Turkey Joins Fight Against ISIS... and Possibly Kurds

Summary
The big news in counter-terrorism circles this week was that Turkey was becoming actively involved in the fight against ISIS.  In part a response to an ISIS suicide bombing on July 20th, 2015, Turkish support will include launching its own airstrikes.  More importantly, perhaps, Turkey will permit the United States to launch airstrikes from the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey.  Although prompted by an ISIS suicide bombing, Turkey's military action in the region will likely include heavy doses of anti-Kurdish activity against both Syrian and Turkish Kurds.

Brief Background
Of course, Turkey's interest in the Syrian civil war has never been straightforward.  The chief threat to Turkey's security over the past several decades has been the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group in Turkey classified as a terrorist organization by NATO and the U.S.  Like the Kurdish populations in Iraq and Syria, the PKK has attempted to create an independent Kurdish state in the region.  Turkey has always opposed these efforts but still entered into a cease-fire with the PKK in spring 2013.

In December 2014, meanwhile, the Turkish parliament authorized military action against ISIS.  At the time, it was not clear if Turkey would take immediate action against ISIS.  Turkey has been committed to toppling Bashar al-Assad and military action against ISIS could effectively keep Assad in power.

Turkish soldiers patrol the border near Syria.  (Source: Wall Street Journal)

Fast forward to early July, 2015.  Kurdish successes against ISIS in northern Syria led to the Syrian Kurdish group Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) controlling a 250-mile continuous area along the Syria-Turkey border.  Turkey did not appreciate this development, given PYD's real or perceived friendliness toward PKK.  These Kurdish gains led analysts to speculate that Turkey will join the fight in Syria -- not necessarily to topple Assad or defeat ISIS, but to prevent the development of a Kurdish proto-state.

Turkey's intervention in Syria turned from speculative to real this week following Monday's suicide bombing by ISIS in the Turkish border town of Suruc that killed 32 and injured more than 100.  On Thursday, Turkey and the United States reached an agreement in which the U.S. can use Turkey's Incirlik Air Base to launch strikes against ISIS.  On Friday and Saturday, Turkey launched strikes against ISIS in Syria but also against multiple PKK facilities in northern Iraq.

Analysis
Turkey has been uneasy about entering the Syrian civil war for multiple reasons.  While it is certainly anti-ISIS, Turkey does not want to empower Assad or the PYD and accordingly has been reluctant to enter the fray.  In short, it recognizes the very real consequences of creating a power vacuum next door.  Turkey's interests in the region transcend borders.  Indeed, Turkey's strike against PKK in Iraq's Kurdistan region is an indication that it will not be deterred by national boundaries.

Of course, while Turkey has been on the sidelines, other groups have been making advances.  Some of the most effective strikes against ISIS have been by the Peshmerga in Iraq and the PYD in Syria.  The Peshmerga's successes in a string of Iraqi military setbacks once again raised talks of a possible push for a Kurdish state.  In Syria, PYD's ability to control a continuous region has made Turkey fearful of a Kurdish-controlled region on its border.  Syrian rebels have made advances as well, though not enough to suggest they're anywhere near the most powerful force in the region.

Turkey may still be looking to hedge its bets -- hence its decision to let the U.S. use its base for U.S. air strikes.  The ISIS suicide bombing in Suruc certainly spurred Turkey into action; it needs to both actually protect its people and also be publicly seen doing so.  On the other hand, Turkey's decision to strike PKK strongholds at the same time as ISIS is an indication that it does not view the battlefront in simple terms of pro- and anti-ISIS groups.  Rather, it recognizes multiple actors that represent threats to its national security and is trying to act on multiple fronts.  This is not unlike the initial U.S. strikes in Syria, where the U.S. launched strikes against al Nusra (al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria) in addition to ISIS.  As yet another country becomes involved in Syria's civil war and the multi-state effort to destroy ISIS, the futures of Syria, Iraq, Kurdish independence movements, and ISIS all remain unclear.  If Kurdish movements continue to fight ISIS and control territory effectively, the Kurdish people of these various states will clamor even more for an independent state.  Syria and Iraq are still struggling to hold artificial states together, and those struggles will likely continue for the next several years without any clear resolution.  While this will result in countless more tragic deaths, there is nothing the U.S. can do to impose its will on the people of these countries.  It will find its use of military force most effective where its national security needs intersect with local security concerns.  ISIS currently provides a common enemy, but even military defeat of ISIS will not bring stability to a region that rarely knows peace.  In Iraq, at least, the fight against ISIS could be transformative if Sunnis had something worth fighting for.  In Syria, the fight against ISIS may benefit Assad in the short term (a consequence Turkey has long recognized).  This may be a necessary consequence, even if it's something the U.S. does not have to accept in the long-term.

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Update, 7/27/15 at 9:40am: On Monday, 7/27/15, reports emerged that Turkey was already launching strikes against Syrian Kurds.  Turkey denied that the Syrian Kurds were a target of their ongoing military operations.

New Series: The Changing World of Territorial Sovereignty (ISIS Edition)

Welcome to a new series on the Changing World of Territorial Sovereignty, where Illexum will explore the ways in which the traditional views of territorial sovereignty have transformed or eroded.  When discussing threats to traditional statehood, the focus is usually on globalization and other new developments that decrease the functions of the traditional state.  However, less attention is paid to the erosion of the traditional view of territorial sovereignty -- in other words, the ways in which states, media, scholars, and public opinion view and analyze territorial sovereignty.

