Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts

Sunday, January 11, 2015

New Series: The Changing World of Territorial Sovereignty (ISIS Edition)

Welcome to a new series on the Changing World of Territorial Sovereignty, where Illexum will explore the ways in which the traditional views of territorial sovereignty have transformed or eroded.  When discussing threats to traditional statehood, the focus is usually on globalization and other new developments that decrease the functions of the traditional state.  However, less attention is paid to the erosion of the traditional view of territorial sovereignty -- in other words, the ways in which states, media, scholars, and public opinion view and analyze territorial sovereignty.

To say that this issue is broad and lends itself to a wide array of sub-topics is an understatement; such topics include direct state-on-state military action, state-on-nonstate action, prolonged military activity vs. limited military strikes, the extent to which states can permit other states to engage in extensive military operations against their own non-state actors, and the extent to which active support from one state toward non-state actors of another states infringes upon the latter's sovereignty.  This is far from an exhaustive list, but it merely underscores the difficulty in analyzing the topic.  Illexum will, of course, place a higher degree of focus on examples from today's news.  We will include some historical analyses as well, however, because those are also instructive on how we will view territorial sovereignty going forward.

The first topic that we will explore is ISIS - specifically, how U.S. military action against ISIS (and other groups, such as al-Nusra) affects traditional notions of territorial sovereignty.  ISIS is a good example of the erosion of territorial sovereignty, given that it currently controls territory in both Syria and Iraq.  Thus, from the outset, the challenge of containing or rolling back ISIS necessarily involves a different approach to the issue of territorial sovereignty.  Moreover, the nation-states in which ISIS operates have very different relationships with the United States.  While the Iraqi government invites U.S. military assistance in fighting ISIS, the Syria's President Bashar al-Assad is not so eager to invite U.S. military involvement.

Brief Background: U.S. Military Action Against ISIS

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the first U.S. action against ISIS took place in Iraq.  First, on August 7, 2014, the U.S. dropped aid packages to displaced Iraqis who had been forced to evacuate to the mountainside in light of ISIS advances.  Specifically, the U.S. launched airstrikes on August 8, 2014, against ISIS artillery that was being used to attack Kurdish forces.  The humanitarian aid drops continued throughout August, as did the airstrikes against ISIS.

The two questions that plagued the United States political and military leadership, however, were 1) whether the U.S. would put troops on the ground and 2) whether military operations would expand to the civil war-ravaged Syria.  As to the first question, President Obama initially declared (in early August 2014) that the United States would not be sending troops back to Iraq to fight ISIS;
As Commander in Chief, I will not allow the United States to be dragged into fighting another war in Iraq, so as we support Iraqis as they take the fight to these terrorists, American combat troops will not be returning to fight in Iraq because there is no American military solution to the larger crisis in Iraq,
Of course, a few hundred American troops already had started returning to Iraq in June 2014, albeit as "advisers" to Iraqi and Kurdish military  forces.  As the airstrikes ramped up in August 2014, the U.S. sent 150 more advisers to Iraq, with Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel emphasizing that this was not a "combat boots on the ground" type situation.  In November 2014, President Obama authorized sending a total of 3,100 troops to Iraq - still, he claimed, in an advisory and training capacity.  The latest update is that President Obama will soon request authorization from Congress for military action against ISIS (despite claiming that the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) already gives it the authority to engage in action against ISIS).

As to the second question, the United States did indeed expand its war against ISIS to Syria, launching airstrikes within Syria's borders in September.  Incidentally, the strikes were not limited to ISIS; in September, the U.S. launched strikes against the shadowy Khorosan Group and in November, it attacked the al Qaeda splinter group Jabbat al-Nusra.  Of course, some analysts say that the Khorosan Group is merely a subset of al-Nusra, and that the Obama administration played up the Khorosan Group in order to build up public support for its military action in Syria.  The strikes against ISIS have continued into the new year, with the U.S. launching strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria just this past weekend.

