Unreliable Energy Focus: Europe's Natural Gas Dreams

Italian energy giant Eni announced today that it has discovered a supergiant gas field in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Egypt. The gas field may surpass the South Pars / North Dome field in the Persian Gulf, which is currently the largest in the world. The time it will take to develop the field will depend on the field's exact geology as well as the resources available. It will also depend on Egypt's near-term stability.

While natural gas near Egypt will greatly support the rising demand by Egypt's growing population, there is likely also another nearby customer interested in natural gas and willing to pay a premium for it - Europe. Apart from Norway, every other European nation is a net energy importer, and natural gas is a particular contributor to that dependency (though not as much as crude oil). European natural gas needs (and the price Europeans are willing to pay for it) would likely far outstrip those of Egypt, though the thought of exporting natural gas that may be needed domestically could prove unpalatable in Egypt's unstable environment.

(Source: Mappery)

For years, Europe has sought to move away from its extreme natural gas dependency on Russia. That dependence has complicated foreign policy, even as Russia's own dependence on its energy reserves for export has proven to be a potential weakness. The new field in the Mediterranean may present Europe with such an opportunity to diversify and divest without much impact to its own economies.

First ISIS Detainee Turned Over to Iraqi Kurds for Trial

News broke late last week that ISIS detainee Nasrin As’ad Ibrahim (alias Umm Sayyaf) was handed over to the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq.  U.S. forces captured Umm Sayyaf in May during a raid in which her husband, Fathi ben Awn ben Jildi Murad al-Tunisi - a powerful ISIS leader involved in oil and gas development - was killed.  The Wall Street Journal reported that Umm Sayyaf "provided valuable insights into Islamic State’s financial operations and leaders" during questioning in the 3-month period she was detained by American forces.

In July, the Washington Post reported that federal prosecutors were preparing charges against Umm Sayyaf.  The Post also noted that "[a] prosecution of Umm Sayyaf for her suspected role in taking Mueller hostage would be the first publicly known FBI case involving an alleged senior figure in the Islamic State."   Reports indicate that the decision to transfer her to Iraq's Kurdish regional government, rather than bring her back to the United States to face charges, stemmed in part from the fact that Iraq does not extradite its citizens.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter speaks to reporters about the operation that led to Umm Sayyaf's capture (Source: WSJ)

This begs the question: what is the current status of U.S.-Iraqi extradition agreements?  This is not merely an academic question.  If the United States continues to conduct military operations against ISIS forces within Iraqi territory, will it be unable to bring ISIS terrorists to trial in the United States?  Once a prisoner is in the U.S., the U.S. has tools at its disposal to try him or her for material support of terrorism.  Specifically, 18 U.S. Code 2339A and 2339B criminalize the material support of terrorists and terrorist organizations.  Though not heavily publicized, the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Offices have been making domestic arrests for material support of terrorism -- often when an individual is at the airport on his way to Syria to join ISIS.  Moreover, the U.S. has jurisdiction over conduct violative of its "material support" statutes even when that conduct occurs outside of the geographic bounds of the United States.  For example, 2339B contains an entire "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" section that states there is jurisdiction for a material support of terrorist organizations offense if "after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States."  Thus, were Umm Sayyaf or another high-profile ISIS member captured and brought into the United States, the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office could charge and prosecute said ISIS member.

In order to get said ISIS member to the U.S., however, one might have to deal with the issue raised by the Iraqis in the present case: extradition.  The United States in fact has a still-existing extradition treaty with Iraq that dates back to 1936.  That treaty lays out the charges and procedures under which either party can request extradition of an individual located within the geographic bounds of the other party.  Reviewing the treaty, terrorism is not mentioned but "murder" and "kidnapping" are charges in which Umm Sayyaf may have been a participant and therefore potentially charged in the United States.  One hurdle, however: Article VIII of the treaty notes that "neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens."  Therefore, Iraq would not be bound to turn over an Iraqi citizen to face charges in the U.S., but nothing in the treaty prohibits Iraq from voluntarily doing so.  The treaty was used most recently in 2014, when Iraq extradited a U.S. citizen back to the U.S. to face fraud charges related to defense contracting.

