Amid the hubbub of Washington politics, the French continue to participate in offensives in North Africa. No one is really paying attention, which is a shame, since, if reports surfacing last week are true, the French have proven to significantly aid US foreign policy in the region.
Chadian troops assisting in the rebuff of militant forces in Mali have claimed to have killed Moktar Belmoktar, a regional rebel leader. Belmoktar has been active in the region for years, and has been continuously linked not just to organized crime, but also al Qaeda. Of course, nothing is taken for granted, as Chadian forces also claimed to have killed another significant regional leader days earlier. Belmoktar shot to infamy as the planner of the raid on the Algerian gas facility in January, which left scores of foreigners dead and nearly ignited the region. France has, in the meantime, taken possession of the bodies and is expected to carry out definitive DNA tests in the coming days. AQIM acknowledged the death of Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (the other leader), but strongly denied Belmoktar's loss, insisting he was still alive and fighting. None of this really says anything other than some rebel fighters were killed, not yet at least.
Since his death, Belmoktar's role in regional terrorism may have grown. Sources in recent days are further reporting that Belmoktar received a suspicious phone call after the attack in Benghazi last year that may tie him to that attack. If true (though we may never know), US access to further information about AQIM operations may be weakened with Belmoktar's and Zeid's deaths. At the same time, it will make it easier for the US and the President in particular to put the incident behind them.
So what does it all mean? Not much of anything until more information is known. Clearly the Sahara is not the prime asymmetrical warfare environment that other parts of the Middle East are. Nonetheless, the killing of rebel and al Qaeda leaders elsewhere has resulted in fragmentation, but not dissolution of terrorist cells and organizations. The combination of factors may hinder AQIM operations, but without the continued development of the region's societies and governments, AQIM won't disappear. The biggest question will certainly be - will this be enough for the French, and, if so, will that make a difference when the battles are left solely to the regional forces, who have yet to coalesce into a cohesive bunch.
Showing posts with label Mali. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mali. Show all posts
Friday, March 8, 2013
Wednesday, January 30, 2013
US Drone Program Expands to West Africa
A low key headline on CNN speaks volumes about potential future engagement options for the United States: U.S. to establish military presence next to Mali. Read beyond the headline and it is clear that not only will there be troops in Niger, there will be drones (previous Illexum notes on drones can be found here and here). On one hand, this is a critical move by US forces in recognizing that the Sahara and Sahel are key to future counterterrorism operations, albeit several years late. One does need to note that there is a drone base in Djibouti, which has primarily focused on East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Djibouti and Mali are worlds apart. Therefore, on the other hand , it is certainly frightening to watch the expansion of the drone program while still lacking clear rules of engagement and a full legal sign-off. While certainly seen in light of the recent conflict in Mali, this agreement was no doubt in the making already (though perhaps not prior to the beginning of Mali's disintegration nearly a year ago). With AQIM and other jihadists operating boldly throughout the desert landscape and regional armies all-but powerless to stop them, it is only a matter of time before this program is fast-tracked to get off the ground, literally.
Friday, January 18, 2013
Counterterrorism in North Africa: A Tale of Two Crises
Previous posts have addressed the French military intervention in Mali. In the meantime, to the very near northeast, another former French colony has grabbed the world's attention since militants took hostages at an Algerian gas field Wednesday. Widespread confusion has ensued, with reports Thursday suggesting some or most hostages escaped.
Today, we've learned more information -- namely, that an Algerian military operation has freed hundreds of hostages while at least 12 have died and approximately 30 remain unaccounted for (update: that number appears to now be 7 hostages still being held). The hostage crisis and the French intervention in Mali are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, early reports indicated that the terrorists in Algeria cited French intervention in Mali as cause for their actions, demanding that French and other Western countries cease operations in Mali.