To say that this issue is broad and lends itself to a wide array of sub-topics is an understatement; such topics include direct state-on-state military action, state-on-nonstate action, prolonged military activity vs. limited military strikes, the extent to which states can permit other states to engage in extensive military operations against their own non-state actors, and the extent to which active support from one state toward non-state actors of another states infringes upon the latter's sovereignty.  This is far from an exhaustive list, but it merely underscores the difficulty in analyzing the topic.  Illexum will, of course, place a higher degree of focus on examples from today's news.  We will include some historical analyses as well, however, because those are also instructive on how we will view territorial sovereignty going forward.

The first topic that we will explore is ISIS - specifically, how U.S. military action against ISIS (and other groups, such as al-Nusra) affects traditional notions of territorial sovereignty.  ISIS is a good example of the erosion of territorial sovereignty, given that it currently controls territory in both Syria and Iraq.  Thus, from the outset, the challenge of containing or rolling back ISIS necessarily involves a different approach to the issue of territorial sovereignty.  Moreover, the nation-states in which ISIS operates have very different relationships with the United States.  While the Iraqi government invites U.S. military assistance in fighting ISIS, the Syria's President Bashar al-Assad is not so eager to invite U.S. military involvement.

Brief Background: U.S. Military Action Against ISIS

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the first U.S. action against ISIS took place in Iraq.  First, on August 7, 2014, the U.S. dropped aid packages to displaced Iraqis who had been forced to evacuate to the mountainside in light of ISIS advances.  Specifically, the U.S. launched airstrikes on August 8, 2014, against ISIS artillery that was being used to attack Kurdish forces.  The humanitarian aid drops continued throughout August, as did the airstrikes against ISIS.

The two questions that plagued the United States political and military leadership, however, were 1) whether the U.S. would put troops on the ground and 2) whether military operations would expand to the civil war-ravaged Syria.  As to the first question, President Obama initially declared (in early August 2014) that the United States would not be sending troops back to Iraq to fight ISIS;

As Commander in Chief, I will not allow the United States to be dragged into fighting another war in Iraq, so as we support Iraqis as they take the fight to these terrorists, American combat troops will not be returning to fight in Iraq because there is no American military solution to the larger crisis in Iraq,

Of course, a few hundred American troops already had started returning to Iraq in June 2014, albeit as "advisers" to Iraqi and Kurdish military  forces.  As the airstrikes ramped up in August 2014, the U.S. sent 150 more advisers to Iraq, with Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel emphasizing that this was not a "combat boots on the ground" type situation.  In November 2014, President Obama authorized sending a total of 3,100 troops to Iraq - still, he claimed, in an advisory and training capacity.  The latest update is that President Obama will soon request authorization from Congress for military action against ISIS (despite claiming that the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) already gives it the authority to engage in action against ISIS).

As to the second question, the United States did indeed expand its war against ISIS to Syria, launching airstrikes within Syria's borders in September.  Incidentally, the strikes were not limited to ISIS; in September, the U.S. launched strikes against the shadowy Khorosan Group and in November, it attacked the al Qaeda splinter group Jabbat al-Nusra.  Of course, some analysts say that the Khorosan Group is merely a subset of al-Nusra, and that the Obama administration played up the Khorosan Group in order to build up public support for its military action in Syria.  The strikes against ISIS have continued into the new year, with the U.S. launching strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria just this past weekend.

Smoke rises over Kobane, Syria, after a U.S. airstrike against ISIS on December 25, 2014 (Source: The Guardian)

Implications for the Erosion of Territorial Sovereignty

The traditional notions of territorial sovereignty have eroded in recent years, especially in those regions where borders or entire regions are out of government control.  Over the last twenty years, this has been especially pronounced in the context of U.S. counter-terrorism.  Airstrikes have been a go-to American response to terrorism, whether it be a response to the 1998 embassy bombings or the prolonged drone war in Pakistan.

There are two common scenarios for drone strikes against militants (though, of course, one can certainly imagine other situations) - those in which the host state expressly or implicitly condones the military action, and those in which the host state opposes such action.  How, one might ask, does such military action fit within the international legal framework for military action?  The United Nations charter prohibits military action that violates territorial sovereignty: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."  The notable exceptions to the use of force against another state are Security Council-authorized actions and "individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."  Typically, the United States presents its military actions as self-defense in response to the armed attack of 9-11 (or, in the case of Iraq, anticipatory self-defense).  Moreover, in those cases where a state invites U.S. action as part of its own counter-terrorism efforts, one might legitimately describe such action as "collective self-defense."  What is unclear in this scenario is whether such a country must formally request assistance in self-defense, or whether secret, behind-the-scenes discussions suffice.  For example, current U.S. military action in Iraq is done with the knowledge and cooperation of the Iraqi government.  The U.S. drone war in Pakistan, meanwhile, was done behind closed doors; Pakistan would often openly condemn U.S. strikes while secretly providing intelligence and targeting information to the U.S. for those very strikes.

When a state openly opposes military operations by a third party within its borders, the legal basis for such action becomes unclear.  In Syria, for example, the United States has taken action against ISIS and al-Nusra.  It has not taken open military action against President al-Assad's forces, although it has provided weaponry, training, and other support for anti-Assad forces.  What presents the United States with a distinct legal challenge, however, is how to justify its invasion of sovereign territory by airstikes and special forces operations.  There is no collective self-defense, as can be argued in Iraq and potentially in Pakistan.  The claim of self-defense is a stretch, given that the U.S. has had to make the dubious claim that ISIS is part of al Qaeda in order to justify such action under the AUMF and the theory that 9-11 constituted an armed attack against which the United States is still engaged in self-defense.  Another theory that has found its way into legal scholarship is that states that cannot control their own borders, or engage in atrocities against their own people, "waive" any claim to territorial sovereignty.  This theory, known as "involuntary sovereignty waiver," has been put forth to justify military action in Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999.

