Growing Pains in Iraq: Reconciling Federalism

Few people believed that Iraq was magically reborn following the departure of the remaining U.S. troops from Iraq in late 2011. After all, that withdrawal was years in the making, both politically and militarily. Even then, there was debate over how Iraq would be shaped, in 2012 and beyond. It was surmised that a Sunni-Shia rift would continue, fueled in part by insurgents pushing the boundaries of Iraqi security forces. At the same time, concerns about Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki's (who is Shia) leadership also existed, in light of clear pro-Shia favoritism.

It seems that "messy democracy" is the favorite description of Iraq over the years; however, this description is really just an easy way to not say anything at all. It's a way to say Iraqi democracy is not the democracy of Norway (ranked #1 in the Democracy Index), but is also not the democracy of Zimbabwe (ranked #148). It is clear that Iraq is somewhere in the middle (#113 in 2012). But what direction is that democracy headed toward - Norway or Zimbabwe?

This is not a question that has an easy answer. Iraqi federalism has been discussed over and over gain. How will the country look? It has been debated whether Iraq can even hold itself together as a single unified country, given its history, colonially drawn borders, and somewhat diverse populations. What power-sharing structures will exist? That entails whether Iraq function as an open democracy where one viewpoint transitions power to another bloodlessly, or would a constitutional requirement for a constant mix of viewpoints be necessary. As well, the level of autonomy given to individual provinces - should Iraq even be a federation or a confederation? And in the end, who will fight who over what, and will that fighting be political or physical? To gain some insight into some of the issues that prevail today, from insurgent fighting in the West to Kurdish self-determination in the North, it helps to take a look at the political and religious boundaries in Iraq:

Religious makeup of Iraq (Source: NPR)

Political makeup of Iraq (Source: Wikipedia)

One province stands out in a grand manner: Al-Anbar in the West. On the one hand, al-Anbar is far larger than any other political division in Iraq, taking up as much as a third of the country. On the other hand, the province is sparsely populated and includes significant desert acreage. 

Al-Anbar is also the source of some of the worst fighting during the Iraq War, including the First Battle of Fallujah and the Second Battle of Fallujah. More recently, it is the location of Sunni protests, and the takeover of Iraqi cities (Ramadi, the capital of Al-Anbar, and, to some extent, Fallujah) by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is associated with al-Qaeda.

In the past, gerrymandering was a possibility. This likely would have been an option early on when the politics of Iraq were still up for debate. However, with a Shia-led government that seemingly continues to clamp down on Sunni politics, this idea is likely off the table, or we will end up with the worst of American democratic traditions married to military conflict.

Within federalism, there exists some level of equality on a national scene, at least in the sense that everyone can, at some point, attain a leadership role and participate in national politics. Without that, there is no purpose to being part of a federalist structure. Both alienating a component of the national population and simultaneously allowing the growth of their own sub-state cannot lead to a solution.

It will take crucial and careful leadership to lead Iraq out of its federalist quagmire. It can't hurt to use the American example here as well: the United States operated under the Articles of Confederation between 1777 (informally) / 1781 (formally) until 1789, when the Constitution took effect. It took years to figure out a better way for the system to operate, and it may take years in Iraq. Focusing on the politics, and the compromises that come with politics, while avoiding warfare and open conflict, are key tenets that could lead to Iraq reconciling its federalism for a lasting state.

Unrest in al-Anbar and Iraq's Newest Crisis

You may have heard a tiny bit of news streaming out of Iraq this week (more important than the polar vortex) - there is trouble west of Baghdad. What kind of trouble? A group of insurgents, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), conveniently connected to al-Qaeda, took control of Ramadi and Fallujah in the al-Anbar province. Though the connections are tenuous and still not entirely clear, ISIL is also at the forefront of the rebellion in Syria. How far west of Baghdad? Pretty close - say 40 miles or so. Here is a map for reference to show Fallujah proximity to Baghdad:

Fallujah location (Source: Wikipedia)

The battles for Ramadi and Fallujah are remembered as some of the most entrenched, violent, and deadly of the Iraq War. That makes the towns not only strategic, falling on the road to Baghdad, but also symbolic.

Nations with deep interest in what happens in Iraq are not quite sure what to do. The United States has ruled out sending ground forces. The United Kingdom has similarly indicated that it would not send troops. Even Iran refused the idea of sending troops. All are willing to send aid to Iraq - military aid. In fact, the US is stepping up military shipments in an attempt to support the Iraqi government and avoid fighting from spreading much further. If there's a war brewing, it always helps to just arm at least someone with more weapons and better ones too.

Nonetheless, beating back the insurgents militarily presents a hypocritical dilemma both for Iraqi and American leadership, who have stood their ground on neighboring Syria, expressing the need for political rather than military solutions. Were Iraq to forego political options and resort to military ones solely, it would surely lose its legitimacy in criticizing Syria's response. It would also not look great for the United States, who is therefore simultaneously pushing for Iraq to employ political pressures through Sunni moderates.

Al-Maliki, meanwhile, is pretty much just throwing things out there to see what sticks. Although locals would surely prefer good governance and open business, tribal and religious distrust exist between those in al-Anbar and al-Maliki's Shia-led central government. For example, al-Maliki ordered Iraqi troops to not strike neighborhoods in Fallujah. Well, "neighborhoods" is certainly not easy to define, while it also provides insurgent troops clear cover and complicates urban warfare immensely. He has also urged residents to expel the insurgents, though without clarifying how they should do so, or why they should stick it out with the central government. Though these may be simply placeholder statements to stave off military options while political ones are attempted, they don't come off as too impressive.

Al-Qaeda has a vested interest in destabilizing foreign influence and bringing territory under its control, but al-Qaeda-backed insurgents don't just show up in town and everyone else suddenly becomes anti-government. There is a significant backstory here, centering on the potential consolidation of power by Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki, who is Shia, and the central government's seeming mistreatment of Sunnis. The Sunni-Shia rift goes back ages, but recent history reflects the dominance by the Sunni minority of the Shia majority under the reign of Saddam Hussein (who was Sunni). Even more recently, al-Maliki's arrest of his Sunni vice president in 2011, and his attempted arrest of a Sunni member of parliament and removal of protest camps in al-Anbar in late 2013 directly contributed to the current crisis.

What happens now? A military conflict is inevitable, regardless of the acrid political aftertaste for Iraq and the United States. It is hopeful, though, that it will be short-lived. What is critical is that Iraq's Shia-led government begin to pay better attention and give greater care to its Sunni minority. It's hard to imagine, but democracy is not a zero-sum game and win-win results are possible. The long-term solution is all-but political and that would involve compromise with various factions and the extensive inclusion of moderates. Al-Maliki is right in encouraging the citizens to expel the insurgents, but words must be tied to actions, and the government's efforts must be tied to explaining why it would be to the benefit of those in al-Anbar to be pro-government rather than anti-government.