Is Hugo Chavez alive? is a question that is likely going to gain popularity over the coming months. Apart from obscure family photos the other day, the Venezuelan president has not been seen since going to Cuba for treatment on his recurring cancer.
The latest news from the Venezuelan front is that Chavez has instructed diplomats to improve relations with the United States. This move could reflect the inner strains of Venezuela's other foreign partners. Chavez has consistently courted American adversaries, including Syria and Iran. Syria has been embroiled in civil war for two years. Iran has elections looming and its economy has been all-but shuttered by sanctions. Venezuela still does have ties with China, but China's economy has slowed and its potential clash in the South China Sea would not necessarily benefit Venezuela. The US meanwhile continues to buy oil from Venezuela, though lessening US reliance on oil could hamper not only the country, but the significant benefit that high oil prices have brought it. Sending oil to China is more complex and costly than to the US.
This could certainly be an opportunity to mend relations between the two countries. More importantly, it could be an avenue through which to build post-Chavez ties. Who knows how much longer he will hold on to power, or be around, for that matter.
Sunday, February 17, 2013
Sunday, February 3, 2013
Egypt: On Elections and Protests
The past week and a half saw great unrest in Egypt as dozens were killed in protests, riots, and clashes with security forces. Yesterday, the Egyptian PM's car was, according to state TV, pelted with stones by protesters in Tahir Square.
Over the past two years, protests in Egypt seem to be as much the rule as the exception. Furthermore, protests appear to enjoy more organization than, say, pre-election planning. One glaring example is this past December's two-step constitutional referendum, passed by a stark 64%-36% margin. The opposition, which appears to have no trouble galvanizing itself for protests, suffered from a crippling lack of coherence and organization in the weeks and months leading up to the referendum. For example, with less than a week before the referendum, Egypt's opposition parties had not decided whether to boycott or vote no. They ultimately decided to participate in the referendum, but it should not come as a surprise that their efforts fell short. In fact, turnout was low for the referendum overall -- an estimated 32.9% turnout. Critics and opposition leaders criticized the process, complaining both about a sense of exclusion from the drafting process and vague wording of the text itself. As the opposition, however, it is your duty to both organize your supporters and offer an alternate vision for your country. The opposition in Egypt has made its disappointment over Morsi's rule extremely vocal, in the form of protests. As part of the long road to stable democracy, however, the opposition must become more involved in the less flashy forms of government -- namely, elections (and all the attendant groundwork involved in them) and specific governance and policy issues. Until it does so, Egypt will continue to muddle through the aftermath of its revolution, its future lurching from one extreme to another.
Over the past two years, protests in Egypt seem to be as much the rule as the exception. Furthermore, protests appear to enjoy more organization than, say, pre-election planning. One glaring example is this past December's two-step constitutional referendum, passed by a stark 64%-36% margin. The opposition, which appears to have no trouble galvanizing itself for protests, suffered from a crippling lack of coherence and organization in the weeks and months leading up to the referendum. For example, with less than a week before the referendum, Egypt's opposition parties had not decided whether to boycott or vote no. They ultimately decided to participate in the referendum, but it should not come as a surprise that their efforts fell short. In fact, turnout was low for the referendum overall -- an estimated 32.9% turnout. Critics and opposition leaders criticized the process, complaining both about a sense of exclusion from the drafting process and vague wording of the text itself. As the opposition, however, it is your duty to both organize your supporters and offer an alternate vision for your country. The opposition in Egypt has made its disappointment over Morsi's rule extremely vocal, in the form of protests. As part of the long road to stable democracy, however, the opposition must become more involved in the less flashy forms of government -- namely, elections (and all the attendant groundwork involved in them) and specific governance and policy issues. Until it does so, Egypt will continue to muddle through the aftermath of its revolution, its future lurching from one extreme to another.
Thursday, January 31, 2013
Israel Bombs Syria, Everyone Stays Quiet
Reports surfaced today of an apparent Israeli aerial incursion into Syria, destroying a convoy near Damascus. Other reports indicate a research facility of some sort (biochemical weapons is assumed) was attacked. Syria denies that the Israelis attacked a convoy headed for Lebanon and presumably Hizbullah.