The hostages at the gas field, many of them workers at the facility, hail from all over the world. Most were Algerian nationals, but among the hostages are British, French, American, Japanese, Belgian, Irish, Romanian, Malaysian, Filipino, and more. Clearly, the sheer number of countries' nationals involved in this tragedy demand a global reaction that will continue beyond the hostage crisis, but the exact nature of that reaction remains to be seen. Some people will suggest a policy of disengagement and/or containment, where these countries are left to their own devices. Recent history has shown us the price of failed states, however, both as a power vacuum for internal strife and a haven for outside terror and militant groups. As the Malian government faces a threat from internal militants, the French have opted for a strong armed force to buttress Malian forces and address the threat. This raises an interesting (and unclear) legal question, namely: under international law, what are the principles under which French or other forces might legitimately intervene and/or provide assistance to the Malian military junta?
Deborah Pearlstein over at OpinioJuris suggests the most logical legal principle would be consent from Mali, which raises its own web of complications:
One possible example from recent history is U.S. involvement in Yemen. A (hopefully) brief digression: When looking at a legal basis for U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, one would likely look to the 2002 AUMF as justification under domestic law. Under international law, however, the situation is trickier. While one might claim that U.S. action in Pakistan is a logical geographic extension of action in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said of Yemen. Rather, the most likely source of justification under international law is consent and collective self-defense. Let me be more specific: by permitting the U.S. to engage in military actions within its borders, Yemen relinquishes its territorial sovereignty. This doesn't solve the issue entirely, however; if Yemen's permission was all that was needed to permit U.S. drone strikes within Yemen's borders, then Yemen could theoretically permit action by the U.S. that it would not be allowed to legally commit on its own. Instead, the U.S. must be engaging in some sort of permitted military action under international law -- in this case, Yemen's self-defense against militants in a non-international armed conflict. Military action in Yemen has indeed shown Yemeni forces severely battling Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP. Although much of the U.S. involvement has been covert, enough has surfaced to indicate that U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has reached new peaks over the past year and has proven effective at targeting terrorists in the region.
U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has mostly come in the form of intelligence-sharing, aid, and U.S. drone strikes at areas Yemeni forces cannot reach themselves. Obviously, the French involvement in Mali is a stark contrast in many respects, with over 1,000 French troops committed in Mali. There are lessons to be learned from U.S. military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen (and, even Pakistan, once upon a time, when it used to provide the U.S. with airfields and intel for drone strikes). Those lessons can include proper levels of engagement, proper division of labor between domestic and foreign military actions, and navigating the murky waters of cooperation with a not-always-ideal domestic government. In this case, France (and to the extent it becomes involved, the U.S.) can learn from the complex U.S. involvement in Pakistan. The U.S. and Pakistan did not often see eye to eye, and indeed the relationship has become increasingly strained over the past two years. However, even in the face of stark disagreements (especially over hardly-secret Pakistani military aid to Afghan Taliban forces), the U.S. and Pakistan teamed up to target Pakistani Taliban forces -- an area of overlapping interests. Similarly, to the extent the U.S. considers involvement in Mali -- a country with whose government the U.S. has expressed serious reservations -- it might look for limited engagement in areas of shared interest. Of course, the downside to such involvement will be that, once again, the U.S. will risk calls of hypocrisy for supporting a non-democratic government. The alternative of extremists gaining a stronger foothold, on the other hand, is something that is in nobody's interest.
Today, we've learned more information -- namely, that an Algerian military operation has freed hundreds of hostages while at least 12 have died and approximately 30 remain unaccounted for (update: that number appears to now be 7 hostages still being held). The hostage crisis and the French intervention in Mali are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, early reports indicated that the terrorists in Algeria cited French intervention in Mali as cause for their actions, demanding that French and other Western countries cease operations in Mali.
The hostages at the gas field, many of them workers at the facility, hail from all over the world. Most were Algerian nationals, but among the hostages are British, French, American, Japanese, Belgian, Irish, Romanian, Malaysian, Filipino, and more. Clearly, the sheer number of countries' nationals involved in this tragedy demand a global reaction that will continue beyond the hostage crisis, but the exact nature of that reaction remains to be seen. Some people will suggest a policy of disengagement and/or containment, where these countries are left to their own devices. Recent history has shown us the price of failed states, however, both as a power vacuum for internal strife and a haven for outside terror and militant groups. As the Malian government faces a threat from internal militants, the French have opted for a strong armed force to buttress Malian forces and address the threat. This raises an interesting (and unclear) legal question, namely: under international law, what are the principles under which French or other forces might legitimately intervene and/or provide assistance to the Malian military junta?