Smoke rises over Kobane, Syria, after a U.S. airstrike against ISIS on December 25, 2014 (Source: The Guardian)


Implications for the Erosion of Territorial Sovereignty

The traditional notions of territorial sovereignty have eroded in recent years, especially in those regions where borders or entire regions are out of government control.  Over the last twenty years, this has been especially pronounced in the context of U.S. counter-terrorism.  Airstrikes have been a go-to American response to terrorism, whether it be a response to the 1998 embassy bombings or the prolonged drone war in Pakistan.

There are two common scenarios for drone strikes against militants (though, of course, one can certainly imagine other situations) - those in which the host state expressly or implicitly condones the military action, and those in which the host state opposes such action.  How, one might ask, does such military action fit within the international legal framework for military action?  The United Nations charter prohibits military action that violates territorial sovereignty: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."  The notable exceptions to the use of force against another state are Security Council-authorized actions and "individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."  Typically, the United States presents its military actions as self-defense in response to the armed attack of 9-11 (or, in the case of Iraq, anticipatory self-defense).  Moreover, in those cases where a state invites U.S. action as part of its own counter-terrorism efforts, one might legitimately describe such action as "collective self-defense."  What is unclear in this scenario is whether such a country must formally request assistance in self-defense, or whether secret, behind-the-scenes discussions suffice.  For example, current U.S. military action in Iraq is done with the knowledge and cooperation of the Iraqi government.  The U.S. drone war in Pakistan, meanwhile, was done behind closed doors; Pakistan would often openly condemn U.S. strikes while secretly providing intelligence and targeting information to the U.S. for those very strikes.

When a state openly opposes military operations by a third party within its borders, the legal basis for such action becomes unclear.  In Syria, for example, the United States has taken action against ISIS and al-Nusra.  It has not taken open military action against President al-Assad's forces, although it has provided weaponry, training, and other support for anti-Assad forces.  What presents the United States with a distinct legal challenge, however, is how to justify its invasion of sovereign territory by airstikes and special forces operations.  There is no collective self-defense, as can be argued in Iraq and potentially in Pakistan.  The claim of self-defense is a stretch, given that the U.S. has had to make the dubious claim that ISIS is part of al Qaeda in order to justify such action under the AUMF and the theory that 9-11 constituted an armed attack against which the United States is still engaged in self-defense.  Another theory that has found its way into legal scholarship is that states that cannot control their own borders, or engage in atrocities against their own people, "waive" any claim to territorial sovereignty.  This theory, known as "involuntary sovereignty waiver," has been put forth to justify military action in Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999.

The United States has not directly put forth a coherent legal theory for its military action in Syria, and it may well not want to.  General norms of international law disfavor unilateral or mostly-unilateral military action, which is why the U.S. is always eager to garner multinational support to buttress the legitimacy of its actions.  Even where those actions are multilateral, however, the legal underpinnings for the military action remain the same.  The only difference is the political distinction between the world's sole superpower engaging in unilateral military action and that same superpower working with other states to thwart the spread of ISIS.  Like most other international norms, the sanctity of territorial sovereignty is often the product of the prevailing political viewpoints -- or whatever the current military and political realities dictate.  The United States does not want to be perceived as engaging in numerous military actions that violate territorial sovereignty.  At the same time, its words and actions have made it clear that the United States views territorial sovereignty as subservient to its own defense needs, whether those needs be real or perceived.  The very notion of a "global war on terror," by its very name, suggests that territorial sovereignty is not as resolute or finite as it was once perceived to be.

