Unrest in al-Anbar and Iraq's Newest Crisis

You may have heard a tiny bit of news streaming out of Iraq this week (more important than the polar vortex) - there is trouble west of Baghdad. What kind of trouble? A group of insurgents, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), conveniently connected to al-Qaeda, took control of Ramadi and Fallujah in the al-Anbar province. Though the connections are tenuous and still not entirely clear, ISIL is also at the forefront of the rebellion in Syria. How far west of Baghdad? Pretty close - say 40 miles or so. Here is a map for reference to show Fallujah proximity to Baghdad:

Fallujah location (Source: Wikipedia)

The battles for Ramadi and Fallujah are remembered as some of the most entrenched, violent, and deadly of the Iraq War. That makes the towns not only strategic, falling on the road to Baghdad, but also symbolic.

Nations with deep interest in what happens in Iraq are not quite sure what to do. The United States has ruled out sending ground forces. The United Kingdom has similarly indicated that it would not send troops. Even Iran refused the idea of sending troops. All are willing to send aid to Iraq - military aid. In fact, the US is stepping up military shipments in an attempt to support the Iraqi government and avoid fighting from spreading much further. If there's a war brewing, it always helps to just arm at least someone with more weapons and better ones too.

Nonetheless, beating back the insurgents militarily presents a hypocritical dilemma both for Iraqi and American leadership, who have stood their ground on neighboring Syria, expressing the need for political rather than military solutions. Were Iraq to forego political options and resort to military ones solely, it would surely lose its legitimacy in criticizing Syria's response. It would also not look great for the United States, who is therefore simultaneously pushing for Iraq to employ political pressures through Sunni moderates.

Al-Maliki, meanwhile, is pretty much just throwing things out there to see what sticks. Although locals would surely prefer good governance and open business, tribal and religious distrust exist between those in al-Anbar and al-Maliki's Shia-led central government. For example, al-Maliki ordered Iraqi troops to not strike neighborhoods in Fallujah. Well, "neighborhoods" is certainly not easy to define, while it also provides insurgent troops clear cover and complicates urban warfare immensely. He has also urged residents to expel the insurgents, though without clarifying how they should do so, or why they should stick it out with the central government. Though these may be simply placeholder statements to stave off military options while political ones are attempted, they don't come off as too impressive.

Al-Qaeda has a vested interest in destabilizing foreign influence and bringing territory under its control, but al-Qaeda-backed insurgents don't just show up in town and everyone else suddenly becomes anti-government. There is a significant backstory here, centering on the potential consolidation of power by Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki, who is Shia, and the central government's seeming mistreatment of Sunnis. The Sunni-Shia rift goes back ages, but recent history reflects the dominance by the Sunni minority of the Shia majority under the reign of Saddam Hussein (who was Sunni). Even more recently, al-Maliki's arrest of his Sunni vice president in 2011, and his attempted arrest of a Sunni member of parliament and removal of protest camps in al-Anbar in late 2013 directly contributed to the current crisis.

What happens now? A military conflict is inevitable, regardless of the acrid political aftertaste for Iraq and the United States. It is hopeful, though, that it will be short-lived. What is critical is that Iraq's Shia-led government begin to pay better attention and give greater care to its Sunni minority. It's hard to imagine, but democracy is not a zero-sum game and win-win results are possible. The long-term solution is all-but political and that would involve compromise with various factions and the extensive inclusion of moderates. Al-Maliki is right in encouraging the citizens to expel the insurgents, but words must be tied to actions, and the government's efforts must be tied to explaining why it would be to the benefit of those in al-Anbar to be pro-government rather than anti-government.