However, there is another, newer hurdle to extradition: the Iraqi Constitution.  Article 21 of the Constitution of Iraq states that "[n]o Iraqi shall be surrendered to foreign entities and authorities."  This is a much more explicit prohibition that the more discretionary language of the 1936 extradition treaty.  As the U.S. continues to wage military operations against ISIS, one must wonder if the Umm Sayyaf incident has led American and Iraqi military and political personnel to discuss creative ways to comply with the Iraqi Constitution and also bring ISIS detainees to the United States.  What if, for example, a high-level ISIS commander known to have been involved in killing American citizens is captured by U.S. military personnel?  At some point, the American government would justifiably want to see certain ISIS detainees brought to the U.S. to face trial.  Indeed, the decision to hand Umm Sayyaf over to the Kurdish regional government rather than the central government may have reflected a reluctance to turn her over to the central Iraqi government (of course, it could have also been a strategic decision to avoid placing the Shiite government in charge of an important ISIS detainee).

One possible solution would be to establish clear U.S. custody of a detainee from the moment of capture.  If the Arabic version of the Iraqi Constitution is interpreted the same as the English version, that constitution prohibits the surrendering of Iraqi citizens to foreign authorities.  If Iraq never has custody over a detainee, the thinking would go, there would be no constitutional violation because Iraqi authorities never had custody of the detainee.  This is one way in which both governments could work together to help respect the integrity of the Iraqi Constitution while also aggressively pursuing ISIS terrorists.

Turkey Joins Fight Against ISIS... and Possibly Kurds

Summary
The big news in counter-terrorism circles this week was that Turkey was becoming actively involved in the fight against ISIS.  In part a response to an ISIS suicide bombing on July 20th, 2015, Turkish support will include launching its own airstrikes.  More importantly, perhaps, Turkey will permit the United States to launch airstrikes from the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey.  Although prompted by an ISIS suicide bombing, Turkey's military action in the region will likely include heavy doses of anti-Kurdish activity against both Syrian and Turkish Kurds.

Brief Background
Of course, Turkey's interest in the Syrian civil war has never been straightforward.  The chief threat to Turkey's security over the past several decades has been the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group in Turkey classified as a terrorist organization by NATO and the U.S.  Like the Kurdish populations in Iraq and Syria, the PKK has attempted to create an independent Kurdish state in the region.  Turkey has always opposed these efforts but still entered into a cease-fire with the PKK in spring 2013.

In December 2014, meanwhile, the Turkish parliament authorized military action against ISIS.  At the time, it was not clear if Turkey would take immediate action against ISIS.  Turkey has been committed to toppling Bashar al-Assad and military action against ISIS could effectively keep Assad in power.

Turkish soldiers patrol the border near Syria.  (Source: Wall Street Journal)

Fast forward to early July, 2015.  Kurdish successes against ISIS in northern Syria led to the Syrian Kurdish group Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) controlling a 250-mile continuous area along the Syria-Turkey border.  Turkey did not appreciate this development, given PYD's real or perceived friendliness toward PKK.  These Kurdish gains led analysts to speculate that Turkey will join the fight in Syria -- not necessarily to topple Assad or defeat ISIS, but to prevent the development of a Kurdish proto-state.

Turkey's intervention in Syria turned from speculative to real this week following Monday's suicide bombing by ISIS in the Turkish border town of Suruc that killed 32 and injured more than 100.  On Thursday, Turkey and the United States reached an agreement in which the U.S. can use Turkey's Incirlik Air Base to launch strikes against ISIS.  On Friday and Saturday, Turkey launched strikes against ISIS in Syria but also against multiple PKK facilities in northern Iraq.

Analysis
Turkey has been uneasy about entering the Syrian civil war for multiple reasons.  While it is certainly anti-ISIS, Turkey does not want to empower Assad or the PYD and accordingly has been reluctant to enter the fray.  In short, it recognizes the very real consequences of creating a power vacuum next door.  Turkey's interests in the region transcend borders.  Indeed, Turkey's strike against PKK in Iraq's Kurdistan region is an indication that it will not be deterred by national boundaries.