As the United States gets dragged into yet another military conflict on foreign soil, however, one must ask -- if Syria doesn't want us there, and the country is in the midst of a devastating civil war, what will further military engagement in the area accomplish?  Will the United States continue its mission creep and deploy forces (either alone or in concert with Iraqi, Kurdish, or other military forces) ever closer to the Syrian border?  Will we engage in ground operations in Syria, and if so, will we have the logistical base to do so?  This is what happens when you engage in military action in a hostile country, and why the violation of territorial sovereignty matters -- what sort of environment does the United States expect to find, in such a deeply divided country?  It would face enemies on multiple fronts, and its scarce allies hold very little territory right now.  If the United States deepens its military involvement, it risks getting to the point where the only way to protect its own forces would be a large-scale deployment - something the country hardly has the stomach for.

Saturday, November 30, 2013

U.S. Role in Afghanistan Post-2014

In early October, prospects for a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan post-2014 looked bleak.  If the U.S. and Afghanistan could not negotiate an agreement soon, the U.S. would have to begin arrangements for a complete withdrawal of troops by the end of 2014.  Hoping to salvage the situation, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Afghanistan.  In mid-October, Kerry and Afghan president Hamid Karzai negotiated the terms of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan post-2014.  The chief sticking point had been whether alleged crimes committed by U.S. soldiers would fall under U.S. or Afghan jurisdiction.  The BSA gave the U.S. jurisdiction over these alleged crimes, a term that Karzai had opposed.  When the BSA was signed, Karzai said that the decision regarding jurisdiction must be made not by him but, rather, by the loya jirga -- a council of approximately 3,000 Afghan elders.

Fast forward to last week.  First, just as the loya jirga convened, President Karzai developed a new position on the BSA -- indicating that it should not be signed until after Afghanistan's April 2014 presidential elections.    After four days of deliberations, the loya jirga responded by approving the BSA and recommending that Karzai promptly sign it.  Karzai refused, indicating that he would not sign it until after the April 2014 elections and after the U.S. brought peace: "Peace is our precondition.  America should bring us peace and then we will sign it."

U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice traveled to Afghanistan to speak with Karzai.  Karzai now has a fresh set of demands that were not part of the original BSA:
Karzai told Rice that he would sign only after the United States helps his government begin peace talks with the Taliban and agrees to release all 17 Afghan citizens being held in the Guantanamo Bay detention center in Cuba, according to Afghan and U.S. officials. 
In addition to those new demands, the Afghan leader reiterated that he will not sign if “another [U.S.] soldier steps foot into an Afghan home,” Karzai spokesman Aimal Faizi said. The United States has already promised to show “restraint” in “home entries” by U.S. troops and to carry them out only in conjunction with Afghan troops, but the tactic remains a part of U.S. operations against some insurgents here.
Rice responded by noting that if the BSA was not signed by the end of the year, the U.S. would have no choice but to prepare for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops by the end of 2014.  The stakes were raised two days ago when, during a NATO strike against an insurgent, a two-year old was tragically killed and two women were injured.  The U.S. maintains that the strike targeted a mid-level Taliban commander traveling on a road, whereas Karzai and his administration maintain that the attack struck a residential home.  Both sides agree, however, that the civilians were killed during the attack.  Karzai noted that he would not sign the agreement if such "oppression" continued.

Putting aside Karzai's competing demands for the U.S. to provide peace and security while ensuring zero civilian casualties, the larger question is whether he will in fact sign the BSA by the end of the year.  Why, one might ask, can't the U.S. simply wait until April 2014 to find out whether Karzai will sign the BSA.  The answer, quite frankly, is that this is not feasible.  There are currently more than 86,000 NATO and affiliated troops in Afghanistan; 60,000 of these are American.  The logistics of transporting the troops; transporting, selling, or destroying the equipment; securing the bases; continuing to train Afghan forces; and myriad other issues, are simply staggering.  A succinct yet excellent account of the challenges posed by the logistics of the withdrawal from Afghanistan can be found here (the article, written in February 2013, anticipated that most troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2014).  In short, logistics alone -- setting politics aside for the moment -- dictate that the U.S. decide soon whether or not to withdraw troops.  While pundits may claim that the U.S. "should stay patient" and that waiting until after April to sign the BSA is acceptable, facts indicate otherwise.  If the U.S. is to keep troops in the country, for example, it cannot completely remove the infrastructure it currently has in place.