Naturally, the Israelis are quiet. Surprisingly, so is most everyone else. (The US did confirm it was an Israeli strike)
Israel has been wary of the civil war in Syria for quite some time. That uneasiness has only increased as Assad's power wanes and the situation becomes ever more desperate. Many analysts worry that this strike only raises the instability in the region. Apart from all out regional war, how much more unstable the Middle East can get is really questionable.
With Syria continuing to supply weapons to Hizbullah, the Israelis are concerned that those weapons may begin to include biological and chemical agents. However, with Syrian forces engaged all across its own territory, the likelihood of counterattack in response to a strike is limited. The press release from Syria disguised as a news article may be the most that can be spared. Therefore, the logic behind this military action can be seen clearly.
Apart from these facts, it seems more likely for Assad to take any possible weapons with him in retreat to the Alawite territory than to give it to Hizbullah. Selling the excess of what cannot be brought, however, may be a possibility, but it is unlikely that Assad has reached that stage yet. Instead, any possibility that it had, or the option to eliminate a weapons delivery of any sort, with minimal repercussions, was taken.
The most interesting non-news piece of this entire incident is how quiet everyone is. Russia called the action "unacceptable," but is also "clarifying" the incident. Little to no information from other countries can be found. It seems that Syria really has no friends left these days. Perhaps it is time for Assad to make for that exit, or retreat, whatever the wish is.
Naturally, the Israelis are quiet. Surprisingly, so is most everyone else. (The US did confirm it was an Israeli strike)
Israel has been wary of the civil war in Syria for quite some time. That uneasiness has only increased as Assad's power wanes and the situation becomes ever more desperate. Many analysts worry that this strike only raises the instability in the region. Apart from all out regional war, how much more unstable the Middle East can get is really questionable.
With Syria continuing to supply weapons to Hizbullah, the Israelis are concerned that those weapons may begin to include biological and chemical agents. However, with Syrian forces engaged all across its own territory, the likelihood of counterattack in response to a strike is limited. The press release from Syria disguised as a news article may be the most that can be spared. Therefore, the logic behind this military action can be seen clearly.
Apart from these facts, it seems more likely for Assad to take any possible weapons with him in retreat to the Alawite territory than to give it to Hizbullah. Selling the excess of what cannot be brought, however, may be a possibility, but it is unlikely that Assad has reached that stage yet. Instead, any possibility that it had, or the option to eliminate a weapons delivery of any sort, with minimal repercussions, was taken.
The most interesting non-news piece of this entire incident is how quiet everyone is. Russia called the action "unacceptable," but is also "clarifying" the incident. Little to no information from other countries can be found. It seems that Syria really has no friends left these days. Perhaps it is time for Assad to make for that exit, or retreat, whatever the wish is.
Wednesday, January 30, 2013
US Drone Program Expands to West Africa
A low key headline on CNN speaks volumes about potential future engagement options for the United States: U.S. to establish military presence next to Mali. Read beyond the headline and it is clear that not only will there be troops in Niger, there will be drones (previous Illexum notes on drones can be found here and here). On one hand, this is a critical move by US forces in recognizing that the Sahara and Sahel are key to future counterterrorism operations, albeit several years late. One does need to note that there is a drone base in Djibouti, which has primarily focused on East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Djibouti and Mali are worlds apart. Therefore, on the other hand , it is certainly frightening to watch the expansion of the drone program while still lacking clear rules of engagement and a full legal sign-off. While certainly seen in light of the recent conflict in Mali, this agreement was no doubt in the making already (though perhaps not prior to the beginning of Mali's disintegration nearly a year ago). With AQIM and other jihadists operating boldly throughout the desert landscape and regional armies all-but powerless to stop them, it is only a matter of time before this program is fast-tracked to get off the ground, literally.
Friday, January 18, 2013
Counterterrorism in North Africa: A Tale of Two Crises
Previous posts have addressed the French military intervention in Mali. In the meantime, to the very near northeast, another former French colony has grabbed the world's attention since militants took hostages at an Algerian gas field Wednesday. Widespread confusion has ensued, with reports Thursday suggesting some or most hostages escaped.