Of course, while Turkey has been on the sidelines, other groups have been making advances.  Some of the most effective strikes against ISIS have been by the Peshmerga in Iraq and the PYD in Syria.  The Peshmerga's successes in a string of Iraqi military setbacks once again raised talks of a possible push for a Kurdish state.  In Syria, PYD's ability to control a continuous region has made Turkey fearful of a Kurdish-controlled region on its border.  Syrian rebels have made advances as well, though not enough to suggest they're anywhere near the most powerful force in the region.

Turkey may still be looking to hedge its bets -- hence its decision to let the U.S. use its base for U.S. air strikes.  The ISIS suicide bombing in Suruc certainly spurred Turkey into action; it needs to both actually protect its people and also be publicly seen doing so.  On the other hand, Turkey's decision to strike PKK strongholds at the same time as ISIS is an indication that it does not view the battlefront in simple terms of pro- and anti-ISIS groups.  Rather, it recognizes multiple actors that represent threats to its national security and is trying to act on multiple fronts.  This is not unlike the initial U.S. strikes in Syria, where the U.S. launched strikes against al Nusra (al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria) in addition to ISIS.  As yet another country becomes involved in Syria's civil war and the multi-state effort to destroy ISIS, the futures of Syria, Iraq, Kurdish independence movements, and ISIS all remain unclear.  If Kurdish movements continue to fight ISIS and control territory effectively, the Kurdish people of these various states will clamor even more for an independent state.  Syria and Iraq are still struggling to hold artificial states together, and those struggles will likely continue for the next several years without any clear resolution.  While this will result in countless more tragic deaths, there is nothing the U.S. can do to impose its will on the people of these countries.  It will find its use of military force most effective where its national security needs intersect with local security concerns.  ISIS currently provides a common enemy, but even military defeat of ISIS will not bring stability to a region that rarely knows peace.  In Iraq, at least, the fight against ISIS could be transformative if Sunnis had something worth fighting for.  In Syria, the fight against ISIS may benefit Assad in the short term (a consequence Turkey has long recognized).  This may be a necessary consequence, even if it's something the U.S. does not have to accept in the long-term.

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Update, 7/27/15 at 9:40am: On Monday, 7/27/15, reports emerged that Turkey was already launching strikes against Syrian Kurds.  Turkey denied that the Syrian Kurds were a target of their ongoing military operations.

Rewriting History in Eastern Europe

On June 30, Russia's Prosecutor General began to investigate the legality of the Soviet Union's 1991 decision to recognize the declarations of independence of Lativa, Estonia, and Lithuania, the three Baltic countries now part of NATO. The question, raised by two members of the Duma, is whether the governmental body at the time had any constitutional power to make such a recognition. Although the Prosecutor General is required by law to investigate the inquiry, the premise itself is inflammatory.

(Source: Baltic Travel Services)

Naturally, all three countries instantly reacted with consternation and outrage, having fought to gain independence ever since annexation in 1939. Later on July 1, the Kremlin moved to distance itself from the review, calling it a formality, but also failing to fully condemn it. Unease has existed across former Soviet bloc nations following President Vladimir Putin's comments in 2014 asserting Russia's right to intervene on behalf of Russian-speaking populations in other countries, of which there are significant numbers in the Baltic states.

Overall, this may be a non-story, a request by extreme positions in the Duma blown out of proportion by media reports. The same could be done for statements or positions of an innumerable amount of politicians in the United States. On the other hand, given Russia's recent annexation of Crimea and the simultaneous abrogation of the 1954 transfer of that land from Russia to Ukraine, the request does carry more weight than simply nationalist rhetoric.

