As each successive Olympic games approach, several threads dominate the conversation, and they largely stray from the athletics. The first is the overall cost of the games (as well as whether the return on that investment brings equal benefit to the host city and country). The second is the security of the games, and how much that security costs. This second conversation has seemingly been driving the first one over the last several Olympics.
Security has particularly been a sore point in recent games. The cost of security has been around or over $1 billion in Beijing in 2008, Vancouver in 2010, and London in 2012. Vancouver had initially budgeted under $200 million for the Olympics, while London budgeted around $500 million. None of those estimates were met and were in fact shattered when final tallies came in. In London, even with the massive security budget, actual security was inadequate, requiring the government to use military support. At over $50 billion, the Socihi Olympic games are projected to be the most expensive ever.. That figure may come with an asterisk though as up to $30 billion of that may have been stolen and diverted. Nonetheless, security can be expected to be a significant chunk of that budget, and that may not even include military operations meant to support the Sochi Olympics. Brazil is already working with Interpol to reinforce security for the 2016 Olympic games.
Sochi is an even more precarious position than previous hosts. Though the terrain is mountainous and challenging, Russia's most violent and unstable region is less than 400 miles away. Nonetheless, terrorist groups from Russia's Caucasus have struck across Russia in the past. Recent operations in the region are not winning any points with its oppressed populations. Russia has been waging a war in the region since the 1990's and it could be debated even earlier.
A recent suicide bombing of a bus in Volgograd illustrated that regional terrorists can strike well outside their home area of operations. Sochi, though it may feel a world way is very accessible. A new generation of suicide bombers, who, unlike previous Black Widows, lack the typical markings of loss and personal grievance, can be an even larger headache to identify for Russian authorities. It could just turn up that the connections of this particular suicide bomber have simply not yet been identified or are not as direct as in the past.
It seems that Russia recognizes the concern and the international stage. Planned security is extensive and makes any successful attack unlikely. There is little doubt though, that threats to Sochi are real. Will Russia thwart them? Will the anti-terrorism operations be successful? Most importantly, will Russia keep it all out of the public eye and leave the focus to its transformation of Sochi? Sochi is the culmination of Russia's about-face to the world. Failure is not an option.
Sunday, October 27, 2013
Monday, October 21, 2013
Approaching High Noon in Sochi
Much controversy has been stirred over Russia's anti-gay law with the approaching 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The potential penalties and repercussions of Russia's new legal minefield are extensive. In a lot of senses, almost anything one does can get them arrested under these laws.
All of this makes what the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) did all the more impressive. On October 11, the USOC updated its non-discrimination policy to include sexual orientation. While the fact that the policy did not already have this statement is unfortunate, its impact could be broad. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) does not have such a clause but is investigating adding similar language to the IOC Charter. The USOC is pushing for this change.
Even Bode Miller has called the existing Russian laws embarrassing. This Bode Miller.
As can be imagined, such a policy would fly directly in the face of new Russian laws and would inject politics into the coming Olympics unlike any time in the recent past. A proposed boycott is unlikely as it produces little tangible result. Nonetheless, Sochi could be very interesting when it opens on February 7, 2014.
All of this makes what the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) did all the more impressive. On October 11, the USOC updated its non-discrimination policy to include sexual orientation. While the fact that the policy did not already have this statement is unfortunate, its impact could be broad. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) does not have such a clause but is investigating adding similar language to the IOC Charter. The USOC is pushing for this change.
Even Bode Miller has called the existing Russian laws embarrassing. This Bode Miller.
As can be imagined, such a policy would fly directly in the face of new Russian laws and would inject politics into the coming Olympics unlike any time in the recent past. A proposed boycott is unlikely as it produces little tangible result. Nonetheless, Sochi could be very interesting when it opens on February 7, 2014.
Thursday, October 10, 2013
Disarming a nation's WMD: not as easy as first thought
Syria's "voluntary" acceptance to give up its chemical weapons arsenal in light of horrific video showing the effects of a gas attack on its own population is, by all means, an unprecedented solution. Even the United Nations admits to as much. It will take well into 2014, at best estimates, to complete the process; even though it is unclear how much WMD Syria even has. One major unknown is that both sides remain locked in a civil war, so there is a disarmament process within a country still at war. Giving up the chemical weapons is certainly a much brighter prospect than being ground zero for the next major international conflict, but in the end, does it solve the problems in Syria, or even help lead to their resolution?
Disarmament is a tricky process. Germany was, in many senses, disarmed between the world wars - that didn't end too well (World War II). The list of nations that have successfully dabbled (armed, not just researched), peaceably disarmed, and then integrated into international community norms is short. You could make the case for South Africa, but its disarmament was tied to significant sanctions because of apartheid. It was apartheid's end that really brought South Africa within norms. You may say Libya; however, similar sanctions decimated the entire economy (and the energy industry in particular). In addition, Libya under Gaddafi still came toppling down years later. Three former Soviet states inherited WMD (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), but all returned them, having no ability to maintain them long-term and limited capacity to use them. Iraq? Well, that went south years later. No great example exists.
In many senses, Syria is a test case. What will be the effect on Assad's government? How will this affect the Syrian Civil War? What implications exist for the greater Middle East? These are all unknowns that rest on the progress of the chemical disarmament.