Today, we've learned more information -- namely, that an Algerian military operation has freed hundreds of hostages while at least 12 have died and approximately 30 remain unaccounted for (update: that number appears to now be 7 hostages still being held). The hostage crisis and the French intervention in Mali are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, early reports indicated that the terrorists in Algeria cited French intervention in Mali as cause for their actions, demanding that French and other Western countries cease operations in Mali.
The hostages at the gas field, many of them workers at the facility, hail from all over the world. Most were Algerian nationals, but among the hostages are British, French, American, Japanese, Belgian, Irish, Romanian, Malaysian, Filipino, and more. Clearly, the sheer number of countries' nationals involved in this tragedy demand a global reaction that will continue beyond the hostage crisis, but the exact nature of that reaction remains to be seen. Some people will suggest a policy of disengagement and/or containment, where these countries are left to their own devices. Recent history has shown us the price of failed states, however, both as a power vacuum for internal strife and a haven for outside terror and militant groups. As the Malian government faces a threat from internal militants, the French have opted for a strong armed force to buttress Malian forces and address the threat. This raises an interesting (and unclear) legal question, namely: under international law, what are the principles under which French or other forces might legitimately intervene and/or provide assistance to the Malian military junta?
Deborah Pearlstein over at OpinioJuris suggests the most logical legal principle would be consent from Mali, which raises its own web of complications:
One possible example from recent history is U.S. involvement in Yemen. A (hopefully) brief digression: When looking at a legal basis for U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, one would likely look to the 2002 AUMF as justification under domestic law. Under international law, however, the situation is trickier. While one might claim that U.S. action in Pakistan is a logical geographic extension of action in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said of Yemen. Rather, the most likely source of justification under international law is consent and collective self-defense. Let me be more specific: by permitting the U.S. to engage in military actions within its borders, Yemen relinquishes its territorial sovereignty. This doesn't solve the issue entirely, however; if Yemen's permission was all that was needed to permit U.S. drone strikes within Yemen's borders, then Yemen could theoretically permit action by the U.S. that it would not be allowed to legally commit on its own. Instead, the U.S. must be engaging in some sort of permitted military action under international law -- in this case, Yemen's self-defense against militants in a non-international armed conflict. Military action in Yemen has indeed shown Yemeni forces severely battling Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP. Although much of the U.S. involvement has been covert, enough has surfaced to indicate that U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has reached new peaks over the past year and has proven effective at targeting terrorists in the region.
U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has mostly come in the form of intelligence-sharing, aid, and U.S. drone strikes at areas Yemeni forces cannot reach themselves. Obviously, the French involvement in Mali is a stark contrast in many respects, with over 1,000 French troops committed in Mali. There are lessons to be learned from U.S. military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen (and, even Pakistan, once upon a time, when it used to provide the U.S. with airfields and intel for drone strikes). Those lessons can include proper levels of engagement, proper division of labor between domestic and foreign military actions, and navigating the murky waters of cooperation with a not-always-ideal domestic government. In this case, France (and to the extent it becomes involved, the U.S.) can learn from the complex U.S. involvement in Pakistan. The U.S. and Pakistan did not often see eye to eye, and indeed the relationship has become increasingly strained over the past two years. However, even in the face of stark disagreements (especially over hardly-secret Pakistani military aid to Afghan Taliban forces), the U.S. and Pakistan teamed up to target Pakistani Taliban forces -- an area of overlapping interests. Similarly, to the extent the U.S. considers involvement in Mali -- a country with whose government the U.S. has expressed serious reservations -- it might look for limited engagement in areas of shared interest. Of course, the downside to such involvement will be that, once again, the U.S. will risk calls of hypocrisy for supporting a non-democratic government. The alternative of extremists gaining a stronger foothold, on the other hand, is something that is in nobody's interest.
