Counterterrorism Sunday

While the U.S. government is ostensibly shut down, its special forces engaged in two very aggressive counterterrorism operations this weekend.

First, in Libya, U.S. forces captured Anas al-Liby, an al Qaeda operative who has been on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list since 2001 for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  Specifically, he conducted surveillance in Nairobi, Kenya -- on the U.S. embassy and other potential targets -- in preparation for the ultimate attack on the U.S. embassy.  In 2000, al-Liby was indicted in the U.S. for his role in that bombing; the FBI offered a reward of up to $5 million for his capture.

Flash forward to this Saturday, when U.S. forces captured al-Liby in the early morning hours on the streets of Tripoli.  U.S. officials have stated that al-Liby is in a secure location and will ultimately face trial.  Some of the fallout has focused on the extent of Libyan knowledge or acceptance of the U.S. operation:

A senior American official said the Libyan government had been apprised of the operation and provided assistance, but it was unclear in what capacity. An assistant to the prime minister of the Libyan transitional government said the government had been unaware of any operation or of Abu Anas’s capture. Asked if American forces had ever conducted raids inside Libya or collaborated with Libyan forces, Mehmoud Abu Bahia, assistant to the defense minister, replied, “Absolutely not.”

Legally speaking -- with respect to international law, that is -- Libyan involvement matters.  If a host state grants permission for a foreign military action within its borders, there is no breach of its territorial sovereignty (scholarly articles discussing the connection between international law and military action with a host state's cooperation can be found here and here).  Of course, even if the Libyan government did permit and/or cooperate with the U.S. operation, the public denial would not be unprecedented.  Indeed, for years, Pakistan criticized U.S. drone strikes in that country; in 2011, however, its very public announcement regarding the CIA departing an air base implicitly acknowledged that the U.S. had been launching drone strikes from air bases inside Pakistan.  Thus, do not be surprised if time reveals Libyan knowledge and/or approval of the U.S. operation.

Second, in Somalia, a U.S. attack targeted the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group.  Al-Shabaab, which controls substantial swaths of territory in Somalia, recently claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack and hostage-taking crisis at a Kenyan shopping mall.  Information continues to be released about that attack; indeed, just today, Kenyan officials released information about several of the militants.  Reports indicate that the U.S. operation this weekend was aborted early, and that the fate of the intended target remains unknown.

Ultimately, while the government shutdown and looming debt ceiling continue to dominate the news, the significance of these two attacks should not be underestimated.  Indeed, the capture of al-Liby on the streets of Tripoli may evoke comparisons to the now-infamous abduction of a terror suspect from the streets of Milan.  The chief difference, at least at this point, is that the U.S. intends to try al-Liby in court.  As far as what these attacks portend for U.S. foreign policy in northern Africa, it is far too early to tell.  If one were to ask whether this represents a "shift" to an African focus, I would simply reply: we've been there for awhile.

Meanwhile, in other nation-building news...

While the world remains focused on developments in the Syrian chemical weapon stockpile saga, the European Union unveiled an aid package of roughly $2.4 billion to the fragile Somali government -- dubbed a "new deal for Somalia."  The EU aid seeks to "sustain the gains made by the government and support the reconstruction of the country after two decades of civil war."  While the al Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab terrorist group still controls much of Somalia, key cities such as Mogadishu are in government control.  That government, which has been in power for one year, is buttressed by African Union and Ethiopian troops. Somali and affiliated forces have made important gains -- notably in port cities -- and the Somali president Hassan Mohamud hopes that the funds can prompt further progress:

For Mohamud, there were four key priorities among many -- security, legal reform, public finances and economic recovery. 

"The New Deal must deliver on the ground soon," he told delegates. After years of suffering, "expectations from our people are understandably high. We must not let them down."

As for U.S. involvement, much of it has been behind-the-scenes training of African Union troops.  Of course, there are also the untold number of covert drone strikes targeting al-Shabaab and other militants in Somalia.  The planned withdraw of Ethiopian troops from certain areas, meanwhile, raises fresh concerns about the African Union's ability to maintain Somali government control in large areas of land.