The United States has not directly put forth a coherent legal theory for its military action in Syria, and it may well not want to.  General norms of international law disfavor unilateral or mostly-unilateral military action, which is why the U.S. is always eager to garner multinational support to buttress the legitimacy of its actions.  Even where those actions are multilateral, however, the legal underpinnings for the military action remain the same.  The only difference is the political distinction between the world's sole superpower engaging in unilateral military action and that same superpower working with other states to thwart the spread of ISIS.  Like most other international norms, the sanctity of territorial sovereignty is often the product of the prevailing political viewpoints -- or whatever the current military and political realities dictate.  The United States does not want to be perceived as engaging in numerous military actions that violate territorial sovereignty.  At the same time, its words and actions have made it clear that the United States views territorial sovereignty as subservient to its own defense needs, whether those needs be real or perceived.  The very notion of a "global war on terror," by its very name, suggests that territorial sovereignty is not as resolute or finite as it was once perceived to be.

As the United States gets dragged into yet another military conflict on foreign soil, however, one must ask -- if Syria doesn't want us there, and the country is in the midst of a devastating civil war, what will further military engagement in the area accomplish?  Will the United States continue its mission creep and deploy forces (either alone or in concert with Iraqi, Kurdish, or other military forces) ever closer to the Syrian border?  Will we engage in ground operations in Syria, and if so, will we have the logistical base to do so?  This is what happens when you engage in military action in a hostile country, and why the violation of territorial sovereignty matters -- what sort of environment does the United States expect to find, in such a deeply divided country?  It would face enemies on multiple fronts, and its scarce allies hold very little territory right now.  If the United States deepens its military involvement, it risks getting to the point where the only way to protect its own forces would be a large-scale deployment - something the country hardly has the stomach for.

A Second Front: The Israeli Dilemma

Rebels fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government forces captured a border crossing between Syria and Israel in the disputed Golan Heights. While Syrian forces are attempting to recapture the crossing near Quneitra, the outlook is bleak; Syria also lost the Tabqa airbase in the country's north, the site of a gruesome mass execution of prisoners of war - a war crime from any perspective. The Nusra Front, linked to al Qaeda, participated in the Quneitra battle and represents a wakeup call for Israel as it settles the country's border.

(Source: The Times of Israel)

It is unlikely that the Israelis are interested in a two-front war, having just disengaged from 50 days of warfare in Gaza just a few days ago. This ceasefire itself may only prove to be temporary. The Israelis have fought several two-front wars in their past (1948, 1967, and 1973) and have conducted operations on multiple fronts since; however, handling two distinct conflict zones is not something that is desired.

Israel has largely stayed out of the Syrian Civil War, having only sporadically engaged across the border. However, with alert levels raised and the capture of 43 United Nations peacekeepers charged with securing the Israel-Syria border by rebel forces, reality may become necessity. Both Israel and the West may have to choose the lesser of two evils - Assad or the rebels. The US is not expected to work with Assad, but airstrikes against some of the rebel forces, namely the Islamic State, may come. This could place Israel in a precarious position of both defending itself and not being swallowed in regional conflict.

Building on Trust: Why the US Isn't Getting Very Far in Israel

Israel and Hamas are, by all accounts, at war in Gaza. US Secretary of State John Kerry is in the Middle East, frantically working with Israelis and Egyptians to nail down some sort of halt to hostilities, since the United States cannot work directly with Hamas - a designated terrorist organization. He's not getting very far and it's not entirely surprising. 

(Source: Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images via The National Post)

Kerry next travels to France, where anti-Semitic rioting has flared in recent days, to attempt to gain support for a ceasefire among European leaders. Earlier, the Israeli cabinet rejected Kerry's ceasefire proposal, which the US has since downplayed as a disagreement on final wording - that no proposal was formally put forth. Part of that rejection involves Israel asserting its objective to continue to destroy tunnels during any ongoing ceasefire. Nonetheless, Israel and Hamas have agreed to a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire, beginning at 8 AM local time.

It's not shocking to see Israel and the US disagree lately; there's very little substance to the US-Israel relationship under the Obama administration. In fact, it could be argued that there's likely no trust at all among leadership in the two countries. Just this past week, Kerry was caught criticizing the Israeli operation in Gaza. In backtracking, Kerry could only come up with the something trite: "...war is tough. We defend Israel's right to do what it is doing..." Well, of course. In 2011, at the G20 meeting, President Obama was also caught making an offhand remark about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, suggesting that he was "fed up with him" and perhaps even agreeing with then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Netanyahu was a liar. Earlier in 2011, Obama rebuffed meeting Netanyahu in the US, a surprise given the close US-Israel relationship in the past. The two have met as recently as this past March, with Netanyahu clearly stating that he would do nothing that would hinder Israeli national security. The two have spent more time attempting to lecture one another than to truly discuss options for peace.

The nonexistence of any legitimate relationship clearly undermines cooperative efforts to bring peace to the region. The damage done to the relationship may prove to solely be superficial - something a change in leadership on either side (or likely both sides) may correct. At the same time, the failure to secure any significant gains, not only in Israel, but in the greater Middle East as a whole, is a legacy that the Obama administration does not desire. In addition to the current Israeli-Hamas war, there are wars, on one level or another, in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Mali and political strife in Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Bahrain, and Iran (I'm sure I missed some). The toll in Syria alone may be as high as 160,000, not something that history or the administration can (continue to) easily brush aside.

The only options that remain during Obama's final few years in office are to make significant and serious decisions. The Washington Post suggests disarming Hamas; after all, how many political parties typically have a military wing (though it is important to note that some have in the past, including Israeli ones). Such bold action will not be easy, but any easy solutions have long since passed. It is time to make difficult decisions that bring change. Only with change can there be peace.