Stopping Home-grown Radicalization in the Internet Age

One of our recent posts addresses the need to develop a better geo-political strategy in Iraq if one hopes to build real and lasting Sunni support in the fight against ISIS.  The threat posed by Islamic extremists, however, is not limited to the foreign battlefield.  Indeed, recent events in the U.S. and Europe have shown the potential to radicalize persons who move about freely in the U.S. or Europe.  ISIS is a media-savvy organization and, indeed, its members often spend countless hours trying to isolate and subsequently convert or radicalize Westerners.

An American in her 20s speaks with the New York Times about ISIS recruitment and conversion efforts (Source: New York Times)

ISIS is not the first Islamic terror organization to utilize the Internet to radicalize Westerners, nor will it be the last.  Indeed, this was already a well-established phenomenon by the time ISIS came on the scene.  The most prominent example was Anwar al-Awlaki, the U.S.-Yemeni dual citizen who was a senior member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) before being killed by a U.S. drone strike.  Al-Awlaki wrote on a blog, posted YouTube videos, wrote for al Qaeda's Inspire magazine, and directly communicated with individuals online, as part of AQAP recruitment and radicalization efforts.  For example, he communicated with Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan online prior to Hassan's actions; recruited the Christmas day "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in person and online; and inspired Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad's attempted car bombing in 2010.  Al-Awlaki, in a sense, paved the way for the current wave of online radicalization that includes the ISIS and/or al Qaeda-inspired Charlie Hebdo attack and the ISIS-inspired failed attack at a Mohammed cartoon contest in Texas this past May.

Internet radicalization -- either by direct communication with vulnerable persons in Western countries or by the ability of Islamic terror's message to inspire lone wolf attacks -- will continue to present a security challenge to Western countries for years to come.  This security challenge is self-apparent: it is much more difficult for a terrorist group to coordinate attacks on U.S. soil than it is for a lone-wolf U.S. citizen radicalized by such a group to carry out an attack.  This begs the question: how do we stop home-grown radicalization?

Part of the solution is tracking the communications.  This has been a touchy political subject in the United States ever since Edward Snowden leaked details of NSA data collection programs to journalists.  Still, data collected in accordance with the 2008 FISA amendments (not the Patriot Act-based surveillance program, which did not specifically authorize bulk data collection and which was ruled unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) led to, among other things, the tracking of emails by an Albanian who sent money to a Pakistani terror group and ultimately was detained trying to travel to Pakistan.  The legality of the 2008 FISA amendments will continue to be litigated even as the U.S. starts conducting its surveillance differently in accordance with the 2015 "FREEDOM Act."

Another part of the solution is stopping the radicalization itself at its roots.  Farah Pandith, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies with years of experience in the National Security Council and the State Department, strongly supports outreach efforts to counter the narrative ISIS and other Islamic extremists are presenting online:

Their narrative pits a monolithic Muslim “us” against a non-Muslim “them,” validating and valorizing the “us” under the veil of religion and purpose. Confronted by this narrative, some Muslim millennials see martyrdom as an attractive job description. Others simply support the extremist team by sporting the bumper sticker, wearing the colors; they’ll alter the cultural landscape so that everyone around them accepts extremism as the norm. 

Yes, we’re waging a military war against ISIS—a war we must win. But ISIS can’t have an army if it lacks recruits. Behind its growing physical army is a virtual army. A viable long-term strategy will devote itself to vanquishing both armies by countering the spread of the underlying ideology.

Or, put more succinctly, she notes that millennial Muslims are "having a crisis of identity [and] . . .[w]e have not flooded the marketplace with alternative narratives to move their minds."

Such efforts at combating radicalization will not be easy to quantify, and indeed, will not have such readily-identifiable benchmarks as cities recaptured or terrorists killed or detained.  However, such efforts may be just as necessary in preventing domestic terror attacks. 

Social Media & the Military: Oil and Water

Individual social media profiles are generally bad news for militaries. They eventually lead to trouble. The Israeli army has repeatedly expressed concern and even made efforts to limit social media usage by soldiers. The United States military has had related concerns over access to social media. Simply put, people tend to overshare.

