Stifling Dissent and Thwarting Protests in Post-Revolution States

Protests in Ukraine

The protests in Ukraine have received extensive media coverage in recent weeks.  These protests, which began as an almost spontaneous reaction to President Victor Yanukovych's decision to scuttle a trade deal with the EU at the last minute, have transformed into a massive expression of widespread discontent with the current regime. (The trade deal was more of a spark that ignited protests for myriad underlying reasons.  For a more in-depth treatment of those underlying reasons, see this previous post from early December 2013).

The Yanukovych government's reactions to the protests have varied greatly; the common thread has been their lack of success.  First, three days after the iconic toppling of the Lenin statue in Kiev, the government tried cracking down by forcibly removing protest barricades.  When this proved unavailing, in mid-December the government suggested it would soon sign the trade deal with the EU after all.  It soon went in the complete opposite direction, negotiating a shadowy deal with Russia on December 17th involving a $15 billion loan and large cuts in natural gas prices amounting to approximately a 1/3 drop in prices.  Details of that deal remain unclear, but protesters were suspicious.  In fact, the protests were re-energized in late December 2013.

January 25, 2014: Protesters clash with riot police in Kiev, Ukraine. (Source: Yahoo News)

The government's next move was to pass new laws in mid-January greatly restricting the right to protest and sending individuals who slandered government officials to one year of "corrective labor."  Protesters were undeterred, clashed with riot police, and even took over some government buildings.  Yanukovych then offered the prime ministership and top government posts to opposition leaders, which they rejected.  This past Tuesday, the prime minster and his cabinet resigned and the government repealed the anti-protest laws it had passed in mid-January.  The government also passed an amnesty law for the protesters which was conditioned on the fact that they stop protesting within two weeks; the protesters rejected this measure.

Protests in Egypt

In Egypt, the military government has similarly found itself the target of resilient protests.  Its response has escalated and been even harsher than Ukraine's.  Outlawing participation in protests generally and the Muslim Brotherhood specifically failed to end anti-government protests.  The government then labeled the group a terrorist organization and made mere participation in the Brotherhood an offense punishable by five years' imprisonment.  The protests, as well as arrests for them, have continued into the new year.

January 17, 2014: Protesters clash with riot police in Cario. (Source: CNN.com)

In 2013, the government also clamped down on freedom of the press.  It shut down media it deemed to harbor pro-Brotherhood sympathies, with the notable exception of al Jazeera.  The seeming exception for al Jazeera has proven illusory, as the government previously imprisoned several of the media organization's employees and just recently indicted 20 al Jazeera reporters -- eight are in custody while the rest were declared fugitives -- for creating "false" portrayals of the Brotherhood's protests.

The Bottom Line

Ukraine and Egypt are both deeply divided countries struggling to forge their respective post-revolution identities.  In Ukraine, the pro-Western movement saw its 2004 Orange Revolution gains dissipate as Victor Yanukovych -- the standardbearer of pre-revolution, pro-Russian policies -- came to power.  Yet Yanukovych himself took steps toward European integration, and the current crisis is a result of his backtracking on those steps.  In Egypt, meanwhile, the 2011 revolution that led to Mubarak's ouster also led to the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and, after a year of rule under Mohammed Morsi, a return to military rule after a protest-inspired military coup.  That military government is now struggling to clamp down the persistent protests of the ousted Brotherhood.  In Ukraine, the deep split is over pro-Europe and pro-Russian sentiments (and the split is itself largely divided along geographic lines), whereas in Egypt the split is between secularism and Islamism.  In both countries, however, the current crises of legitimacy stem from the governing group's inability to satisfactorily address that divide.

While the narrative of a deeply divided country is hardly unique, and indeed can be found in many countries throughout the world, what is unique to Egypt and Ukraine in current world affairs is the months-long persistence of protests aimed at bringing down a post-revolution regime.  While many people imagine slow steps forward following a pro-democratic revolution, both of these countries have addressed the protests by clamping down on freedoms of protest and the press.  This strategy might have prevailed in the pre-social media days or even today in a tightly-controlled country ala North Korea, but it has proven grossly ineffective in both countries.  As part of their growing pains, the current regimes will have to learn that to govern means to be criticized; to govern effectively, moreover, might even mean listening to your critics.


