Counterterrorism Sunday

While the U.S. government is ostensibly shut down, its special forces engaged in two very aggressive counterterrorism operations this weekend.

First, in Libya, U.S. forces captured Anas al-Liby, an al Qaeda operative who has been on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list since 2001 for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  Specifically, he conducted surveillance in Nairobi, Kenya -- on the U.S. embassy and other potential targets -- in preparation for the ultimate attack on the U.S. embassy.  In 2000, al-Liby was indicted in the U.S. for his role in that bombing; the FBI offered a reward of up to $5 million for his capture.

Flash forward to this Saturday, when U.S. forces captured al-Liby in the early morning hours on the streets of Tripoli.  U.S. officials have stated that al-Liby is in a secure location and will ultimately face trial.  Some of the fallout has focused on the extent of Libyan knowledge or acceptance of the U.S. operation:

A senior American official said the Libyan government had been apprised of the operation and provided assistance, but it was unclear in what capacity. An assistant to the prime minister of the Libyan transitional government said the government had been unaware of any operation or of Abu Anas’s capture. Asked if American forces had ever conducted raids inside Libya or collaborated with Libyan forces, Mehmoud Abu Bahia, assistant to the defense minister, replied, “Absolutely not.”

Legally speaking -- with respect to international law, that is -- Libyan involvement matters.  If a host state grants permission for a foreign military action within its borders, there is no breach of its territorial sovereignty (scholarly articles discussing the connection between international law and military action with a host state's cooperation can be found here and here).  Of course, even if the Libyan government did permit and/or cooperate with the U.S. operation, the public denial would not be unprecedented.  Indeed, for years, Pakistan criticized U.S. drone strikes in that country; in 2011, however, its very public announcement regarding the CIA departing an air base implicitly acknowledged that the U.S. had been launching drone strikes from air bases inside Pakistan.  Thus, do not be surprised if time reveals Libyan knowledge and/or approval of the U.S. operation.

Second, in Somalia, a U.S. attack targeted the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group.  Al-Shabaab, which controls substantial swaths of territory in Somalia, recently claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack and hostage-taking crisis at a Kenyan shopping mall.  Information continues to be released about that attack; indeed, just today, Kenyan officials released information about several of the militants.  Reports indicate that the U.S. operation this weekend was aborted early, and that the fate of the intended target remains unknown.

Ultimately, while the government shutdown and looming debt ceiling continue to dominate the news, the significance of these two attacks should not be underestimated.  Indeed, the capture of al-Liby on the streets of Tripoli may evoke comparisons to the now-infamous abduction of a terror suspect from the streets of Milan.  The chief difference, at least at this point, is that the U.S. intends to try al-Liby in court.  As far as what these attacks portend for U.S. foreign policy in northern Africa, it is far too early to tell.  If one were to ask whether this represents a "shift" to an African focus, I would simply reply: we've been there for awhile.

The French Really Are Invading...

To briefly update the previous piece on French support to repel Islamist rebels in Mali, it turns out that the French have sent in significant, though irregular, ground forces, including paratroopers and helicopter gunships. Meanwhile, France has also raised its national alert level as Islamist forces have threatened to attack France itself. With estimates of 100 adversaries killed out of a force that likely numbers below 1,000, it will be interesting to see how long French President Hollande sticks to the statement in his speech: This operation will last as long as is necessary. This is a very vague and dangerous estimate, given the nature of insurgency and irregular warfare. It is not likely that France will be unable to root out the rebels entirely, but at what point will it feel the mission complete? The current effort seems to be focusing on reversing rebel gains in central Mali around the town of Konna. However, northern Mali, with its vast size and empty, dangerous landscape, is an different war entirely and could not be won by such a small force.

In addition to Mali, French troops went into Somalia, where at least two French troops lost their lives in a rescue attempt on a French citizen. The rescue attempt was ultimately unsuccessful.

Also to update, AFRICOM Combatant Commander General Carter Ham, who is visiting Niger, did imply that the US would be willing to provide some limited hands-off support, possibly in the form of drones or satellites. At the same time, General Ham has noted that a clearer plan for Mali would need to be in place prior to any US intervention. In a sense, the US could help, but wants to be sure the result is going to be effective, something it has had trouble with throughout the Middle East and Africa.

A quick overview of recent French intervention in Africa (which I was looking for the other day) can be found on the Washington Post.

The French are Invading! (Sort of)

Well, not exactly. Or at least it's not clear yet what they're doing, apart from some form of military "support" with the troops organization by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to repel rebellious forces aligned with al-Qaeda. It's not even clear if French involvement is limited to air support, which is sorely needed, or also actively includes ground forces stationed in the region. Mali has been spiraling down a black hole for a while, and it has been particularly bad for at least six months.

Nonetheless, everyone seems happy with the party, so long as they don't have to participate. The United Kingdom, European Union, and the United States all extended support for the mission and French involvement. None hinted at physical support, even though some weapons in the hands of the rebels may be the result of those made available to Libyan rebels and in the wake of Libya's rebellion. The United Nations, having urged an African-led counter to the rebels in UNSC 2071 (October) and reaffirmed it in UNSC 2085 (December), is also pleased that the Security Council does not seem inept.

However, does any of this really have to do with any of these countries or pan-national bodies? Mali was under French colonial power until its independence in 1960. Since the waves of independence in Africa, France has consistently displayed a willingness to use military force to support post-independence governments. Although France is using Security Council resolutions to back its participation, there is little question that French forces would have otherwise assisted. The French have spent the past half-century attempting to use military force to attempt to fix substantive flaws in colonial administration that led to much post-independence violence, hatred, and bickering.

So while France continues to show its role in Africa, a role that it wants to have given the still potential impact of African countries and economies on trade, energy, and precious mineral availability, the United States is missing an opportunity. Wasn't AFRICOM created for specifically this purpose? Instead, AFRICOM seems to be sitting quietly in Germany, watching at best.

It remains to be seen what will come of this military intervention. Will the rebels be driven back, or will it falter? The only given so far is who is sitting this one out.