Amnesty: The Price of Peace?

In my last post, I briefly hinted at the idea of fringe or terrorist groups being brought into the political fold.  Now I'd like to talk about a related topic: amnesty for those groups.

Colombia is the latest example of amnesty issues plaguing a war-torn country seeking peace.  Just yesterday, its senate passed -- by a razor-thin 65-3 margin -- a constitutional amendment (dubbed the "Legal Framework for Peace") that gives Colombia's Congress more authority to legislate the conditions under which rebels are prosecuted.  This means, for example, that the Congress could pass legislation directing prosecutors to only go after rebel leaders or making sentences for rebel crimes more lenient.  Former president Uribe has criticized the amendment, deeming any potential amnesty an inappropriate tool with which to handle FARC and other terrorist or rebel groups.

Also interesting: opposition to this law, and many other amnesty laws, comes from human rights organizations.  Human Rights Watch, for example, opposes the amendment because of its potential for amnesty.  A chief source of contention is amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and similar crimes that are the focus of international criminal law prosecutions.  Indeed, this is a problem in the international law field: international criminal law relies upon the idea that violators of certain egregious crimes are brought to justice, but countries may have to forego some prosecution (or provide lighter sentences) in order to achieve lasting peace.  Some international legal scholars go so far as to claim that countries cannot provide amnesty to those who violate international criminal law.  This, I believe, is a mistake.  While one does not want to diminish the import of crimes committed in the past, it would be a disservice to the people of a country, not to mention the global community at large, if chances for peace were thwarted in favor of an unyielding prosecutorial principle.

This is not to say, of course, that any peace is good peace.  History will always find ways to remind us of the potential for folly -- Chamberlain's peace with Hitler being the most commonplace example.  Still, countries must have the flexibility to develop unique solutions to their unique situations.  Colombia's constitutional amendment is the latest iteration of this concept.  If its execution turns out to be poor, then Colombia will deserve the criticism it will undoubtedly receive.  The law in its current form, however, is more designed to give the Colombian government greater flexibility in dealing with rebel groups -- something with which I believe most reasonable people could agree.

In a bid to stay relevant, Al Shabaab Places Bounty on Obama, Clinton

One curious item picked up by the major news outlets over the last 24 hours is the bounty placed on President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton (Click here if you haven't read it yet, though it's made yahoo's headlines since this post has been written). Clearly, the bounties are a play in a pretend tit-for-tat game with the United States. A few days prior, US officials leaked information on up to $33 million in bounties for Al Shabaab leadership (here). In return, Al Shabaab offered 10 camels for Obama and 2 camels for Clinton. The CNN article linked above mentions that the average price of a camel is $700 in Somalia, though a number of websites selling camels (likely not in Somalia) indicate that prices can be a few thousand per camel. So a guy with a $5 million dollar bounty on his head puts one of a up to a few ten thousands on his opponent.

Is the bounty price meant as an insult, or is it truly a sign of weakness? The information available so far does not indicate any insult. In fact, military strategy often notes to respect the strength of your opponent, until you can secure victory. The one exception is where an insult can lead to your opponent's position becoming unwound, none of which seems to apply here.

Let's also compare this bounty to others. There has been a $100,000 bounty on a rapper who insulted Islam and a $2.2 million bounty on the pastor who burnt the Koran, just to name a few. On the other side, a British parliamentarian supposedly offered (though later denied offering) a bounty of £10 million on President Obama. So this helps put the no more than $10,000 camel bounty placed by Al Shabaab in perspective.

At the same time, it is widely believed that Al Shabaab's power has diminished over the past year or so. Its tactics and strategies seem to be less and less effective. So much so that it has been forced to partner with Al Qaeda, which reflects on the diminishing power of both groups. It is rapidly losing territory and influence (ex: here and here). On a related note, despite there existing a lack of government, it has been argued that the Somali economy is no where near as absent as its government. This means that there should be more "money" for such a bounty. Perhaps. But many signs point to less capacity within Al Shabaab.

