that it would not send troops. Even Iran refused the idea of sending troops. All are willing to send aid to Iraq - military aid. In fact, the US is stepping up military shipments in an attempt to support the Iraqi government and avoid fighting from spreading much further. If there's a war brewing, it always helps to just arm at least someone with more weapons and better ones too.
Nonetheless, beating back the insurgents militarily presents a hypocritical dilemma both for Iraqi and American leadership, who have stood their ground on neighboring Syria, expressing the need for political rather than military solutions. Were Iraq to forego political options and resort to military ones solely, it would surely lose its legitimacy in criticizing Syria's response. It would also not look great for the United States, who is therefore simultaneously pushing for Iraq to employ political pressures through Sunni moderates.
Al-Maliki, meanwhile, is pretty much just throwing things out there to see what sticks. Although locals would surely prefer good governance and open business, tribal and religious distrust exist between those in al-Anbar and al-Maliki's Shia-led central government. For example, al-Maliki ordered Iraqi troops to not strike neighborhoods in Fallujah. Well, "neighborhoods" is certainly not easy to define, while it also provides insurgent troops clear cover and complicates urban warfare immensely. He has also urged residents to expel the insurgents, though without clarifying how they should do so, or why they should stick it out with the central government. Though these may be simply placeholder statements to stave off military options while political ones are attempted, they don't come off as too impressive.
Al-Qaeda has a vested interest in destabilizing foreign influence and bringing territory under its control, but al-Qaeda-backed insurgents don't just show up in town and everyone else suddenly becomes anti-government. There is a significant backstory here, centering on the potential consolidation of power by Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki, who is Shia, and the central government's seeming mistreatment of Sunnis. The Sunni-Shia rift goes back ages, but recent history reflects the dominance by the Sunni minority of the Shia majority under the reign of Saddam Hussein (who was Sunni). Even more recently, al-Maliki's arrest of his Sunni vice president in 2011, and his attempted arrest of a Sunni member of parliament and removal of protest camps in al-Anbar in late 2013 directly contributed to the current crisis.
What happens now? A military conflict is inevitable, regardless of the acrid political aftertaste for Iraq and the United States. It is hopeful, though, that it will be short-lived. What is critical is that Iraq's Shia-led government begin to pay better attention and give greater care to its Sunni minority. It's hard to imagine, but democracy is not a zero-sum game and win-win results are possible. The long-term solution is all-but political and that would involve compromise with various factions and the extensive inclusion of moderates. Al-Maliki is right in encouraging the citizens to expel the insurgents, but words must be tied to actions, and the government's efforts must be tied to explaining why it would be to the benefit of those in al-Anbar to be pro-government rather than anti-government.
Fallujah location (Source: Wikipedia)
The battles for Ramadi and Fallujah are remembered as some of the most entrenched, violent, and deadly of the Iraq War. That makes the towns not only strategic, falling on the road to Baghdad, but also symbolic.
Nations with deep interest in what happens in Iraq are not quite sure what to do. The United States has ruled out sending ground forces. The United Kingdom has similarly indicated that it would not send troops. Even Iran refused the idea of sending troops. All are willing to send aid to Iraq - military aid. In fact, the US is stepping up military shipments in an attempt to support the Iraqi government and avoid fighting from spreading much further. If there's a war brewing, it always helps to just arm at least someone with more weapons and better ones too.
Nonetheless, beating back the insurgents militarily presents a hypocritical dilemma both for Iraqi and American leadership, who have stood their ground on neighboring Syria, expressing the need for political rather than military solutions. Were Iraq to forego political options and resort to military ones solely, it would surely lose its legitimacy in criticizing Syria's response. It would also not look great for the United States, who is therefore simultaneously pushing for Iraq to employ political pressures through Sunni moderates.