Deborah Pearlstein over at OpinioJuris suggests the most logical legal principle would be consent from Mali, which raises its own web of complications:
Attacking anything in Mali raises territorial sovereignty concerns. Is there a government there that could lawfully consent to the U.S. use of force in country such that the U.S. wouldn't risk violating UN Charter article 2 prohibitions against the use of force? Consent, best I can tell, is the only option here. There's no UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. . . . So consent it is, and it would come from, best case, a government that seized power by coup and to which we've otherwise cut off military aid. The U.S. still maintains an embassy in Mali (as does Mali in the U.S.), so perhaps consent is not legally insurmountable. But I'd wonder both what the terms of the U.S. aid cut-off were, and whether there's any precedent for this.
One possible example from recent history is U.S. involvement in Yemen. A (hopefully) brief digression: When looking at a legal basis for U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, one would likely look to the 2002 AUMF as justification under domestic law. Under international law, however, the situation is trickier. While one might claim that U.S. action in Pakistan is a logical geographic extension of action in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said of Yemen. Rather, the most likely source of justification under international law is consent and collective self-defense. Let me be more specific: by permitting the U.S. to engage in military actions within its borders, Yemen relinquishes its territorial sovereignty. This doesn't solve the issue entirely, however; if Yemen's permission was all that was needed to permit U.S. drone strikes within Yemen's borders, then Yemen could theoretically permit action by the U.S. that it would not be allowed to legally commit on its own. Instead, the U.S. must be engaging in some sort of permitted military action under international law -- in this case, Yemen's self-defense against militants in a non-international armed conflict. Military action in Yemen has indeed shown Yemeni forces severely battling Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP. Although much of the U.S. involvement has been covert, enough has surfaced to indicate that U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has reached new peaks over the past year and has proven effective at targeting terrorists in the region.
U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has mostly come in the form of intelligence-sharing, aid, and U.S. drone strikes at areas Yemeni forces cannot reach themselves. Obviously, the French involvement in Mali is a stark contrast in many respects, with over 1,000 French troops committed in Mali. There are lessons to be learned from U.S. military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen (and, even Pakistan, once upon a time, when it used to provide the U.S. with airfields and intel for drone strikes). Those lessons can include proper levels of engagement, proper division of labor between domestic and foreign military actions, and navigating the murky waters of cooperation with a not-always-ideal domestic government. In this case, France (and to the extent it becomes involved, the U.S.) can learn from the complex U.S. involvement in Pakistan. The U.S. and Pakistan did not often see eye to eye, and indeed the relationship has become increasingly strained over the past two years. However, even in the face of stark disagreements (especially over hardly-secret Pakistani military aid to Afghan Taliban forces), the U.S. and Pakistan teamed up to target Pakistani Taliban forces -- an area of overlapping interests. Similarly, to the extent the U.S. considers involvement in Mali -- a country with whose government the U.S. has expressed serious reservations -- it might look for limited engagement in areas of shared interest. Of course, the downside to such involvement will be that, once again, the U.S. will risk calls of hypocrisy for supporting a non-democratic government. The alternative of extremists gaining a stronger foothold, on the other hand, is something that is in nobody's interest.
Wednesday, January 16, 2013
US Admits...Helping the French in Mali Would be a Web of Contradictions
An interesting piece in the Washington Post carefully notes some of the concerns that exist with US aid to French forces in Mali. As most everyone suspects, the idea of ground forces being deployed is near to nonexistent. In fact, logistical support and intelligence is about all that is being considered. France, however, has sent in ground forces, expecting up to 2,500 to be available soon, in addition to ECOWAS forces and the Malian military.