So what is the end goal? Al Shabaab is not capable of a tit for tat with the US, unless it is an imaginary one from the Islamist perspective wherein the small group from Somalia is fighting with the hegemon on the world stage. It's important to remember that terrorism is meant to spread an effect and any opportunity for publicity is critical. Islamist compete, much like nonprofits and politicians, for donations and funding. This is Al Shabaab's grab at a larger slice of the media pie and thereby, the funding critical for them to retain their previous power.

The Arab Spring: Ideals, Stability, and Security Issues

With the first free and fair(ish) democratic elections taking place in Egypt, the United States must once again evaluate its strategic interests with this and other states in the region.  As has been the case for decades now, we find ourselves struggling to balance our democracy-promoting idealism with the take-it-as-we-find-it realpolitik of working with dictators and other dubious allies.

Barring unforeseen circumstances, the runoff in the Egyptian presidential elections will feature Mubarak’s former prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s champion, Mohammed Mursi.  People argue that Shafiq is no fan of the revolution; indeed, he refers to Mubarak as his idol and promises to clamp down on dissent with an “iron fist.”  Mursi, meanwhile, hails from a party that promises greater influence of Islam in Egyptian law and affairs.  Many Egyptians see no good choice at all and, indeed, analysts expect voter turnout to be low.

Just glancing at another Arab Spring country, one can see continued turmoil in Yemen.  Yemen held elections a few months ago, though the fact that there was one candidate (Vice President Abdurabu Mansur Hadi, who had been acting president after Saleh stepped down) made the use of the word “election” questionable.  Still, the situation in Yemen makes one question what U.S. priorities should be: do we push for Hadi to keep his promises and move toward free and fair elections, or do we focus on the burgeoning problem of Yemen becoming a major breeding ground for terrorism and the fact that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is now considered by many the “most active and lethal Qaeda affiliate”?  One might argue that the two options are not mutually exclusive, and hopefully they can co-exist.  However, our prior support for dictators like Mubarak and Saleh (and Qaddafi) makes the U.S. uniquely ill-positioned to be a champion of the Arab Spring – an irony when one takes into account our unique status as the largest democracy in the world with the oldest written constitution.

People sometimes call democracies “natural allies” and argue that democracies don’t go to war with each other.  If so, it follows that the U.S. should promote free elections and democracy everywhere.  On the other hand, one consequence of democracy is that we might not always like how elections turn out (see Palestinian elections in 2006).  For many reasons, Hamas winning elections was not something the U.S. had hoped for.  Still, the very fact that Hamas was able to win elections should have sent some signals to the world community – Palestinians were unhappy with the PA, with their lot in life, and with a multitude of other things that Hamas was able to exploit.  Hamas is a terrorist organization that needs to fundamentally change before it can be an acceptable partner in negotiations on a two-state solution.  While one part of me wants to argue that Hamas is too rotten to its core to ever be a legitimate political partner in negotiations, history reminds us that the Palestinian Authority itself was once a terrorist organization.  This isn’t to say that “terrorism works.”  To the contrary, I think that history has shown that terrorist organizations can sometimes evolve into political organizations (Sinn Fein and the Palestinian Authority immediately come to mind, though I know there are others).

This brings us back to the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt.  Although the Muslim Brotherhood is not a terrorist organization, it is an Islamist political party.  This in and of itself has made many Westerners uncomfortable.  Western countries are unsure whether the Muslim Brotherhood would, for example, continue to let Egypt be the state in the Middle East that helps maintain the regional peace with Israel.  Would the Muslim Brotherhood take a more anti-Israeli stance that could threaten the always-tenuous regional stability?  For that matter, is the alternative – which may well include a violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrations – a better option?