Al-Maliki, meanwhile, is pretty much just throwing things out there to see what sticks. Although locals would surely prefer good governance and open business, tribal and religious distrust exist between those in al-Anbar and al-Maliki's Shia-led central government. For example, al-Maliki ordered Iraqi troops to not strike neighborhoods in Fallujah. Well, "neighborhoods" is certainly not easy to define, while it also provides insurgent troops clear cover and complicates urban warfare immensely. He has also urged residents to expel the insurgents, though without clarifying how they should do so, or why they should stick it out with the central government. Though these may be simply placeholder statements to stave off military options while political ones are attempted, they don't come off as too impressive.
Al-Qaeda has a vested interest in destabilizing foreign influence and bringing territory under its control, but al-Qaeda-backed insurgents don't just show up in town and everyone else suddenly becomes anti-government. There is a significant backstory here, centering on the potential consolidation of power by Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki, who is Shia, and the central government's seeming mistreatment of Sunnis. The Sunni-Shia rift goes back ages, but recent history reflects the dominance by the Sunni minority of the Shia majority under the reign of Saddam Hussein (who was Sunni). Even more recently, al-Maliki's arrest of his Sunni vice president in 2011, and his attempted arrest of a Sunni member of parliament and removal of protest camps in al-Anbar in late 2013 directly contributed to the current crisis.
What happens now? A military conflict is inevitable, regardless of the acrid political aftertaste for Iraq and the United States. It is hopeful, though, that it will be short-lived. What is critical is that Iraq's Shia-led government begin to pay better attention and give greater care to its Sunni minority. It's hard to imagine, but democracy is not a zero-sum game and win-win results are possible. The long-term solution is all-but political and that would involve compromise with various factions and the extensive inclusion of moderates. Al-Maliki is right in encouraging the citizens to expel the insurgents, but words must be tied to actions, and the government's efforts must be tied to explaining why it would be to the benefit of those in al-Anbar to be pro-government rather than anti-government.
Wednesday, August 29, 2012
The Grass Isn't Always Greener on the Other Side
Revolutions, in all their forms, rarely setup a country to be exactly what the revolutionaries wanted it to be. Take for example how Iran emerged out of its 1979 revolution (theocratic), or how Russia has developed following the "transfer of power" from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev (dictatorial). Egypt is no outlier to the post-revolutionary balancing act wherein a country seeks to redefine itself on the international stage and appease the populace who clamored for revolution.
In the West, it is therefore troubling that one of the first trips by Egypt's new President, Mohammed Morsi, is to China and Iran. In China, Morsi will focus on business and development. These are important objectives: China is sought after as an alternative to Western influence throughout the world and Egypt is in dire need of an economic kindling in order to validate the revolution. In Iran, he will attend the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. Morsi will not visit the United States until the upcoming United Nations meeting.
This trip scheduling may be just logistics, but it will also be seen as a poor choice in the West (Thomas Friedman in particular doesn't like it). The United States is one of the largest aid donors to Egypt and no friend of Tehran's. At the same time, relations with China remain cool, and could head for a downturn if an incoming American president labels China a currency manipulator. Therefore it is troubling that Morsi chose to visit Tehran in person - which no Egyptian president has done since its 1979 treaty with Israel - rather than send a deputy or via alternative diplomatic means.
Morsi is clearly attempting to solidify a position as a moderate. The question everyone wants to know the answer to is: Is he one? At the same time as his trip abroad began, Morsi, albeit in somewhat vague terms, reaffirmed Egypt's position to the treaty with Israel as well as its terms regarding the Egyptian military's presence in the Sinai. One thing to remember is that eventually, everyone is aligned (even if you are aligned with the non-aligned) and the grass isn't always greener on that other side. It might behoove Mr. Morsi to consider not only where a significant amount of Egyptian aid comes from, but also which countries may most benefit the business, development, and political prospects of Egypt for years to come.