Coming Elections in Syria, Sponsored Today by: Chlorine Gas

Officials claim that Syria has handed over nearly 90% of its chemical weapons stores. Percentages are easy figures when they fail to elaborate on how those numbers are derived. Intelligence has existed for some time that suggests Syria will fail to disclose its full chemical weapons stockpiles and hold on to some instead. Moreover, easily-weaponized agents could be hidden away, particularly if they are not being sought and the world believes Syria has included those in its concessions. Such concerns over dual-use components hover over rogue states like a constant fog. As long as some internal control is maintained, it isn't so hard to imagine clandestine operations of all kinds. Syria has even threatened Israel and other spillover, something that one imagines would be difficult were the government fighting to its last man and materiel for domestic control.

If (nearly) 90% of those chemical weapons are handed over, why is Syria still employing chemical weapons, as the recent chlorine gas attack indicates? Apparently, chlorine gas is not included on the list of chemical weapons Syria is giving up, although it is banned. Who knew that the agreement in Syria allowed for such leniency and compromise as to which weapons it could keep and which it must give up? At the same time, the government continues to direct blame to the rebels, who have less incentive and even less means to launch chemical weapons strikes. It just doesn't entirely add up.

Amid the conflict, al-Assad's government has set a date for new elections -June 3, 2014. That's correct - about six weeks from now, Syrians all across the country are going to go the polls to elect their new leader. That is, except for the over 150,000 people killed and millions who have fled the country as refugees - they won't be voting, but the show must go on. The United Nations has suggested to Syria that it avoid having elections during a civil war. It is unlikely there will be any significant challenger (though a puppet challenger may be brought in). Why even go through the trouble? It is not really all that possible to gloss over this kind of electoral travesty.

Stalled Talks, Grand Confusion in Syria

Given that this story is a few days old, this post will be fairly brief.

The Syrian peace talks have not exactly been going splendidly. Neither side seems to be at the talks for the same reasons and the fighting continues all the while. The talks are practically an exercise in futility.

UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi recently blamed the al-Assad regime for hampering the talks for refusing to discuss a transition of power. This should really come as no surprise. The government came to the talks indicating that it would refuse to discuss regime change. The opposition came only for that reason. It seems as if the talks were doomed from the start. Apart from discussing Syria's future, the talks have never even been on the same page.

It will be impressive if the UN, as well as the two sides who are backed by their respective world powers, can re-energize the talks to really begin to talk about facts on the ground and move toward some sort of path toward resolution and peace, however slow that may be.

A Fundamentalist Divide: Al Qaeda Separates Itself from ISIL

It seems you can be "too much," even for al Qaeda. On Monday, the terrorist group formally cut off its relationship with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). This declaration follows al Qaeda's demand that ISIL remain separate from the al Nusra Front, al Qaeda's branch in Syria, which ISIL has attempted to consolidate into itself over the past year. In fact, it is apparent that ISIL and al Qaeda have been at odds for several years, dating to the mid 2000s. While it is unlikely that the two groups will become equal rivals, it is, at the same time, clear that they may view themselves that way in the near future. In the ongoing infighting of Syria's opposition forces, al Qaeda has propped up its links to the al Nusra Front and ISIL signed a truce with Suqour al Sham. Consolidation in the region could mean less infighting, but could also lead to a severely split opposition, making it more difficult for outside powers to support either side.

(Map of ISIL operations, Source: Red24)

Critically, al Qaeda's declaration may reflect which battle it now envisions as more winnable - Syria or Iraq. While it has made occasional gains in Iraq, al Qaeda forces, by and large, have been continually beaten back. Moreover, the continued presence of American troops and related support hinder operations in Iraq. Syria, meanwhile, has limited Western interference while it collapses - The Economist's "The Death of a Country" piece ran nearly a year ago - leaving a potential vacuum of power in all but al Assad's western strongholds. In the end, this could make Syria's near term future only more violent, a fact that is difficult to imagine given the United Nations' February 4 report detailing the violence there today. 

Homebrew: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

Growing out of the chaos of Middle Eastern insurgencies, the al Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has built its presence and spread fear throughout the region. Often viewed as one of the more violent terrorist groups in the Middle East, ISIL has taken over towns in Iraq - the first time insurgents have controlled these towns since 2003 - and is contributing to infighting among opposition fighters in Syria.

ISIL fighters have been careful, focusing on political aims to establish themselves, only to later identify with more fundamental positions. When necessary, socioeconomic and political arguments are employed to attempt to garner support among the locals. Once established, their strength limits the options to opponents, both civilian and military, as is the case in Syria. In a sense, entrenched positions are difficult to change.

ISIL's origins remain somewhat shrouded, and its role in the region has become unclear. Some reports suggest that ISIL is linked to Bashar al-Assad, Syria's President, as an attempt to fracture and debase the opposition. Others suggest that ISIL is little more than a concept Syria developed to change the face of its civil war. The BBC, though, has ISIL's formation pinned down to April 2013 as an independent terrorist organization. Analysts tend to tie it to insurgents previously known as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which may be best described as an evolutionary step in that organization's history. There is much information floating around, but most of it only lightly touches on why there was an outgrowth across borders. Why did the influx of fighters into the regional coalesce into much more coherent organizations than previously? Why are they more successful now? (apart from the withdrawal from Iraq, for that can't be the reason for everything)

Countries in the region continue to grow wary. Jordan has gone so far as to note that ISIL does not operate within its borders and that the terrorist group is "no threat." This is a surprising statement given ISIL's operations in two of Jordan's neighbors. Meanwhile, ISIL has threatened to attack Turkish cities over a disputed closed border crossing. It seems that ISIL's reach may yet expand.