While laudable, democracy can often be messy.  Right now, many people look at Egypt’s upcoming elections and see two bad choices.  Many people look at U.S. presidential elections, however, and often see the same thing.  We in America are often told that we are “throwing away” our vote if we don’t vote for one of the two major political party candidates, even if we don’t truly support either of them (one of the problems with not having a runoff system).  Egypt’s experiment with democracy will undoubtedly face many obstacles, but the very fact that it’s having these elections is something to celebrate.

The hope, ultimately, is that the U.S. can have good relations with democratic states in the Middle East, and that those states can be allies in the war on terror.  We tried our hand with dictatorial allies – from Musharraf to Mubarak to Saleh to Qaddafi – because we needed allies to fight terrorism.  We’ve been making the same compromises for decades, however, supporting several dictatorships in the Cold War when they professed to be anti-Communist.  I’m not saying the choices we made were wrong.  I’m just pointing out that supporting dictatorships comes with a cost – aside from exposing ourselves to claims of hypocrisy, we run the risk of losing a potential alliance with a democratic government in the future.  Building a good relationship with a Muslim Brotherhood government, for example, would be complicated by both our prior support for Mubarak and the fact that many in the U.S. are skeptical of any Islamist government, democratic or not.  Would those same people prefer an Egyptian dictatorship?  Perhaps it will require the continued sale of billions of dollars’ worth of arms to Egypt to smooth over any rough edges in such a relationship.  My personal hope is that, in Egypt and other countries where democratic elections might lead to results we might not find ideal, we can still develop positive relations and find common ground where our democratic principles align.

Opposing Soft Diplomacy

The Economist makes the case this week (Nul points: http://www.economist.com/node/21555919) against overlooking domestic oppression in the selection of international contests. While Eurovision is at the heart of the argument, the article also touches on the upcoming EURO 2012 championship, which a number of European leaders have pledged to not attend in light of Ukraine's treatment of its former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who is jailed under dubious charges.

It seems funny that this, albeit short, article fails to mention international contests that cross European borders. For instance, the 2018 FIFA World Cup was awarded to Russia, a bastion of regression towards authoritarianism and international malaise over the past decade. 2022 was awarded to Qatar, which recognizes neither gay rights nor Israel. Brazil, home of the 2014 Cup, is little better, having improved democratically in recent years, but continues to undermine human rights by forcibly removing settled populations for construction and aesthetics. Another event subject to controversy is the Formula One Grand Prix, most recently in Bahrain, where human rights concerns have been raised regarding the government response to protesters. Even the biggest international contest of them all is no stranger. The 2008 Summer Games were held in China. 2016 - Brazil. 2014 Winter Games - Russia.

One aspect nearly all of these contests have in common is the fact that they are awarded by committee. The sole exception is Eurovision, which automatically transfers from country to country based on the victor. Perhaps that unique aspect of Eurovision gives it some semblance of fairness that other international contest selections lack. Instead, countries should not only pledge to politically boycott awarded games, but sometimes a more thorough boycott is needed. For example, how would Ukraine have responded under threat to move the games out of Ukraine (Poland's neighbor Germany seems to have some recently-built soccer stadiums). Despite claims, politics and sports are not separate. Sport is often used to divert attention, build loyalty, and promote populism. Does it do more to make international contests seem inclusive, so long as one has the ability to fund them, whether that funding comes from economic success or economic subjugation, or does it do more to make international contests exclusive, reserved for only those nations who agree on certain basic principles, such as human rights and representative government?

Europe's Greek Tragedy?

As Greece heads towards elections on June 17, the drama is unfolding not unlike one of its ancient tragedies. While Europe is enveloped in the melodrama of successively failing Greek governments and the potential for Greece's exit from the Eurozone (even becoming termed the "Grexit" as I've learned from The Economist), the rest of the world is watching cautiously.