In the West, it is therefore troubling that one of the first trips by Egypt's new President, Mohammed Morsi, is to China and Iran. In China, Morsi will focus on business and development. These are important objectives: China is sought after as an alternative to Western influence throughout the world and Egypt is in dire need of an economic kindling in order to validate the revolution. In Iran, he will attend the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. Morsi will not visit the United States until the upcoming United Nations meeting.
This trip scheduling may be just logistics, but it will also be seen as a poor choice in the West (Thomas Friedman in particular doesn't like it). The United States is one of the largest aid donors to Egypt and no friend of Tehran's. At the same time, relations with China remain cool, and could head for a downturn if an incoming American president labels China a currency manipulator. Therefore it is troubling that Morsi chose to visit Tehran in person - which no Egyptian president has done since its 1979 treaty with Israel - rather than send a deputy or via alternative diplomatic means.
Morsi is clearly attempting to solidify a position as a moderate. The question everyone wants to know the answer to is: Is he one? At the same time as his trip abroad began, Morsi, albeit in somewhat vague terms, reaffirmed Egypt's position to the treaty with Israel as well as its terms regarding the Egyptian military's presence in the Sinai. One thing to remember is that eventually, everyone is aligned (even if you are aligned with the non-aligned) and the grass isn't always greener on that other side. It might behoove Mr. Morsi to consider not only where a significant amount of Egyptian aid comes from, but also which countries may most benefit the business, development, and political prospects of Egypt for years to come.
Monday, August 13, 2012
When do we start helping Israel with the Middle East's dirty work?
In 1981, Israeli planes bombed and destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor just south of Baghdad. The operation was vehemently lambasted by the United Nations. At the same time, many believe that the attack set back a developing nuclear weapons program by at least a decade. This not to say that work on weapons of mass destruction halted entirely after the attack, but that efforts to meet those ends were harmed. Even the expansion of those efforts and their hidden nature did not, it seems, bring Iraq back to where it would have been had the reactor remained.
More than 20 years later, in 2007, Israeli commandos and planes destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria. Reaction, this time around, was softer with largely silence throughout the Middle East. Reports quickly confirmed that the destroyed facility was an undeclared nuclear reactor with possible military implications.
Come to 2012, and the question of Iranian reactors lingers. Israel has been repeatedly asked to back off and avoid repeating the 1981 and 2007 incidents. It seems though, that patience is wearing thin. For Israel, the question is not of politics, or even military ability; the question is existential. Will the Israelis carry out a third strike on a nuclear reactor in the Middle East in (just about) 30 years?
This time around, the environment is different. Calculations are more complex. The Israeli public is arguably more comfortable with the international environment and more wary of a war with a (relative) neighbor, or at least one with the missile capacity to rock Israeli cities and towns.
The US, the West, and the UN, have tiptoed around the issue of Iranian nuclear development for years. Perhaps it is time we draw a hard line and help our supposed ally, thereby possibly also avoiding an all-out conflict that could drag in other neighbors, including those with fledgling democratic reforms.
More than 20 years later, in 2007, Israeli commandos and planes destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria. Reaction, this time around, was softer with largely silence throughout the Middle East. Reports quickly confirmed that the destroyed facility was an undeclared nuclear reactor with possible military implications.
Come to 2012, and the question of Iranian reactors lingers. Israel has been repeatedly asked to back off and avoid repeating the 1981 and 2007 incidents. It seems though, that patience is wearing thin. For Israel, the question is not of politics, or even military ability; the question is existential. Will the Israelis carry out a third strike on a nuclear reactor in the Middle East in (just about) 30 years?
This time around, the environment is different. Calculations are more complex. The Israeli public is arguably more comfortable with the international environment and more wary of a war with a (relative) neighbor, or at least one with the missile capacity to rock Israeli cities and towns.
The US, the West, and the UN, have tiptoed around the issue of Iranian nuclear development for years. Perhaps it is time we draw a hard line and help our supposed ally, thereby possibly also avoiding an all-out conflict that could drag in other neighbors, including those with fledgling democratic reforms.
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