Russian soldiers and separatists have had a hard time keeping social media in check in Eastern Ukraine. The location functionality has repeatedly revealed activity that, according to Russia, isn't happening. Pictures are particularly telling. Recently, a reporter tracked down some specific locations, proving the photos were taken in Ukraine:

(Source: Vice News)

But the problem isn't just for Russia, Israel, or the United States. It's really a problem for all militaries. When it comes to social media, things separate out and float to the top, becoming real headaches in time. Social media doesn't mix well with the military.

Return to the Concept of a Three-State Solution in Iraq

Any "defeat" of ISIS, however one defines it, would certainly include re-taking ISIS-controlled areas of Iraq and holding them.  Part of the problem is that, similar to the "Anbar awakening" in 2007, such a strategy necessarily involves a serious and committed effort by local Sunnis to expel a distasteful group.  There is one key difference, this time.  In 2007, the U.S. military paid local Sunni groups to fight and expel al Qaeda.  This time, the Iraqi government is nominally in control of ground operations and put simply, there is little Sunni appetite to participate with a Shia-led government that has turned a blind eye to atrocities against Sunnis, used violence to break up Sunni protest camps, and has directly participated in the political disenfranchisement of Sunnis.  While many Sunnis bravely risk their lives to oppose ISIS control of their lands, there is a very understandable reticence to work side by side with the government that has spent much of its time oppressing and vilifying them.

Iraqis flee the city of Ramadi as ISIS forces take over after an 18-month fight with the Iraqi military (Source: CNN)

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In short, Sunnis need to be invested in the future of their government.  They are certainly not invested in the current form of Iraqi government, and its history since the U.S. departure has suggested that they don't have much reason to support and be invested in such a government.  The Obama administration acknowledges that there must be meaningful Sunni participation in any Iraqi government.  However, that was already the plan when the United States was deeply involved in developing Iraq's governmental structure.  The plan was for a Sunni vice president and protections of Sunni citizens.  Obviously, that plan has not transpired, with the Sunni vice president arrested and expelled from the government soon after the U.S. departure.

How does one rebuild trust in a participatory Iraqi government?  One step in the right direction was the ouster of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, whose name toward the end of his tenure had become synonymous with Sunni oppression.  However, the changing of the guard has not translated to better relations between Sunni and Shia; rather, Shia militia rage through Sunni areas unabated, committing atrocities.

There has been a little discussion lately -- but not much -- of a three-state solution or some autonomy-heavy federalism in Iraq.  Indeed, the timing of such a discussion might seem ludicrous as ISIS controls vast swathes of what would be a Sunni state.  However, a few things should be kept in mind.  First, a three-state solution or heavily decentralized state was more widely discussed during the early years of the insurgency in Iraq.  The very reason is the same that warrants discussing it now: getting Sunnis invested in their own future.  Second, there is no reason that a discussion of a three-state solution must concede ISIS control over northwestern Iraq.  One could suggest, for example, that a northwestern Iraq referendum on independence or decentralized government occur only after Iraqi forces retake ISIS-controlled territory.

For those worried about the possibility of a Sunni state becoming a haven for terrorism: keep in mind that ISIS already controls much of the territory, and that the inability of Iraq's Shias and Sunnis to make political peace has in large part led to the lack of a united front to combat ISIS.  Indeed, so long as Iraq's Shia leaders fail to include and indeed openly oppress the Sunni, there is no incentive for Sunni to fight for such leaders.  Fighting for their own state, or own self-controlled region within a partitioned state, might give more Sunnis a real reason to expel ISIS and hold any territory it takes from the terrorist organization.

Of course, the political partition of Iraq needn't necessarily be a "three-state" solution.  One possibility, for example, is a two-state solution: an independent Kurdish state and a "federal" Sunni-Shia state with a weak central government and significant autonomy to the two federal regions.

Any type of devolution or partitioning of Iraq would involve the tricky issue of oil revenues.  Indeed, some people see oil revenue as overriding other concerns and thereby necessitating a strong central government.  Ultimately, however, any central government in Iraq is doomed if it is not ready to cede significant political autonomy to Sunni regions.  Moreover, control over their own future might be the only incentive significant enough to bring Sunnis to the fore of the fight against ISIS.