The question on every European politican's mind is whether an exit by Greece, a seriously indebted outlier, could trigger the collapse of the Eurozone altogether and the death knell of an integrated Europe. Greece is followed, in no short order, by Portugal and Ireland, with Italy and Spain not lagging far behind. Further concern over France and the Netherlands continues to grow daily. It is perhaps Germany who seems the strongest, but 40% of its exports are to the Eurozone. If a domino effect were to occur, Europe would be shorn apart.

At least until mid-June, it seems that the threat is grave, but overstated. The "contagion" problem, and the ramifications of the collapse of the Euro are so great, that it is unlikely that Europe's stronger economies, namely Germany, would allow a weak economy to so significantly affect them. Protection against the sovereign risk of a Greek default or a Greek exit is minimal, with the default being more likely and easier to work through (though not easy in any means). In essence, Europe's strong would need to convince investors, the people, and other nations that a Greek exit would have little to no effect on the Euro. All in all, that is highly unlikely to occur, and even less so in the course of a single month.

Therefore, if Greece were to stay, it would need to be controlled. In order for it to be controlled, a more unified Eurozone fiscal and budgetary policy would need to be implemented. So although we see a Europe today in crisis, is it really in any more crisis than when Ireland rejected the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 or when the European Union enlarged in 2004 and 2007? Recall that the Lisbon Treaty was ratified in time and European expansion has slowed, but never fully stopped (Croatia looks to be next to join). This is the dichotomous story of Europe since World War II - always either about to collapse into itself or integrate further. The value of integration has been well illustrated over the decades, and the value of collapse well understood by two major wars and some smaller, but still noteworthy conflicts. The question really remains: do today's politicians, and today's citizens for that matter, remember what happened when Europe collapses? If they don't, or if they choose to ignore it, the tragedy they're watching may simply be a story within a story, with the themselves as the main characters failing to see the relationship to their own situation.

Do We Really Need an Arms Trade Treaty?

In a word: no.

Most people don't know that the next big treaty on the United Nations' horizon is an Arms Trade Treaty.  This summer, diplomats, scholars, NGO representatives, and other interested parties, will descend upon the Big Apple to hammer out a multilateral treaty that will (in theory) regulate the international trade of conventional weapons.  While it is always good to promote ideals and advance the rule of law, the most likely outcome of this treaty will be millions of dollars wasted and an ineffective human rights-promoting institution.

So, what exactly are we talking about when we say "arms trade"?  The arms trade includes conventional weaponry -- mostly consisting of firearms, assault rifles, rocket and grenade launchers, artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-ship missiles, tanks, helicopters, and aircraft.  Meanwhile, the term excludes WMD -- nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.  Conventional weapons arms trade is massive.  Because a great amount is unreported, underreported, and/or illicit, the exact amount is unknown.  The best estimate, though a few years old, puts conventional arms trade at approximately $55 billion per year.

In addition to providing states with finished weaponry, arms exports may assist states that are in the process of developing their own weapons systems.  China, for example, imported parts from Canadian, British, Italian, French, and German companies while developing a new attack helicopter.  Furthermore, China could export those finished attack helicopters to a state like Sudan that has a record of human rights violations.

So, at first glance, the notion of an arms trade treaty seems like a great idea.  However, when looking at the practices of the biggest arms-exporting countries, one might find reason to pause.

The United States, for example, sells billions of dollars of weapons per year and is the single biggest exporter of conventional weapons.  At the same time, the U.S. has an extremely robust arms control regime.  In considering arms exports, the U.S. considers its own national security interests, potential effects on the recipient state and region, and the possibility of re-transfer to third-party states (22 U.S.C. § 2751).  As far as process is concerned, the State Department reviews most sales and Congress has the power to express disapproval for export sales over $1 million; preferential treatment and streamlined approval is given to NATO members and other close allies (22 U.S.C. § 2776).  For various reasons, including state sponsorship of terrorism, U.S. regulations restrict sales to certain state and sub-state actors (including, for example, Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, and Syria).  The U.S. export regime also closely analyzes sales of dual-use items (commercial items that might have military purposes).