Previous Illexum Posts
Ukraine: Overlooked, Underreported
Ukraine Protests Grow, Government Wavers, World Begins to Take Notice
Egypt Update: Muslim Brotherhood Declared Terrorist Organization

Coup? What's a Coup?

...our month-long summer hibernation is over...

Coup: a sudden, violent, and illegal seizure of power from a government (Oxford Dictionary)

Coup: a change in government that is not in the nation's interest, when we decide that it's not, and not any sooner (United States government definition)

There is, of course, a formal definition likely somewhere buried in the government's glossary, but it's not quite relevant. It is clear in everyone's eyes that Egypt's change in government was a coup, whether or not the United States supported the change.

Since the overthrow, the United States has been on the "what do we do!?!" fence for what has seemed like an eternity. Formally labeling the change in government a coup leads to all sorts of ramifications, domestically and abroad. Namely, the US aid agreement with Egypt would likely be invalidated by the coup definition. This could complicate matters with the silent, but reciprocal aid given to Israel to avoid a perception of favoritism in the Middle East. Save for Afghanistan, Egypt and Israel are at the top of the list for United States military aid, and largely have been so since their 1979 peace treaty. At home, the government could be on the hook for the contracts that would terminate as a result of halting aid to Egypt - and the price is not cheap.

Quietly, over the past week, reports have leaked that aid to Egypt is not only under review, but may have already been suspended. Of course, this could be a technicality with a time lag - purchases already made for the fiscal year could be in the past and the looming cut so far in the future that it is still under discussion. Other funding tranches may simply not yet be due. Nonetheless, the positive side is sending a signal. The mess needs to be cleaned up and in an orderly fashion - not with civilians bleeding in the streets. Egypt may turn out, after all, to be a comparison against the change in regime in Iraq. What path is the one that leads toward a better future? Only time will tell.

US Admits...Helping the French in Mali Would be a Web of Contradictions

An interesting piece in the Washington Post carefully notes some of the concerns that exist with US aid to French forces in Mali. As most everyone suspects, the idea of ground forces being deployed is near to nonexistent. In fact, logistical support and intelligence is about all that is being considered. France, however, has sent in ground forces, expecting up to 2,500 to be available soon, in addition to ECOWAS forces and the Malian military.

See, the problem seems to be two-fold.

First, Mali's government is not exactly considered legitimate by the US government. A March 2012 coup, followed since by military junta rule, has stifled any democratic development. The US terminated assistance and even critical aid is reviewed case by case. Perhaps this gut reaction wasn't the best idea, considering how the US has treated countries under similar conditions (Myanmar isn't a distant comparison, prior to its recent actions). Nonetheless, all this means that any direct support to Mali is out of the question. Moreover, there are questions as to what extent the US can even aid France without breaking the law. Meanwhile, some reports also implicate US officials in encouraging the French to strike quickly. All in all, the politics of this conflict are already messy.

The second problem is the rebels, which, like many insurgencies, are really a collective of a variety of groups, including those the US wishes to not retaliate against, such as local tribesmen, and those that are on the terrorist watch list, such as AQIM. In a sense, the US wants to avoid the muddy legal waters it can already see coming were it to strike, even accidentally, groups that it has not declared itself in conflict with. Although the Islamist control currently being battled is not in US interests, a vacuum of power in northern Mali is not quite the solution.

So while France seems to be gearing up, the US is waffling. To what extent should the US participate? US expertise on counterterrorism in North Africa has been rapidly developing capacity since around 2002. It would likely behoove the US to not throw it all away over some technicalities and instead to find a way to offer assistance that is both significant and legal at the same time. Failing to do so could require us to lead the way into Mali later on, a lesson from Vietnam we would hope to not repeat.