Previous Illexum Posts on Syria:
Disarmament is a tricky process. Germany was, in many senses, disarmed between the world wars - that didn't end too well (World War II). The list of nations that have successfully dabbled (armed, not just researched), peaceably disarmed, and then integrated into international community norms is short. You could make the case for South Africa, but its disarmament was tied to significant sanctions because of apartheid. It was apartheid's end that really brought South Africa within norms. You may say Libya; however, similar sanctions decimated the entire economy (and the energy industry in particular). In addition, Libya under Gaddafi still came toppling down years later. Three former Soviet states inherited WMD (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), but all returned them, having no ability to maintain them long-term and limited capacity to use them. Iraq? Well, that went south years later. No great example exists.
In many senses, Syria is a test case. What will be the effect on Assad's government? How will this affect the Syrian Civil War? What implications exist for the greater Middle East? These are all unknowns that rest on the progress of the chemical disarmament.
Previous Illexum Posts on Syria:
- Unthinkable? No. Unprecedented? No. Ignored. Yes. - Syria Today (September 5, 2013)
- UN good at counting; everything else - not so much (June 13, 2013)
- Foreign Arms in Syria (June 2, 2013)
- Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria) (May 19, 2013)
- The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD (April 28, 2013)
- Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons (March 21, 2013)
- Annan Resigns, Endgame Approaches? (August 2, 2012)
Sunday, October 6, 2013
Counterterrorism Sunday
While the U.S. government is ostensibly shut down, its special forces engaged in two very aggressive counterterrorism operations this weekend.
First, in Libya, U.S. forces captured Anas al-Liby, an al Qaeda operative who has been on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list since 2001 for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Specifically, he conducted surveillance in Nairobi, Kenya -- on the U.S. embassy and other potential targets -- in preparation for the ultimate attack on the U.S. embassy. In 2000, al-Liby was indicted in the U.S. for his role in that bombing; the FBI offered a reward of up to $5 million for his capture.
Flash forward to this Saturday, when U.S. forces captured al-Liby in the early morning hours on the streets of Tripoli. U.S. officials have stated that al-Liby is in a secure location and will ultimately face trial. Some of the fallout has focused on the extent of Libyan knowledge or acceptance of the U.S. operation:
Second, in Somalia, a U.S. attack targeted the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group. Al-Shabaab, which controls substantial swaths of territory in Somalia, recently claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack and hostage-taking crisis at a Kenyan shopping mall. Information continues to be released about that attack; indeed, just today, Kenyan officials released information about several of the militants. Reports indicate that the U.S. operation this weekend was aborted early, and that the fate of the intended target remains unknown.
Ultimately, while the government shutdown and looming debt ceiling continue to dominate the news, the significance of these two attacks should not be underestimated. Indeed, the capture of al-Liby on the streets of Tripoli may evoke comparisons to the now-infamous abduction of a terror suspect from the streets of Milan. The chief difference, at least at this point, is that the U.S. intends to try al-Liby in court. As far as what these attacks portend for U.S. foreign policy in northern Africa, it is far too early to tell. If one were to ask whether this represents a "shift" to an African focus, I would simply reply: we've been there for awhile.
First, in Libya, U.S. forces captured Anas al-Liby, an al Qaeda operative who has been on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list since 2001 for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Specifically, he conducted surveillance in Nairobi, Kenya -- on the U.S. embassy and other potential targets -- in preparation for the ultimate attack on the U.S. embassy. In 2000, al-Liby was indicted in the U.S. for his role in that bombing; the FBI offered a reward of up to $5 million for his capture.
Flash forward to this Saturday, when U.S. forces captured al-Liby in the early morning hours on the streets of Tripoli. U.S. officials have stated that al-Liby is in a secure location and will ultimately face trial. Some of the fallout has focused on the extent of Libyan knowledge or acceptance of the U.S. operation:
A senior American official said the Libyan government had been apprised of the operation and provided assistance, but it was unclear in what capacity. An assistant to the prime minister of the Libyan transitional government said the government had been unaware of any operation or of Abu Anas’s capture. Asked if American forces had ever conducted raids inside Libya or collaborated with Libyan forces, Mehmoud Abu Bahia, assistant to the defense minister, replied, “Absolutely not.”Legally speaking -- with respect to international law, that is -- Libyan involvement matters. If a host state grants permission for a foreign military action within its borders, there is no breach of its territorial sovereignty (scholarly articles discussing the connection between international law and military action with a host state's cooperation can be found here and here). Of course, even if the Libyan government did permit and/or cooperate with the U.S. operation, the public denial would not be unprecedented. Indeed, for years, Pakistan criticized U.S. drone strikes in that country; in 2011, however, its very public announcement regarding the CIA departing an air base implicitly acknowledged that the U.S. had been launching drone strikes from air bases inside Pakistan. Thus, do not be surprised if time reveals Libyan knowledge and/or approval of the U.S. operation.
Second, in Somalia, a U.S. attack targeted the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group. Al-Shabaab, which controls substantial swaths of territory in Somalia, recently claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack and hostage-taking crisis at a Kenyan shopping mall. Information continues to be released about that attack; indeed, just today, Kenyan officials released information about several of the militants. Reports indicate that the U.S. operation this weekend was aborted early, and that the fate of the intended target remains unknown.
Ultimately, while the government shutdown and looming debt ceiling continue to dominate the news, the significance of these two attacks should not be underestimated. Indeed, the capture of al-Liby on the streets of Tripoli may evoke comparisons to the now-infamous abduction of a terror suspect from the streets of Milan. The chief difference, at least at this point, is that the U.S. intends to try al-Liby in court. As far as what these attacks portend for U.S. foreign policy in northern Africa, it is far too early to tell. If one were to ask whether this represents a "shift" to an African focus, I would simply reply: we've been there for awhile.
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