While the U.S. arms export regime is considered by many to be the "gold standard," other states and organizations are not always so careful.  The EU's arms export program has some similarities to that of the U.S., but less strict in certain areas -- for example, EU states export hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of weapons per year to China.  Germany also exports arms to Iran, Libya, and Syria.  Russia, meanwhile, has sold billions of dollars' worth of weapons to Iran.  China sells weapons to Sudan, Nepal, Burma, Chad, and Tanzania.  China claims that its arms sales are "cautious and responsible," but it does not participate in any multilateral arms export treaties seeking to prevent the use of exported arms to human rights-violating states.

For those states already desiring to restrict arms sales to certain states, there are several international bodies attempting to address the serious issues.  For example, the U.N. Security Council maintains embargoes against Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, North Korea, Somalia, al Qaeda and the Taliban, nongovernmental forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, nongovernmental forces in Iraq, nongovernmental forces in Lebanon, nongovernmental forces in Rwanda, nongovernmental forces in Sierra Leone, and the Darfur region of Sudan.  These arms embargoes are regularly violated, however.  While widespread violations of Security Council embargoes could well serve as an indicator of an arms trade treaty's ineffectiveness, NGOs actually (and disingenuously) use the embargoes' ineffectiveness to argue for an arms trade treaty.

There are also voluntary multilateral institutions like the Wassenar Arrangement, which promote best practices in arms export control among member states.  Such arrangements are voluntary and non-binding, and thus contain no system for determining or punishing violations of the Arrangement's principles.  At the same time, the Arrangement has the flexibility to allow member states to participate how they see fit; such flexibility and voluntary participation are perhaps the best indicia of states' desire to engage in responsible arms export practices.

Meanwhile, over the last five years, support for an arms trade treaty has increased amongst NGOs, the U.N., and states.  The common theme is that a binding, multilateral treaty would codify the "highest possible common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms" (this language appears in multiple U.N. General Assembly resolutions).

While the final makeup of an arms trade treaty is unclear, draft resolutions acknowledge "the right of all States to manufacture, import, export, transfer and retain conventional arms for self-defence and security needs and in order to participate in peace support operation."  The treaty will also probably set a base level of standards with which states should comply before exporting arms.  The U.S. insists that states should be able to unilaterally set higher arms control standards, but it remains unclear how this principle would be reconciled with the right of states to import conventional weapons.

Furthermore, setting aside the politically questionable issue of state ratification, one must question the extent to which an arms trade treaty would affect state behavior.  Without U.S. support, the treaty would not include the vast majority of arms export sales.  Meanwhile, Russia and China abstained on the vote for the latest U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for an arms trade treaty.  This is particularly important, as these two states are major arms exporters as well as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.  This leaves both states well-positioned to block Security Council arms embargoes, block any Security Council action against Russia or China for violating already-existing arms embargoes, and circumvent the provisions of an arms trade treaty without consequence.

What should one think, meanwhile, of the numerous states that support an arms trade treaty but currently do not employ rigorous export controls?  There is already ample evidence of states (even developed European states) permitting arms exports to states with dubious human rights and/or retransfer practices.  Will an arms trade treaty affect their behavior?  Scholars and NGOs supporting an arms trade treaty appear to think so.  They point to violations of an EU embargo on sales to China as evidence of the need for a multilateral treaty.  If a 27-member institution of developed states cannot control its own export practices, however, what is the expected efficacy of a much broader treaty with a much more diverse polity?

Take China, for example.  Faced with China’s dubious export practices, Amnesty International pushes hard for an arms trade treaty and calls upon China to participate in that treaty process.  The countervailing strategy that Amnesty implicitly rejects is strengthened political pressure from other states.  Of course, this might reflect the simple reality that other states are ill-positioned to coerce a state with the world’s largest population, third-largest economy, and a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.  Regardless of how one views China's arms export practices, the very dubious likelihood of China and other states changing their arms control practices calls into question the great need for an arms trade treaty.