Today, we've learned more information -- namely, that an Algerian military operation has freed hundreds of hostages while at least 12 have died and approximately 30 remain unaccounted for (update: that number appears to now be 7 hostages still being held). The hostage crisis and the French intervention in Mali are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, early reports indicated that the terrorists in Algeria cited French intervention in Mali as cause for their actions, demanding that French and other Western countries cease operations in Mali.
The hostages at the gas field, many of them workers at the facility, hail from all over the world. Most were Algerian nationals, but among the hostages are British, French, American, Japanese, Belgian, Irish, Romanian, Malaysian, Filipino, and more. Clearly, the sheer number of countries' nationals involved in this tragedy demand a global reaction that will continue beyond the hostage crisis, but the exact nature of that reaction remains to be seen. Some people will suggest a policy of disengagement and/or containment, where these countries are left to their own devices. Recent history has shown us the price of failed states, however, both as a power vacuum for internal strife and a haven for outside terror and militant groups. As the Malian government faces a threat from internal militants, the French have opted for a strong armed force to buttress Malian forces and address the threat. This raises an interesting (and unclear) legal question, namely: under international law, what are the principles under which French or other forces might legitimately intervene and/or provide assistance to the Malian military junta?
Deborah Pearlstein over at OpinioJuris suggests the most logical legal principle would be consent from Mali, which raises its own web of complications:
Attacking anything in Mali raises territorial sovereignty concerns. Is there a government there that could lawfully consent to the U.S. use of force in country such that the U.S. wouldn't risk violating UN Charter article 2 prohibitions against the use of force? Consent, best I can tell, is the only option here. There's no UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. . . . So consent it is, and it would come from, best case, a government that seized power by coup and to which we've otherwise cut off military aid. The U.S. still maintains an embassy in Mali (as does Mali in the U.S.), so perhaps consent is not legally insurmountable. But I'd wonder both what the terms of the U.S. aid cut-off were, and whether there's any precedent for this.
One possible example from recent history is U.S. involvement in Yemen. A (hopefully) brief digression: When looking at a legal basis for U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, one would likely look to the 2002 AUMF as justification under domestic law. Under international law, however, the situation is trickier. While one might claim that U.S. action in Pakistan is a logical geographic extension of action in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said of Yemen. Rather, the most likely source of justification under international law is consent and collective self-defense. Let me be more specific: by permitting the U.S. to engage in military actions within its borders, Yemen relinquishes its territorial sovereignty. This doesn't solve the issue entirely, however; if Yemen's permission was all that was needed to permit U.S. drone strikes within Yemen's borders, then Yemen could theoretically permit action by the U.S. that it would not be allowed to legally commit on its own. Instead, the U.S. must be engaging in some sort of permitted military action under international law -- in this case, Yemen's self-defense against militants in a non-international armed conflict. Military action in Yemen has indeed shown Yemeni forces severely battling Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP. Although much of the U.S. involvement has been covert, enough has surfaced to indicate that U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has reached new peaks over the past year and has proven effective at targeting terrorists in the region.
U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has mostly come in the form of intelligence-sharing, aid, and U.S. drone strikes at areas Yemeni forces cannot reach themselves. Obviously, the French involvement in Mali is a stark contrast in many respects, with over 1,000 French troops committed in Mali. There are lessons to be learned from U.S. military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen (and, even Pakistan, once upon a time, when it used to provide the U.S. with airfields and intel for drone strikes). Those lessons can include proper levels of engagement, proper division of labor between domestic and foreign military actions, and navigating the murky waters of cooperation with a not-always-ideal domestic government. In this case, France (and to the extent it becomes involved, the U.S.) can learn from the complex U.S. involvement in Pakistan. The U.S. and Pakistan did not often see eye to eye, and indeed the relationship has become increasingly strained over the past two years. However, even in the face of stark disagreements (especially over hardly-secret Pakistani military aid to Afghan Taliban forces), the U.S. and Pakistan teamed up to target Pakistani Taliban forces -- an area of overlapping interests. Similarly, to the extent the U.S. considers involvement in Mali -- a country with whose government the U.S. has expressed serious reservations -- it might look for limited engagement in areas of shared interest. Of course, the downside to such involvement will be that, once again, the U.S. will risk calls of hypocrisy for supporting a non-democratic government. The alternative of extremists gaining a stronger foothold, on the other hand, is something that is in nobody's interest.