Of course, this post is simply reporting the situation with respect to ongoing negotiations as well as the pragmatic issue of logistical challenges.  Another question entirely is whether the benefits of a continued U.S. troop presence outweigh the costs in terms of lives lost (American, Afghan, and others), money, and anti-American sentiment.  That's a question we'll let you decide for yourselves.

Monday, June 17, 2013

Pakistan's Quagmire an International Concern

Another day, another disquieting incident in Pakistan, home of possibly the world's most dangerous nuclear weapons program. Militants attacked a bus of students from a women's university, and then proceeded to attack the hospital where survivors were being treated. Although this attack garnered little attention outside of minor news blurbs, it included all the facets that Western nations are concerned about: homegrown terrorism, suicide bombers, a coordinated attack, and significant civilian casualties. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a group with links to al-Qaeda.

As with each attack, international concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal surface. Can Pakistan, a country with deep internal divisions, keep itself together? This attack, on the very fundamental elements of reform Pakistan has struggled with - women's rights - comes on the heels of and as a test to the newly elected government of Nawaz Sharif.

Sharif, a political mainstay of Pakistani politics (this is his third term), has a slew of election promises to uphold. While improving the economy will be quite a challenge on the heels of an accelerating US withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan, ending drone strikes in a country that reels from the majority of American targets will be an even more daunting task. Pakistan has been the center of US operations and there is little evidence to suggest that even as the physical American presence on the ground decreases, the threat of the US military will as well.

Attacks like the one this past week are exactly why. A country with fundamentalist, militant opposition, an active military, and nuclear weapons, is a dangerous mix. And concerns nations far removed from the subcontinental neighborhood. It wouldn't be such bad idea if these stories made more than a dent in the international news blotter.

Friday, January 18, 2013

Counterterrorism in North Africa: A Tale of Two Crises

Previous posts have addressed the French military intervention in Mali.  In the meantime, to the very near northeast, another former French colony has grabbed the world's attention since militants took hostages at an Algerian gas field Wednesday.  Widespread confusion has ensued, with reports Thursday suggesting some or most hostages escaped.

Today, we've learned more information -- namely, that an Algerian military operation has freed hundreds of hostages while at least 12 have died and approximately 30 remain unaccounted for (update: that number appears to now be 7 hostages still being held).  The hostage crisis and the French intervention in Mali are inextricably intertwined.  Indeed, early reports indicated that the terrorists in Algeria cited French intervention in Mali as cause for their actions, demanding that French and other Western countries cease operations in Mali.

The hostages at the gas field, many of them workers at the facility, hail from all over the world.  Most were Algerian nationals, but among the hostages are British, French, American, Japanese, Belgian, Irish, Romanian, Malaysian, Filipino, and more.  Clearly, the sheer number of countries' nationals involved in this tragedy demand a global reaction that will continue beyond the hostage crisis, but the exact nature of that reaction remains to be seen.  Some people will suggest a policy of disengagement and/or containment, where these countries are left to their own devices.  Recent history has shown us the price of failed states, however, both as a power vacuum for internal strife and a haven for outside terror and militant groups.  As the Malian government faces a threat from internal militants, the French have opted for a strong armed force to buttress Malian forces and address the threat.  This raises an interesting (and unclear) legal question, namely: under international law, what are the principles under which French or other forces might legitimately intervene and/or provide assistance to the Malian military junta?

Deborah Pearlstein over at OpinioJuris suggests the most logical legal principle would be consent from Mali, which raises its own web of complications:

Attacking anything in Mali raises territorial sovereignty concerns. Is there a government there that could lawfully consent to the U.S. use of force in country such that the U.S. wouldn't risk violating UN Charter article 2 prohibitions against the use of force? Consent, best I can tell, is the only option here. There's no UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. . . . So consent it is, and it would come from, best case, a government that seized power by coup and to which we've otherwise cut off military aid. The U.S. still maintains an embassy in Mali (as does Mali in the U.S.), so perhaps consent is not legally insurmountable. But I'd wonder both what the terms of the U.S. aid cut-off were, and whether there's any precedent for this.