While we do not know what the arms trade treaty will look like in its final form, it will not likely solve many of the problems its proponents cite as justification for the treaty.  Regional and international structures exist – notably the Wassenaar Arrangement, on the international scale – for those states interested in developing better arms export practices.  Those states currently not interested in setting high arms export standards would not likely care to develop them after an arms trade treaty.  Rather, like human rights treaties, states would likely comply when there are low costs of compliance or when faced with non-treaty coercive pressure.

The United States, in particular, should view the development toward an arms trade treaty with caution.  It should make sure that, regardless of whether it ratifies the treaty, such a treaty embraces high standards of export control and permits states to surpass those standards.  A failure to do so could allow the treaty process to be hijacked by states seeking to set low standards or simply embarrass the United States by forcing it to accept low standards or not sign the treaty at all.  Because the arms trade treaty would not likely solve the problems it identifies, greater attention should be paid to already-existing agreements amongst those states truly seeking to set high standards for export control.  If states earnestly tried to address arms trade problems through those agreements and still found those agreements unavailing, then it might be time to seriously consider an arms trade treaty.


Further reading:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/
http://www.state.gov/t/us/136849.htm
http://armstradetreaty.blogspot.com/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_Trade_Treaty
http://www.oxfam.org/en/category/freetags/arms-trade-treaty
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/08/the-uns-arms-trade-treaty-a-dangerous-multilateral-mistake-in-the-making

Don't cry for Argentina...

It seems that the Argentinian President Cristina Fernandez needs a summer crash course in history and economics, particularly as they relate to capital-intensive energy sectors. It is still to a large extent beyond me how Ms Fernandez was the deemed the most qualified individual in a country of approximately 40 million (at the time), but, then again, we haven't made the wisest decisions here at home either over the past decade or so. But enough of past history. The other week, Ms Fernandez decided that the best way to keep Argentina financially afloat would be to nationalize the 51% stake of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), the country's largest energy company. YPF was formerly Argentina's national oil firm, having been privatized just in the past decade. It seems that popular support in the country's senate makes this move likely to actually occur. (EDIT: Approved by the senate!)

Many outside observers consider this an unwise decision, and rightly so. To start, the entire 51% share being nationalized is owned by Respol, a Spanish company (minority owners, largely Argentine, would be less affected). Spain is one of Argentina's largest trading partners, so that doesn't seem like a good way to spur economic development or any growth. Part of Ms Fernandez's claims include the lack of reinvestment by YPF/Respol. Problematically, nationalization scares away investment. This is particularly noticeable in the energy sector where significant amounts of capital are needed just to take chances of finding and producing energy at a profitable rate. Examples just over the past twelve or so years include Russia and Venezuela, while going further back one can look at Libya. All in all, a country such as Argentina needs the expertise, capital, and sheer willpower of large energy firms just to explore, take chances, and invest in developing new energy opportunities. Nationalization is not going to make the multinational companies who lead the international energy sector eager to invest; the risks of energy investment are high enough without the political risk of expropriation.

Respol is asking for upwards of $10 billion for its stake, a sizable chunk for a country that has repeatedly found creative ways to manage its economy over the past few years, including raiding central bank coffers and pension funds. Compounding this situation is that Argentina still has not fully agreed to pay out for its default a decade ago. Respol may not get any compensation (or may get it decades down the line). In turn, this will lead other industries, beyond energy, to toe carefully before entering Argentina. After all, who wants to risk developing products, markets, and infrastructure in a country that may take it all away without any real compensation?

The repercussions of this move, following a number of other, similarly concerning government decisions (noted briefly above), can have ramifications for Argentina's economy for years to come. Perhaps it is time to move beyond populism and revisit economics and history in Argentina, or is it too late? Regardless of the terminal station this road leads Argentina to, don't cry for Argentina; it chose the road itself.