Looking ahead, the horizon for ISIL is unclear. Expansion opens up new fronts, builds enemies, and attracts attention. Showing its face in Syria has increased its exposure and has proven of little benefit. At the same time, there is concern for a large lawless region in northwest Syria controlled by ISIL turning into another Afghanistan. Regional powers are keen to get it all under control though, and it is unlikely for a large power vacuum to redevelop, given recent history. This homegrown movement may not get much bigger, but might redouble its efforts where it already controls the land.

Unrest in al-Anbar and Iraq's Newest Crisis

You may have heard a tiny bit of news streaming out of Iraq this week (more important than the polar vortex) - there is trouble west of Baghdad. What kind of trouble? A group of insurgents, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), conveniently connected to al-Qaeda, took control of Ramadi and Fallujah in the al-Anbar province. Though the connections are tenuous and still not entirely clear, ISIL is also at the forefront of the rebellion in Syria. How far west of Baghdad? Pretty close - say 40 miles or so. Here is a map for reference to show Fallujah proximity to Baghdad:

Fallujah location (Source: Wikipedia)

The battles for Ramadi and Fallujah are remembered as some of the most entrenched, violent, and deadly of the Iraq War. That makes the towns not only strategic, falling on the road to Baghdad, but also symbolic.

Nations with deep interest in what happens in Iraq are not quite sure what to do. The United States has ruled out sending ground forces. The United Kingdom has similarly indicated that it would not send troops. Even Iran refused the idea of sending troops. All are willing to send aid to Iraq - military aid. In fact, the US is stepping up military shipments in an attempt to support the Iraqi government and avoid fighting from spreading much further. If there's a war brewing, it always helps to just arm at least someone with more weapons and better ones too.

Nonetheless, beating back the insurgents militarily presents a hypocritical dilemma both for Iraqi and American leadership, who have stood their ground on neighboring Syria, expressing the need for political rather than military solutions. Were Iraq to forego political options and resort to military ones solely, it would surely lose its legitimacy in criticizing Syria's response. It would also not look great for the United States, who is therefore simultaneously pushing for Iraq to employ political pressures through Sunni moderates.

Al-Maliki, meanwhile, is pretty much just throwing things out there to see what sticks. Although locals would surely prefer good governance and open business, tribal and religious distrust exist between those in al-Anbar and al-Maliki's Shia-led central government. For example, al-Maliki ordered Iraqi troops to not strike neighborhoods in Fallujah. Well, "neighborhoods" is certainly not easy to define, while it also provides insurgent troops clear cover and complicates urban warfare immensely. He has also urged residents to expel the insurgents, though without clarifying how they should do so, or why they should stick it out with the central government. Though these may be simply placeholder statements to stave off military options while political ones are attempted, they don't come off as too impressive.

Al-Qaeda has a vested interest in destabilizing foreign influence and bringing territory under its control, but al-Qaeda-backed insurgents don't just show up in town and everyone else suddenly becomes anti-government. There is a significant backstory here, centering on the potential consolidation of power by Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki, who is Shia, and the central government's seeming mistreatment of Sunnis. The Sunni-Shia rift goes back ages, but recent history reflects the dominance by the Sunni minority of the Shia majority under the reign of Saddam Hussein (who was Sunni). Even more recently, al-Maliki's arrest of his Sunni vice president in 2011, and his attempted arrest of a Sunni member of parliament and removal of protest camps in al-Anbar in late 2013 directly contributed to the current crisis.

What happens now? A military conflict is inevitable, regardless of the acrid political aftertaste for Iraq and the United States. It is hopeful, though, that it will be short-lived. What is critical is that Iraq's Shia-led government begin to pay better attention and give greater care to its Sunni minority. It's hard to imagine, but democracy is not a zero-sum game and win-win results are possible. The long-term solution is all-but political and that would involve compromise with various factions and the extensive inclusion of moderates. Al-Maliki is right in encouraging the citizens to expel the insurgents, but words must be tied to actions, and the government's efforts must be tied to explaining why it would be to the benefit of those in al-Anbar to be pro-government rather than anti-government.

Syrian peace talks scheduled, peace itself delayed

Amidst the surprising news from the Middle East this week was word that peace talks have been agreed upon by the two opposing sides in the Syrian civil war. Scheduled for late January in Geneva, this positive development is most certainly clouded by its more intricate details.

The first is the purported objective: transition. The opposition has consistently refused talks unless they included Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ceding power. Assad, meanwhile, has refused to cede power under any circumstances. In many ways, this is what the civil war has become all about. Although numerous reports mention that transitional government is a clear goal of the peace talks, it is curious whether both sides see that goal similarly. Assad's camp may view transition as inclusive of current government officials, while the opposition may believe it would completely exclude those currently in power. It would be unsurprising if this would become the main sticking point during the talks, if they actually take place that is.

The second is the question of who is capable of wholly leading the opposition, and, related, whether the opposition is cohesive enough to be led. More extremist groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continue to advance and take control of swathes of territory. Even less extremist groups do not accept the full authority of the political opposition, as clearly exemplified by this quote: Opposition political delegations do not have any power or influence on the Syrian street. On the whole, the Syrian National Council has foreign backing, but limited support within the opposition itself. At the same time, fighting continues in Syria, and its prevalence over the near future will be a testament to both cohesion and preparedness to peace. All of this makes one wonder: will the talks even take place?

There is little objective change in the civil war conditions of late. In fact, the United Nations seems to be spurring the peace talks based mostly on 'hope,' as opposed to more serious developments It is doubtful whether this is the best practice approach and leads to questions over whether the two opposing sides are even in agreement over what the purpose of the peace talks is. The world will know soon enough. In the meantime, it should hope.

From Albania to Norway, and everywhere in between

The saga of Syria's chemical weapons continues. It took ages to get Syria to admit to using banned weapons (though Syria never signed the ban) on its own population during the civil war. Now, with much work done, the question of how to dispose of and destroy the weapons remains unanswered.