See, the problem seems to be two-fold.
First, Mali's government is not exactly considered legitimate by the US government. A March 2012 coup, followed since by military junta rule, has stifled any democratic development. The US terminated assistance and even critical aid is reviewed case by case. Perhaps this gut reaction wasn't the best idea, considering how the US has treated countries under similar conditions (Myanmar isn't a distant comparison, prior to its recent actions). Nonetheless, all this means that any direct support to Mali is out of the question. Moreover, there are questions as to what extent the US can even aid France without breaking the law. Meanwhile, some reports also implicate US officials in encouraging the French to strike quickly. All in all, the politics of this conflict are already messy.
The second problem is the rebels, which, like many insurgencies, are really a collective of a variety of groups, including those the US wishes to not retaliate against, such as local tribesmen, and those that are on the terrorist watch list, such as AQIM. In a sense, the US wants to avoid the muddy legal waters it can already see coming were it to strike, even accidentally, groups that it has not declared itself in conflict with. Although the Islamist control currently being battled is not in US interests, a vacuum of power in northern Mali is not quite the solution.
So while France seems to be gearing up, the US is waffling. To what extent should the US participate? US expertise on counterterrorism in North Africa has been rapidly developing capacity since around 2002. It would likely behoove the US to not throw it all away over some technicalities and instead to find a way to offer assistance that is both significant and legal at the same time. Failing to do so could require us to lead the way into Mali later on, a lesson from Vietnam we would hope to not repeat.
See, the problem seems to be two-fold.
First, Mali's government is not exactly considered legitimate by the US government. A March 2012 coup, followed since by military junta rule, has stifled any democratic development. The US terminated assistance and even critical aid is reviewed case by case. Perhaps this gut reaction wasn't the best idea, considering how the US has treated countries under similar conditions (Myanmar isn't a distant comparison, prior to its recent actions). Nonetheless, all this means that any direct support to Mali is out of the question. Moreover, there are questions as to what extent the US can even aid France without breaking the law. Meanwhile, some reports also implicate US officials in encouraging the French to strike quickly. All in all, the politics of this conflict are already messy.
The second problem is the rebels, which, like many insurgencies, are really a collective of a variety of groups, including those the US wishes to not retaliate against, such as local tribesmen, and those that are on the terrorist watch list, such as AQIM. In a sense, the US wants to avoid the muddy legal waters it can already see coming were it to strike, even accidentally, groups that it has not declared itself in conflict with. Although the Islamist control currently being battled is not in US interests, a vacuum of power in northern Mali is not quite the solution.
So while France seems to be gearing up, the US is waffling. To what extent should the US participate? US expertise on counterterrorism in North Africa has been rapidly developing capacity since around 2002. It would likely behoove the US to not throw it all away over some technicalities and instead to find a way to offer assistance that is both significant and legal at the same time. Failing to do so could require us to lead the way into Mali later on, a lesson from Vietnam we would hope to not repeat.
Sunday, January 13, 2013
The French Really Are Invading...
To briefly update the previous piece on French support to repel Islamist rebels in Mali, it turns out that the French have sent in significant, though irregular, ground forces, including paratroopers and helicopter gunships. Meanwhile, France has also raised its national alert level as Islamist forces have threatened to attack France itself. With estimates of 100 adversaries killed out of a force that likely numbers below 1,000, it will be interesting to see how long French President Hollande sticks to the statement in his speech: This operation will last as long as is necessary. This is a very vague and dangerous estimate, given the nature of insurgency and irregular warfare. It is not likely that France will be unable to root out the rebels entirely, but at what point will it feel the mission complete? The current effort seems to be focusing on reversing rebel gains in central Mali around the town of Konna. However, northern Mali, with its vast size and empty, dangerous landscape, is an different war entirely and could not be won by such a small force.
In addition to Mali, French troops went into Somalia, where at least two French troops lost their lives in a rescue attempt on a French citizen. The rescue attempt was ultimately unsuccessful.
