Building on Trust: Why the US Isn't Getting Very Far in Israel

Israel and Hamas are, by all accounts, at war in Gaza. US Secretary of State John Kerry is in the Middle East, frantically working with Israelis and Egyptians to nail down some sort of halt to hostilities, since the United States cannot work directly with Hamas - a designated terrorist organization. He's not getting very far and it's not entirely surprising. 

(Source: Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images via The National Post)

Kerry next travels to France, where anti-Semitic rioting has flared in recent days, to attempt to gain support for a ceasefire among European leaders. Earlier, the Israeli cabinet rejected Kerry's ceasefire proposal, which the US has since downplayed as a disagreement on final wording - that no proposal was formally put forth. Part of that rejection involves Israel asserting its objective to continue to destroy tunnels during any ongoing ceasefire. Nonetheless, Israel and Hamas have agreed to a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire, beginning at 8 AM local time.

It's not shocking to see Israel and the US disagree lately; there's very little substance to the US-Israel relationship under the Obama administration. In fact, it could be argued that there's likely no trust at all among leadership in the two countries. Just this past week, Kerry was caught criticizing the Israeli operation in Gaza. In backtracking, Kerry could only come up with the something trite: "...war is tough. We defend Israel's right to do what it is doing..." Well, of course. In 2011, at the G20 meeting, President Obama was also caught making an offhand remark about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, suggesting that he was "fed up with him" and perhaps even agreeing with then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Netanyahu was a liar. Earlier in 2011, Obama rebuffed meeting Netanyahu in the US, a surprise given the close US-Israel relationship in the past. The two have met as recently as this past March, with Netanyahu clearly stating that he would do nothing that would hinder Israeli national security. The two have spent more time attempting to lecture one another than to truly discuss options for peace.

The nonexistence of any legitimate relationship clearly undermines cooperative efforts to bring peace to the region. The damage done to the relationship may prove to solely be superficial - something a change in leadership on either side (or likely both sides) may correct. At the same time, the failure to secure any significant gains, not only in Israel, but in the greater Middle East as a whole, is a legacy that the Obama administration does not desire. In addition to the current Israeli-Hamas war, there are wars, on one level or another, in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Mali and political strife in Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Bahrain, and Iran (I'm sure I missed some). The toll in Syria alone may be as high as 160,000, not something that history or the administration can (continue to) easily brush aside.

The only options that remain during Obama's final few years in office are to make significant and serious decisions. The Washington Post suggests disarming Hamas; after all, how many political parties typically have a military wing (though it is important to note that some have in the past, including Israeli ones). Such bold action will not be easy, but any easy solutions have long since passed. It is time to make difficult decisions that bring change. Only with change can there be peace.

U.S. Role in Afghanistan Post-2014

In early October, prospects for a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan post-2014 looked bleak.  If the U.S. and Afghanistan could not negotiate an agreement soon, the U.S. would have to begin arrangements for a complete withdrawal of troops by the end of 2014.  Hoping to salvage the situation, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Afghanistan.  In mid-October, Kerry and Afghan president Hamid Karzai negotiated the terms of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan post-2014.  The chief sticking point had been whether alleged crimes committed by U.S. soldiers would fall under U.S. or Afghan jurisdiction.  The BSA gave the U.S. jurisdiction over these alleged crimes, a term that Karzai had opposed.  When the BSA was signed, Karzai said that the decision regarding jurisdiction must be made not by him but, rather, by the loya jirga -- a council of approximately 3,000 Afghan elders.

Fast forward to last week.  First, just as the loya jirga convened, President Karzai developed a new position on the BSA -- indicating that it should not be signed until after Afghanistan's April 2014 presidential elections.    After four days of deliberations, the loya jirga responded by approving the BSA and recommending that Karzai promptly sign it.  Karzai refused, indicating that he would not sign it until after the April 2014 elections and after the U.S. brought peace: "Peace is our precondition.  America should bring us peace and then we will sign it."

U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice traveled to Afghanistan to speak with Karzai.  Karzai now has a fresh set of demands that were not part of the original BSA:

Karzai told Rice that he would sign only after the United States helps his government begin peace talks with the Taliban and agrees to release all 17 Afghan citizens being held in the Guantanamo Bay detention center in Cuba, according to Afghan and U.S. officials. 

In addition to those new demands, the Afghan leader reiterated that he will not sign if “another [U.S.] soldier steps foot into an Afghan home,” Karzai spokesman Aimal Faizi said. The United States has already promised to show “restraint” in “home entries” by U.S. troops and to carry them out only in conjunction with Afghan troops, but the tactic remains a part of U.S. operations against some insurgents here.

Rice responded by noting that if the BSA was not signed by the end of the year, the U.S. would have no choice but to prepare for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops by the end of 2014.  The stakes were raised two days ago when, during a NATO strike against an insurgent, a two-year old was tragically killed and two women were injured.  The U.S. maintains that the strike targeted a mid-level Taliban commander traveling on a road, whereas Karzai and his administration maintain that the attack struck a residential home.  Both sides agree, however, that the civilians were killed during the attack.  Karzai noted that he would not sign the agreement if such "oppression" continued.