It was originally thought that a neutral nation would allow the careful and systematic destruction of chemical weapons on its soil by a competent team of experts. Clearly, this assumption has proven naive. The NIMBY (not in my backyard) complex is extremely strong when it comes to sensitive topics such as chemical weapons. And with 1,300 tons of weapons to destroy, this is no simple or quick task.

Although a proponent of peaceful resolution in Syria and the destruction of the chemical weapons, Norway was first to say no. A flurry of other European nations have followed suit, including Germany, France, Albania, and, last but not least, Belgium. Neither Russia nor the U.S. are willing to do the dirty work (U.S. law, in fact, prohibits this). It seems, that no one may be willing.

Now, the weapons may be dismantled and destroyed at sea. This is a risky operation, though technically possible. It would involve significant precautions and security. More unsteady is the logistics of setting up this operation. Nonetheless, it may be the only option.

Disarming a nation's WMD: not as easy as first thought

Syria's "voluntary" acceptance to give up its chemical weapons arsenal in light of horrific video showing the effects of a gas attack on its own population is, by all means, an unprecedented solution. Even the United Nations admits to as much. It will take well into 2014, at best estimates, to complete the process; even though it is unclear how much WMD Syria even has. One major unknown is that both sides remain locked in a civil war, so there is a disarmament process within a country still at war. Giving up the chemical weapons is certainly a much brighter prospect than being ground zero for the next major international conflict, but in the end, does it solve the problems in Syria, or even help lead to their resolution?

Disarmament is a tricky process. Germany was, in many senses, disarmed between the world wars - that didn't end too well (World War II). The list of nations that have successfully dabbled (armed, not just researched), peaceably disarmed, and then integrated into  international community norms is short. You could make the case for South Africa, but its disarmament was tied to significant sanctions because of apartheid. It was apartheid's end that really brought South Africa within norms. You may say Libya; however, similar sanctions decimated the entire economy (and the energy industry in particular). In addition, Libya under Gaddafi still came toppling down years later. Three former Soviet states inherited WMD (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), but all returned them, having no ability to maintain them long-term and limited capacity to use them. Iraq? Well, that went south years later. No great example exists.

In many senses, Syria is a test case. What will be the effect on Assad's government? How will this affect the Syrian Civil War? What implications exist for the greater Middle East? These are all unknowns that rest on the progress of the chemical disarmament.

Previous Illexum Posts on Syria:

• Unthinkable? No. Unprecedented? No. Ignored. Yes. - Syria Today (September 5, 2013)
• UN good at counting; everything else - not so much (June 13, 2013)
• Foreign Arms in Syria (June 2, 2013)
• Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria) (May 19, 2013)
• The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD (April 28, 2013)
• Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons (March 21, 2013)
• Annan Resigns, Endgame Approaches? (August 2, 2012)

Unthinkable? No. Unprecedented? No. Ignored. Yes. - Syria Today

The disaster that is Syria continues to unfold and capture the world's attention. The United States, led by President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, have begun to use some of the harshest rhetoric of late in describing the calamity there in a bid to garner political support for military action against Syria. The trigger, late in coming, is the all-but certain use of chemical weapons. It is questionable whether the trigger may be too late.

Before touting the latest news, it is important to recognize that this chemical attack would be only the latest atrocity in a civil war that has dragged on and has been ignored. The Economist wrote an excellent piece on the disintegration of Syria as a nation-state and its impact on regional and international affairs back in February of 2013. For a conflict that has already lasted years, the question that certainly arises is: why now? what makes this so different?

Is this the unthinkable? No - there were chemical weapons atrocities throughout the twentieth century, and even during the Syrian Civil War reports as far back as early this year suggested chemical weapons use. In fact, a response in Syria would be the first of its kind, following the Chemical Weapons Convention (of which Syria is not a signatory).This latest attack was simply too public and too brazen to ignore is the line of thinking.

Is the scale of Syria Civil War unprecedented? This is certainly arguable. This is Homs this year:

                                          (Source: Daily Mail)

Meanwhile, this is Hama in 1982:

                                          (Source: Wikipedia)

Recent United Nations reports also point to an approximate two million refugees and massive camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. An addition four million are internally displaced, though this gets much less news much like internally displaced persons get much fewer rights than refugees. While the scale in terms of the total population is much higher, the overall scale is not much different from the Democratic Republic of Congo civil war. This is an all-out war. Whoever wins, it will take decades to rebuild Syria.

What has happened, and what often happens in these situations, is that the entire conflict has largely been ignored from the foreign policy of Western nations. Countries and international institutions have noted their opinions, counted the dead, but not acted. The reality is that no one wants to repeat Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, the US has likely eliminated any considerations of infantry use for the foreseeable future. It is unsurprising that a significant part of the US plan involves improving the Syrian resistance. In itself, this is problematic, with portions of the Syrian resistance being directly affiliates with al Qaeda. Meanwhile, Pentagon estimates suggest it would take 75,000 troops to control the ground in Syria.

None of this paints a pretty picture (nor is it meant to). Is action in Syria needed? Probably. Would it have been more useful months and months ago? Probably. The question now is most certainly - what kind of response will occur. Will it drive Assad out of power, or will it simply lead to a repeat of the two Gulf Wars?


Previous Illexum Posts on Syria:

• UN good at counting; everything else - not so much (June 13, 2013)
• Foreign Arms in Syria (June 2, 2013)
• Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria) (May 19, 2013)
• The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD (April 28, 2013)
• Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons (March 21, 2013)
• Annan Resigns, Endgame Approaches? (August 2, 2012)

UN good at counting; everything else - not so much

A new report from the United Nations (UN) human rights commission indicates that the death toll of the Syrian Civil War stands at nearly 93,000 (Full report here). This is not the first time the UN has released a report on the Syrian death toll. The list only includes those whose names and locations of death are known, thereby all-but guaranteeing that the actual toll of the war is much higher. The UN seems to be great at compiling sources and counting reports of deaths. It is not unimaginable that a team of graduate students could likely do the job (and there are databases of civil war deaths and civilian deaths of wars - example here).