Also to update, AFRICOM Combatant Commander General Carter Ham, who is visiting Niger, did imply that the US would be willing to provide some limited hands-off support, possibly in the form of drones or satellites. At the same time, General Ham has noted that a clearer plan for Mali would need to be in place prior to any US intervention. In a sense, the US could help, but wants to be sure the result is going to be effective, something it has had trouble with throughout the Middle East and Africa.
A quick overview of recent French intervention in Africa (which I was looking for the other day) can be found on the Washington Post.
In addition to Mali, French troops went into Somalia, where at least two French troops lost their lives in a rescue attempt on a French citizen. The rescue attempt was ultimately unsuccessful.
Also to update, AFRICOM Combatant Commander General Carter Ham, who is visiting Niger, did imply that the US would be willing to provide some limited hands-off support, possibly in the form of drones or satellites. At the same time, General Ham has noted that a clearer plan for Mali would need to be in place prior to any US intervention. In a sense, the US could help, but wants to be sure the result is going to be effective, something it has had trouble with throughout the Middle East and Africa.
A quick overview of recent French intervention in Africa (which I was looking for the other day) can be found on the Washington Post.
Friday, January 11, 2013
The French are Invading! (Sort of)
Well, not exactly. Or at least it's not clear yet what they're doing, apart from some form of military "support" with the troops organization by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to repel rebellious forces aligned with al-Qaeda. It's not even clear if French involvement is limited to air support, which is sorely needed, or also actively includes ground forces stationed in the region. Mali has been spiraling down a black hole for a while, and it has been particularly bad for at least six months.
Nonetheless, everyone seems happy with the party, so long as they don't have to participate. The United Kingdom, European Union, and the United States all extended support for the mission and French involvement. None hinted at physical support, even though some weapons in the hands of the rebels may be the result of those made available to Libyan rebels and in the wake of Libya's rebellion. The United Nations, having urged an African-led counter to the rebels in UNSC 2071 (October) and reaffirmed it in UNSC 2085 (December), is also pleased that the Security Council does not seem inept.
However, does any of this really have to do with any of these countries or pan-national bodies? Mali was under French colonial power until its independence in 1960. Since the waves of independence in Africa, France has consistently displayed a willingness to use military force to support post-independence governments. Although France is using Security Council resolutions to back its participation, there is little question that French forces would have otherwise assisted. The French have spent the past half-century attempting to use military force to attempt to fix substantive flaws in colonial administration that led to much post-independence violence, hatred, and bickering.
So while France continues to show its role in Africa, a role that it wants to have given the still potential impact of African countries and economies on trade, energy, and precious mineral availability, the United States is missing an opportunity. Wasn't AFRICOM created for specifically this purpose? Instead, AFRICOM seems to be sitting quietly in Germany, watching at best.
It remains to be seen what will come of this military intervention. Will the rebels be driven back, or will it falter? The only given so far is who is sitting this one out.
Nonetheless, everyone seems happy with the party, so long as they don't have to participate. The United Kingdom, European Union, and the United States all extended support for the mission and French involvement. None hinted at physical support, even though some weapons in the hands of the rebels may be the result of those made available to Libyan rebels and in the wake of Libya's rebellion. The United Nations, having urged an African-led counter to the rebels in UNSC 2071 (October) and reaffirmed it in UNSC 2085 (December), is also pleased that the Security Council does not seem inept.
However, does any of this really have to do with any of these countries or pan-national bodies? Mali was under French colonial power until its independence in 1960. Since the waves of independence in Africa, France has consistently displayed a willingness to use military force to support post-independence governments. Although France is using Security Council resolutions to back its participation, there is little question that French forces would have otherwise assisted. The French have spent the past half-century attempting to use military force to attempt to fix substantive flaws in colonial administration that led to much post-independence violence, hatred, and bickering.
So while France continues to show its role in Africa, a role that it wants to have given the still potential impact of African countries and economies on trade, energy, and precious mineral availability, the United States is missing an opportunity. Wasn't AFRICOM created for specifically this purpose? Instead, AFRICOM seems to be sitting quietly in Germany, watching at best.