In short, while both sides are firmly entrenched and the civil war rages on, the Somali government currently has momentum; the EU aid package constitutes a large part of President Mohamud's efforts to maintain that momentum.  Stay tuned to see whether the coming months show any serious shifts in the country's balance of power.

Shadow Wars: Yemen Edition

From the mid-2000s onward, the U.S. has fought a shadow war in Pakistan.  U.S. relations with Pakistan have ebbed and flowed in that time, with Pakistan often providing intelligence on targets and airstrip space while publicly decrying the drone attacks.

Fast forward to the past two years, where the U.S. has ramped up its involvement in Yemen.  While U.S. officials hem and haw, never officially acknowledging the extent of our actions and involvement there, analysts say that we're at war.  This sounds familiar: for years, the U.S. conducted the massive, covert drone (and special ops) war in Pakistan without publicly acknowledging it.  Officials have become more open about operations in Pakistan in recent years, in part in order to provide legal justification for the continued, aggressive drone campaign.

While the similarities between Pakistan and Yemen are clearly evident, there are some important differences that America must keep in mind as it tailors its response to the growing threat of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  First, AQAP is considered by some analysts, with good reason, to be the most active and lethal al Qaeda affiliate.  The underwear bomber, the cargo plane bomb plot (the one with the printer ink cartridges), and the failed NYC bomber were all organized or inspired by AQAP.  Even the perpetrator of the Fort Hood massacre, Maj. Hasan, conversed online extensively with now-deceased AQAP leader (and propaganda leader of al Qaeda) Anwar al-Awlaki.  Thus, the U.S. must not underestimate the threat posed by this al Qaeda affiliate, and the extent of our recent involvement there suggests that the government is well-aware of the threat and has ramped up operations accordingly.

Furthermore, military operations between U.S. and Yemeni forces is much more cooperative than that of U.S. and Pakistan military personnel.  Indeed, the level of mistrust between U.S. and Pakistani military forces (stemming from repeated Pakistani military leaks to Taliban forces) existed for years but was on display for the entire world to see during the bin Laden raid.  U.S. military, meanwhile, cooperate with Yemeni counterterrorist operations in much more direct ways:

In an escalation of America’s clandestine war in Yemen, a small contingent of U.S. troops is providing targeting data for Yemeni airstrikes as government forces battle to dislodge Al Qaeda militants and other insurgents in the country’s restive south, U.S. and Yemeni officials said.

Operating from a Yemeni base, at least 20 U.S. special operations troops have used satellite imagery, drone video, eavesdropping systems and other technical means to help pinpoint targets for an offensive that intensified this week, said U.S. and Yemeni officials who asked not to be identified talking about the sensitive operation.

The U.S. forces also advised Yemeni military commanders on where and when to deploy their troops, two senior Obama administration officials said. The U.S. contingent is expected to grow, a senior military official said.

 Clearly, we are heavily engaged in Yemen right now, but to what end?  The always-prescient writers at Danger Room raise this question, and suggest that President Obama admit we're at war and articulate the strategic.  Just as there was a time lag regarding operations in Pakistan, however, I think keeping mum about Yemen might make sense for the near future.  First, while operations are ramping up, they are nowhere near the level of activity that took place in Pakistan for years without official acknowledgement.  While this is not in and of itself a justification to keep quiet about operations, keeping quiet about Yemen allows the U.S. government to be adaptable to the quickly-changing conditions in Yemen.  Perhaps the U.S. will not decide whether its goal is "defeat" or merely containment of AQAP until more is known about the feasibility of each option.

The U.S. has already articulated reasons for providing aid to Yemen for infrastructure and civil society-building.  Meanwhile, when providing billions in aid to Pakistan for years, the U.S. openly admitted that the funds were geared toward helping our partner in the war on terror combat the threat of the Taliban and al Qaeda.  The U.S. should, at the very least, articulate a broad policy of providing counter-terrorism assistance to Yemen.  I don't know think this would necessarily involve articulating our end-game in that country, especially when the combination of the Arab Spring and the rise of AQAP make the country one of the most unstable in a very unstable region of the world.  Ultimately, while our current activities appear to be a proactive effort to tamp down the rise of AQAP, our ultimate long game in Yemen might have to be a reactionary one reflective of the realities of our ability to control the direction and fate of the country.