Wednesday, January 16, 2013
US Admits...Helping the French in Mali Would be a Web of Contradictions
An interesting piece in the Washington Post carefully notes some of the concerns that exist with US aid to French forces in Mali. As most everyone suspects, the idea of ground forces being deployed is near to nonexistent. In fact, logistical support and intelligence is about all that is being considered. France, however, has sent in ground forces, expecting up to 2,500 to be available soon, in addition to ECOWAS forces and the Malian military.
See, the problem seems to be two-fold.
First, Mali's government is not exactly considered legitimate by the US government. A March 2012 coup, followed since by military junta rule, has stifled any democratic development. The US terminated assistance and even critical aid is reviewed case by case. Perhaps this gut reaction wasn't the best idea, considering how the US has treated countries under similar conditions (Myanmar isn't a distant comparison, prior to its recent actions). Nonetheless, all this means that any direct support to Mali is out of the question. Moreover, there are questions as to what extent the US can even aid France without breaking the law. Meanwhile, some reports also implicate US officials in encouraging the French to strike quickly. All in all, the politics of this conflict are already messy.
The second problem is the rebels, which, like many insurgencies, are really a collective of a variety of groups, including those the US wishes to not retaliate against, such as local tribesmen, and those that are on the terrorist watch list, such as AQIM. In a sense, the US wants to avoid the muddy legal waters it can already see coming were it to strike, even accidentally, groups that it has not declared itself in conflict with. Although the Islamist control currently being battled is not in US interests, a vacuum of power in northern Mali is not quite the solution.
So while France seems to be gearing up, the US is waffling. To what extent should the US participate? US expertise on counterterrorism in North Africa has been rapidly developing capacity since around 2002. It would likely behoove the US to not throw it all away over some technicalities and instead to find a way to offer assistance that is both significant and legal at the same time. Failing to do so could require us to lead the way into Mali later on, a lesson from Vietnam we would hope to not repeat.
See, the problem seems to be two-fold.
First, Mali's government is not exactly considered legitimate by the US government. A March 2012 coup, followed since by military junta rule, has stifled any democratic development. The US terminated assistance and even critical aid is reviewed case by case. Perhaps this gut reaction wasn't the best idea, considering how the US has treated countries under similar conditions (Myanmar isn't a distant comparison, prior to its recent actions). Nonetheless, all this means that any direct support to Mali is out of the question. Moreover, there are questions as to what extent the US can even aid France without breaking the law. Meanwhile, some reports also implicate US officials in encouraging the French to strike quickly. All in all, the politics of this conflict are already messy.
The second problem is the rebels, which, like many insurgencies, are really a collective of a variety of groups, including those the US wishes to not retaliate against, such as local tribesmen, and those that are on the terrorist watch list, such as AQIM. In a sense, the US wants to avoid the muddy legal waters it can already see coming were it to strike, even accidentally, groups that it has not declared itself in conflict with. Although the Islamist control currently being battled is not in US interests, a vacuum of power in northern Mali is not quite the solution.
So while France seems to be gearing up, the US is waffling. To what extent should the US participate? US expertise on counterterrorism in North Africa has been rapidly developing capacity since around 2002. It would likely behoove the US to not throw it all away over some technicalities and instead to find a way to offer assistance that is both significant and legal at the same time. Failing to do so could require us to lead the way into Mali later on, a lesson from Vietnam we would hope to not repeat.
Sunday, January 13, 2013
US Admits Helping French Forces...in Somalia
News came out earlier today that US jets entered Somali airspace in assistance to the failed French attempt to free a hostage. No actual engagement took place. It is interesting that the US chose to help the French in an attempted hostage rescue, but has yet to aid any against rebel forces/AQIM in Mali.
Separately, can a country's airspace be violated if said country has "no" government?
Separately, can a country's airspace be violated if said country has "no" government?
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