It remains to be seen what will come of this military intervention. Will the rebels be driven back, or will it falter? The only given so far is who is sitting this one out.
Wednesday, July 25, 2012
Silence: The World's Reaction to Islamism in Mali
This could be a fun exercise: point out Mali on the world map. Much like Iraq, many adults likely do not know where Mali is, or even possibly what continent it is on. Somewhat ironically, many have likely heard of Timbuktu, the ancient center of learning, which is found in present-day Mali. Although the general population is much unaware of Mali, it is deplorable that statesmen around the world, unceremoniously including those here in the US, are ignoring the situation in Mali.
To give a quick rundown. In March, soldiers staged a coup and ousted the government. Tuareg rebels, more or less tied to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), quickly expanded their insurgency and now all-but control the country's north. Meanwhile, a military government, propped up by the coup, continues to control the quickly deteriorating government, or what's left of it. The ingredients for a failed state are quickly manifesting themselves and mixing into a violent concoction.
International reaction? Condemnation. US reaction? None, though a quick Google search does show that the US has now allotted $10 million for Malian refugees. The F-22 Raptor fighter plane costs $150 million a pop. By the time that money reaches Mali, it will be all-but spent.
In summary, the international reaction has resembled a couple of crickets having a conversation. While the West seemingly focuses its attention to its own crises, it ignores the problems brewing on its borders. Mali is ever close to the countries clinging to delicate democratic ideals and processes borne out of the Arab Spring. More critically, Mali's lawless north presents an opportunity for Muslim extremists to carve out space for independent action. It's happened in Africa before, with Sudan and Libya entertaining some relationships with international terrorists. But Mali is a new case - there is no strongman keeping it together. Mali is closer to Afghanistan - remote and on the verge of collapse. So while Syria is a trendy topic, Mali is ignored.
It seems that, with every moment, the world leans closer to collapse. The West is so enamored with saving its own economies that it fails to ignore the problems that may affect those economies in the not-too-distant future. Perhaps, and this is just a thought, condemnation isn't enough. Action is needed if Mali is to regain its internal sovereignty. While Mali may no longer be critical to the international system as in its heyday, it would be wise for the international community to think critically and support, either directly or indirectly, the capacity Mali requires to avoid it becoming a hotbed for international terrorism.
To give a quick rundown. In March, soldiers staged a coup and ousted the government. Tuareg rebels, more or less tied to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), quickly expanded their insurgency and now all-but control the country's north. Meanwhile, a military government, propped up by the coup, continues to control the quickly deteriorating government, or what's left of it. The ingredients for a failed state are quickly manifesting themselves and mixing into a violent concoction.
International reaction? Condemnation. US reaction? None, though a quick Google search does show that the US has now allotted $10 million for Malian refugees. The F-22 Raptor fighter plane costs $150 million a pop. By the time that money reaches Mali, it will be all-but spent.
In summary, the international reaction has resembled a couple of crickets having a conversation. While the West seemingly focuses its attention to its own crises, it ignores the problems brewing on its borders. Mali is ever close to the countries clinging to delicate democratic ideals and processes borne out of the Arab Spring. More critically, Mali's lawless north presents an opportunity for Muslim extremists to carve out space for independent action. It's happened in Africa before, with Sudan and Libya entertaining some relationships with international terrorists. But Mali is a new case - there is no strongman keeping it together. Mali is closer to Afghanistan - remote and on the verge of collapse. So while Syria is a trendy topic, Mali is ignored.
It seems that, with every moment, the world leans closer to collapse. The West is so enamored with saving its own economies that it fails to ignore the problems that may affect those economies in the not-too-distant future. Perhaps, and this is just a thought, condemnation isn't enough. Action is needed if Mali is to regain its internal sovereignty. While Mali may no longer be critical to the international system as in its heyday, it would be wise for the international community to think critically and support, either directly or indirectly, the capacity Mali requires to avoid it becoming a hotbed for international terrorism.
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