Putting aside Karzai's competing demands for the U.S. to provide peace and security while ensuring zero civilian casualties, the larger question is whether he will in fact sign the BSA by the end of the year.  Why, one might ask, can't the U.S. simply wait until April 2014 to find out whether Karzai will sign the BSA.  The answer, quite frankly, is that this is not feasible.  There are currently more than 86,000 NATO and affiliated troops in Afghanistan; 60,000 of these are American.  The logistics of transporting the troops; transporting, selling, or destroying the equipment; securing the bases; continuing to train Afghan forces; and myriad other issues, are simply staggering.  A succinct yet excellent account of the challenges posed by the logistics of the withdrawal from Afghanistan can be found here (the article, written in February 2013, anticipated that most troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2014).  In short, logistics alone -- setting politics aside for the moment -- dictate that the U.S. decide soon whether or not to withdraw troops.  While pundits may claim that the U.S. "should stay patient" and that waiting until after April to sign the BSA is acceptable, facts indicate otherwise.  If the U.S. is to keep troops in the country, for example, it cannot completely remove the infrastructure it currently has in place.

Of course, this post is simply reporting the situation with respect to ongoing negotiations as well as the pragmatic issue of logistical challenges.  Another question entirely is whether the benefits of a continued U.S. troop presence outweigh the costs in terms of lives lost (American, Afghan, and others), money, and anti-American sentiment.  That's a question we'll let you decide for yourselves.

Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons

President Obama's visit to Israel this week would be an excellent opportunity for some serious, evenhanded discussion on what's going on in Syria. In fact, the President should pull in  his national security team and ask Benjamin Netanyahu to do the same. Frankly, the testy relationship between the two leaders is reflected in the countries' differing statements on Syria's use of chemical weapons.

See, the Israelis are affirming reports that Syria has begun to use chemical weapons. The Syrians, of course, blame it on the rebels. As does Russia. The United States, however, is not so sure and is not jumping to any conclusions so quickly. In fact, the United States is "deeply skeptical," which of course sits none too well with Russia and Syria, who are demanding an investigation.

What seems likely is that someone used a chemical (or biological) agent of some sort. Given the levels of frustration and the severity of factions in rebel forces, it is impossible to rule out rebel use, perhaps even to attempt to trigger larger retaliation. President Obama's line in the sand will perhaps turn out to be a moving target. Does it truly mean only if government forces use them? Do dirty agents count, or only official ones? All these questions gloss over the point - the line in the sand is meant to protect the people. If anyone uses chemical agents to any extent, the line has been crossed. Moreover, continuous retreat is seen as a sign of weakness in the region (as well as elsewhere). One must hold their ground if resolution is truly a desired result. Lastly, the relationship between the United States and Israel could further be strained if they are unable to agree on the events and repercussions of those events in Syria, much like how the relationship has been strained over Iran.

Therefore, the time for action, on some level, is on the horizon. Even nominal air support, with drones perhaps, would indicate that the United States' position is firm and the line in the sand doesn't move with the wind. Such action will, in time, bring Syria closer to resolution, as well as likely continue to repair the relationship with Israel. It is not the time to let technicalities get in the way.

In a bid to stay relevant, Al Shabaab Places Bounty on Obama, Clinton

One curious item picked up by the major news outlets over the last 24 hours is the bounty placed on President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton (Click here if you haven't read it yet, though it's made yahoo's headlines since this post has been written). Clearly, the bounties are a play in a pretend tit-for-tat game with the United States. A few days prior, US officials leaked information on up to $33 million in bounties for Al Shabaab leadership (here). In return, Al Shabaab offered 10 camels for Obama and 2 camels for Clinton. The CNN article linked above mentions that the average price of a camel is $700 in Somalia, though a number of websites selling camels (likely not in Somalia) indicate that prices can be a few thousand per camel. So a guy with a $5 million dollar bounty on his head puts one of a up to a few ten thousands on his opponent.

Is the bounty price meant as an insult, or is it truly a sign of weakness? The information available so far does not indicate any insult. In fact, military strategy often notes to respect the strength of your opponent, until you can secure victory. The one exception is where an insult can lead to your opponent's position becoming unwound, none of which seems to apply here.

Let's also compare this bounty to others. There has been a $100,000 bounty on a rapper who insulted Islam and a $2.2 million bounty on the pastor who burnt the Koran, just to name a few. On the other side, a British parliamentarian supposedly offered (though later denied offering) a bounty of £10 million on President Obama. So this helps put the no more than $10,000 camel bounty placed by Al Shabaab in perspective.

At the same time, it is widely believed that Al Shabaab's power has diminished over the past year or so. Its tactics and strategies seem to be less and less effective. So much so that it has been forced to partner with Al Qaeda, which reflects on the diminishing power of both groups. It is rapidly losing territory and influence (ex: here and here). On a related note, despite there existing a lack of government, it has been argued that the Somali economy is no where near as absent as its government. This means that there should be more "money" for such a bounty. Perhaps. But many signs point to less capacity within Al Shabaab.

So what is the end goal? Al Shabaab is not capable of a tit for tat with the US, unless it is an imaginary one from the Islamist perspective wherein the small group from Somalia is fighting with the hegemon on the world stage. It's important to remember that terrorism is meant to spread an effect and any opportunity for publicity is critical. Islamist compete, much like nonprofits and politicians, for donations and funding. This is Al Shabaab's grab at a larger slice of the media pie and thereby, the funding critical for them to retain their previous power.