The biggest missing piece is action, or even a call to action. The UN was created to (emphasis ours):

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

That is Article 1, Section 1 of the United Nations Charter. That is the first thing that was considered - the basis of all else. It's spirit is not being upheld. That is not to say how many articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are being outright ignored - to which, surprisingly, Syria voted in favor of.

In fact, the current UN report concludes most irreverently:

"Examining reported killings is an important step in understanding violence in Syria. But it is only a first step. Further analysis is necessary to answer substantive questions about patterns of violence during this conflict."

It seems to completely gloss over the fact that this is not a historical conflict where historical data is being examined - this is happening now - today. The next step is not to answer "substantive questions about patterns of violence during this conflict." The next step is to use this evidence to encourage a stand against the violence and bringing the conflict to an end.

Previous Illexum posts on Syria:

Foreign Arms in Syria (June 2, 2013)

Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria) (May 19, 2013)

To Do What Feels Necessary (May 4, 2013)

The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD (April 28, 2013)

Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons (March 21, 2013)

Israel Bombs Syria, Everyone Stays Quiet (January 31, 2013)

Foreign Arms in Syria

As the civil war rages on in Syria, foreign countries continue to wade in the murky waters of arms deals to government and rebel forces.

Russia, for one, is providing advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Syria.  Despite initial reports that the missiles had already arrived, Russian sources indicated that the missiles -- part of a 2010 arms deal -- wouldn't arrive in Syria for months.  Those same sources said, however, that delivery could be expedited based on conditions on the ground in Syria or changing positions/activities of Western governments.

On Monday, meanwhile, the EU ended its arms embargo on Syria, opening the door for countries like Britain and France to arm the rebels.  Canada's foreign minister responded to the news negatively, claiming that more arms flowing into Syria will only cause further bloodshed.

To make matters even worse, news came out Friday that the developer of Russia's MiG fighters will ink a deal to ship at least 10 fighter jets to Syria.  While details are sketchy, one can only hope that such a deal does not come to pass.

In short, while there does not appear to be any move toward direct military intervention by foreign governments, all indications seem to point to a weapons influx in the near future.  This of course brings us back to the question: who are we arming?  According to numerous accounts, the most organized and effective faction of the Syrian rebels is Jabhat al-Nusra -- a group with ties to al-Qaeda in Iraq.  The U.S. State Department designated Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization in December 2012, and the UN just added the group to its sanctions blacklist.

Therefore, those states looking to arm the Syrian rebels have some issues to address:

-Providing arms to Jabhat al-Nusra would violate the UN sanctions.

-Providing arms to other Syrian groups would likely be less effective, not to mention the fact that the arms could well end up in the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters.  Indeed, reports indicate that entire units of Free Syria Army soldiers have defected to Jabhat al-Nusra.

-Providing arms could provoke an arms race between Western powers and Russia to equip their respective sides.

-Providing arms could be the first step in the road to direct military intervention.

An arms escalation could further derail peace talks.  A U.S.-Russia conference planned for early June to discuss Syria, for example, will not be taking place in light of the recent arms developments.  With a weapons influx seemingly imminent, peace in Syria appears as elusive as ever.

Previous posts on Syria:

Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria) (May 19, 2013)

To Do What Feels Necessary (May 4, 2013)

The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD (April 28, 2013)

Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons (March 21, 2013)

Israel Bombs Syria, Everyone Stays Quiet (January 31, 2013)

Can't Trust Anyone (in Syria)

What has transpired in Syria over the past few years can only be described in two ways: both as a tragedy and as an embarrassment. A tragedy because a country pining for freedom has been devastated by war and devastation while its citizens huddle into refugee camps or are killed as collateral damage. An embarrassment because the world has stood by with covered eyes and ears, limiting any aid that may cut short the conflict, and just imagining a magical solution will help it end. And all because of politics - because Russia is still supportive of Assad, because Syria has limited natural resources, because no one wants to be performing regime change...

It seems that over the past six months or so, the conflict has crossed a broad, invisible line that will separate it from the level of medium-term resolvable (like the Balkans) to long-term potentially resolvable (like the Democratic Republic of Congo). This is also a line that separates the points where those inside the country can be trusted to where they cannot. The Syrian Civil War has arguably crossed that threshold.

Most evidently, the animosity and ferocity only continues to increase. Reports and videos circulate of (among other things) a rebel eating the heart of a government soldier, biochemical weapons use by both rebels and the government, and executions of prisoners of war, Meanwhile, the line the in sand that the United States drew regarding biochemical weapons use has turned to nothing more than a mirage, with reports as early as March, and more recent (and confirmed) reports being treated not as a reason to act now, but as a reason to investigate further. A vacuum of leadership is becoming ever more evident.

At this point, the likelihood that anyone in Syria currently on either side is a feasible post-conflict leader is questionable. Neither side can really be trusted to take charge and rule fairly and honestly. Moreover, the window that may have existed to tilt the balance may have closed long ago. Perhaps nothing short of a costly ground force, in human and physical terms, will change the current conflict path - and such an event is not likely to happen. Instead, the can is being kicked down the road, and another generation will wonder why a powder keg was allowed to ignite so easily and with such devastating consequences.

To Do What Feels Necessary

Reports early this morning indicated that Israel had struck inside Syria, though details were slim. At first, there was speculation that the Israelis had struck a chemical weapons site. This would have changed the dynamics of the Israel-Syria relationship, which remains in a technical state of war. Despite espousing concern over Syria's chemical weapons over the past month, Israel has not ventured into the conflict itself, likely at the behest of the United States, who belatedly continues to review and grow concerned with the atrocities inside Syria.

