This has nothing to do with the Disney movie and everything to do with "frozen conflicts," seemingly interminable wars that change little year to year. Russia is a master of establishing them, limiting the countries in its former sphere of influence from progressing or developing without Russia having a significant role.
Russia is succeeding in establishing a new frozen front in Ukraine, complete with a cease-fire that is lightly observed and battlefield lines that spell disaster for years to come. A loss of international focus on the conditions in eastern Ukraine have allowed Russia to control more of the conflict's outcome as well as its narrative. The truce barely exists in name along anymore.
Thinking long-term, ignoring the situation in Ukraine will feel like a mistake. It will serve to embolden governments that trample international norms and human rights. It will limit the progress of democratic movements where they are needed most, in the confines of nations struggling to transform from tyranny and kelptocracy to semblances of democracy.
Wednesday, October 8, 2014
Thursday, August 28, 2014
A Second Front: The Israeli Dilemma
Rebels fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government forces captured a border crossing between Syria and Israel in the disputed Golan Heights. While Syrian forces are attempting to recapture the crossing near Quneitra, the outlook is bleak; Syria also lost the Tabqa airbase in the country's north, the site of a gruesome mass execution of prisoners of war - a war crime from any perspective. The Nusra Front, linked to al Qaeda, participated in the Quneitra battle and represents a wakeup call for Israel as it settles the country's border.
(Source: The Times of Israel)
It is unlikely that the Israelis are interested in a two-front war, having just disengaged from 50 days of warfare in Gaza just a few days ago. This ceasefire itself may only prove to be temporary. The Israelis have fought several two-front wars in their past (1948, 1967, and 1973) and have conducted operations on multiple fronts since; however, handling two distinct conflict zones is not something that is desired.
Israel has largely stayed out of the Syrian Civil War, having only sporadically engaged across the border. However, with alert levels raised and the capture of 43 United Nations peacekeepers charged with securing the Israel-Syria border by rebel forces, reality may become necessity. Both Israel and the West may have to choose the lesser of two evils - Assad or the rebels. The US is not expected to work with Assad, but airstrikes against some of the rebel forces, namely the Islamic State, may come. This could place Israel in a precarious position of both defending itself and not being swallowed in regional conflict.
Tuesday, August 19, 2014
Press Play
It seems that Russian and Ukrainian leaders are simply waiting around till someone tells them to press play. After a huge row last week over a supposed humanitarian convoy purported to be poorly disguised military support, full-fledged war is occurring in all-but name across Eastern Ukraine. And it seems that the convoy will cross the border after all.
Meanwhile, a group of refugees fleeing the fighting were hit with "rockets and mortars," causing numerous fatalities and casualties. Both sides blame one another, naturally.
Victories in this war are reminiscent of recently-highlighted accounts of World War I on the centenary of its beginning - opposing sides fighting for mere feet and meters at great cost and little tactical advantage. Even the politics of soccer have been infiltrated, with teams in annexed Crimea beginning play in the Russian leagues.
But perhaps the real concern should be perspective. Everyone became worried for a week and half after pro-Russian rebels shot down an airliner at cruising altitude, but then the airlines and other nations decided they would just not fly over Ukraine anymore and all became well again. Perspective is in how a conflict is described, discussed, and referenced. Perhaps it is no longer appropriate to call it the "Ukraine Crisis," or the "Crisis in Ukraine" (also used by the Wall Street Journal). Perhaps we call it what is - war - because it's quite possible that reality may lead us toward a solution.
(Source: AP via BBC)
Meanwhile, a group of refugees fleeing the fighting were hit with "rockets and mortars," causing numerous fatalities and casualties. Both sides blame one another, naturally.
Victories in this war are reminiscent of recently-highlighted accounts of World War I on the centenary of its beginning - opposing sides fighting for mere feet and meters at great cost and little tactical advantage. Even the politics of soccer have been infiltrated, with teams in annexed Crimea beginning play in the Russian leagues.
But perhaps the real concern should be perspective. Everyone became worried for a week and half after pro-Russian rebels shot down an airliner at cruising altitude, but then the airlines and other nations decided they would just not fly over Ukraine anymore and all became well again. Perspective is in how a conflict is described, discussed, and referenced. Perhaps it is no longer appropriate to call it the "Ukraine Crisis," or the "Crisis in Ukraine" (also used by the Wall Street Journal). Perhaps we call it what is - war - because it's quite possible that reality may lead us toward a solution.
Monday, August 18, 2014
India and Pakistan: Domestic and Foreign Policies Collide
May 2014 brought the promise of progress in India-Pakistan relations. After the historic swearing-in of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi - the first ever attended by a Pakistani prime minister - people were cautiously optimistic about relations between the feuding nuclear powers. That optimism was extended when Modi and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif publicly exchanged letters of gratitude toward each other, which followed up on the meeting the two held after Modi's swearing-in. In his letter, Modi also expressed India's sympathy toward Pakistan after the terror attack on Karachi's airport.