One possible example from recent history is U.S. involvement in Yemen.  A (hopefully) brief digression:  When looking at a legal basis for U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, one would likely look to the 2002 AUMF as justification under domestic law.  Under international law, however, the situation is trickier.  While one might claim that U.S. action in Pakistan is a logical geographic extension of action in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said of Yemen.  Rather, the most likely source of justification under international law is consent and collective self-defense.  Let me be more specific: by permitting the U.S. to engage in military actions within its borders, Yemen relinquishes its territorial sovereignty.  This doesn't solve the issue entirely, however; if Yemen's permission was all that was needed to permit U.S. drone strikes within Yemen's borders, then Yemen could theoretically permit action by the U.S. that it would not be allowed to legally commit on its own.  Instead, the U.S. must be engaging in some sort of permitted military action under international law -- in this case, Yemen's self-defense against  militants in a non-international armed conflict.  Military action in Yemen has indeed shown Yemeni forces severely battling Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP.  Although much of the U.S. involvement has been covert, enough has surfaced to indicate that U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has reached new peaks over the past year and has proven effective at targeting terrorists in the region.

U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has mostly come in the form of intelligence-sharing, aid, and U.S. drone strikes at areas Yemeni forces cannot reach themselves.  Obviously, the French involvement in Mali is a stark contrast in many respects, with over 1,000 French troops committed in Mali.  There are lessons to be learned from U.S. military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen (and, even  Pakistan, once upon a time, when it used to provide the U.S. with airfields and intel for drone strikes).  Those lessons can include proper levels of engagement, proper division of labor between domestic and foreign military actions, and navigating the murky waters of cooperation with a not-always-ideal domestic government.  In this case, France (and to the extent it becomes involved, the U.S.) can learn from the complex U.S. involvement in Pakistan.  The U.S. and Pakistan did not often see eye to eye, and indeed the relationship has become increasingly strained over the past two years.  However, even in the face of stark disagreements (especially over hardly-secret Pakistani military aid to Afghan Taliban forces), the U.S. and Pakistan teamed up to target Pakistani Taliban forces -- an area of overlapping interests.  Similarly, to the extent the U.S. considers involvement in Mali -- a country with whose government the U.S. has expressed serious reservations -- it might look for limited engagement in areas of shared interest.  Of course, the downside to such involvement will be that, once again, the U.S. will risk calls of hypocrisy for supporting a non-democratic government.  The alternative of extremists gaining a stronger foothold, on the other hand, is something that is in nobody's interest.

Sunday, August 12, 2012

Civilian Deaths Down In Afghanistan; U.N. Unhappy

Even in a short U.N. press release such as this, there are numerous questions about how to gauge success in Afghanistan or success of counter-terrorism in general.  Civilian casualties caused by international and pro-government forces were down 25%, and those forces were responsible for only 10% of all civilian casualties.  Anti-government forces, meanwhile, were responsible for 80% of civilian casualties, and their assassinations of pro-government officials, use of IEDs, and attacks on schools, were all on the rise.  Overall, civilian casualties were down 15%.

From that data, one could point to numerous successes, including the improved efforts of pro-government forces to minimize civilian casualties.  On the other hand, protecting civilians from Taliban and other insurgent attacks -- though extremely difficult -- is a necessary component of any successful counter-terrorist effort.  If a government cannot keep its citizens safe, then those citizens will continue to lack faith in that government.  The Taliban is likely too embedded into Afghan society to ever be eradicated by military means alone; rather, any lasting peace in the region will almost undoubtedly involve bringing the Taliban to the table.  Until then, the war will continue to wind down to a bloody end, if indeed an end is in sight.