It seems, later reports indicate, that Israeli planes did not enter Syrian airspace (though they did enter Lebanese airspace) to conduct the airstrike. In fact, the target was another weapons convoy to Hizbullah, much like the previous strike in January. Therefore, in fact, as the day has gone on and the details have come out, this story has died down. It is not a new phase in the war, but Israel's continuance of doing what is necessary in order to keep itself secure.

The Chorus Grows Louder: Syria & WMD

Are they or aren't they? And who is they - the government or the rebels? The only known known, as Donald Rumsfeld would eloquently put it, is that the mess in Syria is turning into a quagmire.

Rumblings of chemical WMD use in the Syrian conflict are not new. New images seem to strongly suggest that conventional weapons are not solely in play. Moreover, American intelligence affirms this position and indicates that sarin has been used, but on a small scale (Syria denies this American "lie"). Unfortunately, as with previous evidence, it doesn't seem that any country, with the United States in particular, is really willing to do anything about it other than utilize euphemisms for further investigation and delayed action. In a sense, the United States is saying that there's evidence, but not clear-cut proof. Figure that?

It seems that the line in the sand, which seemed so clear in the past based on American statements, has blurred with the wind. Given recent history and even considering older military history (dating as far back as World War I), the United States is visibly shaken by the potential problems of confronting chemical weapons militarily. While those weapons pose significant threat to Americans, putting soldiers on the ground to eliminate them seems to be a line in itself. It seems doubtful that in all this time, no special force has been organized and trained to tackle such an obvious concern.

Despite all this, it is time to take a position, whether it be showing force (regional deployment) or showing presence (drones). Something must be done. Or will the world stand by as another civil war drags months into years and death and destruction into the everyday? Just in the past few decades, the world watched Somalia, Congo, and Yugoslavia - do we really need another example? Where are the massive protests about inaction? Where is the public outcry? It seems that the Syrian conflict's human toll has gone overlooked in the face of political calculations.

It's important to remember that sometimes the war we try to avoid is the war that drags us in. Perhaps we can truly preempt such a calamity by taking a stance now and beginning to end the madness.

Raise Your Hand if You Saw Chemical Weapons

President Obama's visit to Israel this week would be an excellent opportunity for some serious, evenhanded discussion on what's going on in Syria. In fact, the President should pull in  his national security team and ask Benjamin Netanyahu to do the same. Frankly, the testy relationship between the two leaders is reflected in the countries' differing statements on Syria's use of chemical weapons.

See, the Israelis are affirming reports that Syria has begun to use chemical weapons. The Syrians, of course, blame it on the rebels. As does Russia. The United States, however, is not so sure and is not jumping to any conclusions so quickly. In fact, the United States is "deeply skeptical," which of course sits none too well with Russia and Syria, who are demanding an investigation.

What seems likely is that someone used a chemical (or biological) agent of some sort. Given the levels of frustration and the severity of factions in rebel forces, it is impossible to rule out rebel use, perhaps even to attempt to trigger larger retaliation. President Obama's line in the sand will perhaps turn out to be a moving target. Does it truly mean only if government forces use them? Do dirty agents count, or only official ones? All these questions gloss over the point - the line in the sand is meant to protect the people. If anyone uses chemical agents to any extent, the line has been crossed. Moreover, continuous retreat is seen as a sign of weakness in the region (as well as elsewhere). One must hold their ground if resolution is truly a desired result. Lastly, the relationship between the United States and Israel could further be strained if they are unable to agree on the events and repercussions of those events in Syria, much like how the relationship has been strained over Iran.

Therefore, the time for action, on some level, is on the horizon. Even nominal air support, with drones perhaps, would indicate that the United States' position is firm and the line in the sand doesn't move with the wind. Such action will, in time, bring Syria closer to resolution, as well as likely continue to repair the relationship with Israel. It is not the time to let technicalities get in the way.

Israel Bombs Syria, Everyone Stays Quiet

Reports surfaced today of an apparent Israeli aerial incursion into Syria, destroying a convoy near Damascus. Other reports indicate a research facility of some sort (biochemical weapons is assumed) was attacked. Syria denies that the Israelis attacked a convoy headed for Lebanon and presumably Hizbullah.

Naturally, the Israelis are quiet. Surprisingly, so is most everyone else. (The US did confirm it was an Israeli strike)

Israel has been wary of the civil war in Syria for quite some time. That uneasiness has only increased as Assad's power wanes and the situation becomes ever more desperate. Many analysts worry that this strike only raises the instability in the region. Apart from all out regional war, how much more unstable the Middle East can get is really questionable.

With Syria continuing to supply weapons to Hizbullah, the Israelis are concerned that those weapons may begin to include biological and chemical agents. However, with Syrian forces engaged all across its own territory, the likelihood of counterattack in response to a strike is limited. The press release  from Syria disguised as a news article may be the most that can be spared. Therefore, the logic behind this military action can be seen clearly.

Apart from these facts, it seems more likely for Assad to take any possible weapons with him in retreat to the Alawite territory than to give it to Hizbullah. Selling the excess of what cannot be brought, however, may be a possibility, but it is unlikely that Assad has reached that stage yet. Instead, any possibility that it had, or the option to eliminate a weapons delivery of any sort, with minimal repercussions, was taken.

The most interesting non-news piece of this entire incident is how quiet everyone is. Russia called the action "unacceptable," but is also "clarifying" the incident. Little to no information from other countries can be found. It seems that Syria really has no friends left these days. Perhaps it is time for Assad to make for that exit, or retreat, whatever the wish is.