These developments were promising, and they may well continue. Of course, it will take more than a meeting and a letter exchange to overcome decades of mistrust and border attacks. Furthermore, both prime ministers must still deal with local populations that are not so quick to mend old wounds. Moving too quickly toward improved relations will undercut the support both leaders need to rule. Indeed, Sharif was condemned for the very decision to attend Modi's inauguration.
Unfortunately, both leaders have already gone back to the tried-and-true tact of using the other country as an easy target for domestic woes. Last week, for example, Modi declared in a speech to Indian troops that Pakistan now wages a "proxy war of terrorism" because it lacks the capabilities to wage a conventional war.
Sharif, meanwhile, finds his own prime ministership at risk in the midst of large-scale protests. Those protests are led by political rival Imran Khan of the PTI party. Khan is calling for Sharif's ouster due to issues ranging from alleged vote-rigging in the 2013 elections to the "dynastic" nepotism of the Sharifs. Although he has called on protesters to keep their actions peaceful, he has also called on them to stop paying taxes and bills as part of the larger protest.
Perhaps it should not come as a surprise that, in the midst of this internal challenge to Sharif's rule, Pakistani military forces attacked Indian border posts at 20 different locations yesterday. Incidentally, none of Pakistan's major English-language outlets - Dawn, The News International, and The Express Tribune - reported on the attacks.
Ultimately, the political strategy of pandering to the local population while trying to present a more suitable international front is nothing new. Its most recent notable iteration may be Iran's positions during the recent nuclear talks. Iran may try to woo investors and welcome the UN nuclear watchdog, on the one hand, but talk about destruction of the U.S. in the event of an attack, on the other. In the case of Pakistan and India, the effort to garner local support by castigating the other country is a short-term tactic. It is also one that finds itself increasingly outdated in the digital age, where information from non-local sources is more readily available. The longer-term strategy of mending old wounds is harder; it will involve less flashy developments like multiple trade summits, cooperation in counter-terrorism investigations, and regular regional meetings to address issues facing the two and their smaller neighbors. This will take time, perseverance, patience, and restraint, none of which lend themselves well to the political arena. Ultimately, the coming months will tell whether May 2014 was a new beginning or merely an aberration in the long-standing dispute.
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| Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif shake hands after Modi's swearing-in (source: The Guardian). |
These developments were promising, and they may well continue. Of course, it will take more than a meeting and a letter exchange to overcome decades of mistrust and border attacks. Furthermore, both prime ministers must still deal with local populations that are not so quick to mend old wounds. Moving too quickly toward improved relations will undercut the support both leaders need to rule. Indeed, Sharif was condemned for the very decision to attend Modi's inauguration.
Unfortunately, both leaders have already gone back to the tried-and-true tact of using the other country as an easy target for domestic woes. Last week, for example, Modi declared in a speech to Indian troops that Pakistan now wages a "proxy war of terrorism" because it lacks the capabilities to wage a conventional war.
Sharif, meanwhile, finds his own prime ministership at risk in the midst of large-scale protests. Those protests are led by political rival Imran Khan of the PTI party. Khan is calling for Sharif's ouster due to issues ranging from alleged vote-rigging in the 2013 elections to the "dynastic" nepotism of the Sharifs. Although he has called on protesters to keep their actions peaceful, he has also called on them to stop paying taxes and bills as part of the larger protest.
Perhaps it should not come as a surprise that, in the midst of this internal challenge to Sharif's rule, Pakistani military forces attacked Indian border posts at 20 different locations yesterday. Incidentally, none of Pakistan's major English-language outlets - Dawn, The News International, and The Express Tribune - reported on the attacks.
Ultimately, the political strategy of pandering to the local population while trying to present a more suitable international front is nothing new. Its most recent notable iteration may be Iran's positions during the recent nuclear talks. Iran may try to woo investors and welcome the UN nuclear watchdog, on the one hand, but talk about destruction of the U.S. in the event of an attack, on the other. In the case of Pakistan and India, the effort to garner local support by castigating the other country is a short-term tactic. It is also one that finds itself increasingly outdated in the digital age, where information from non-local sources is more readily available. The longer-term strategy of mending old wounds is harder; it will involve less flashy developments like multiple trade summits, cooperation in counter-terrorism investigations, and regular regional meetings to address issues facing the two and their smaller neighbors. This will take time, perseverance, patience, and restraint, none of which lend themselves well to the political arena. Ultimately, the coming months will tell whether May 2014 was a new beginning or merely an aberration in the long-standing dispute.
Friday, August 8, 2014
Of Bombs & Air Strikes
(Source: Associated Press via Wall Street Journal)
What looks like a dust storm or the desert tracks of a very fast vehicle is actually the result of air strikes by American fighter jets on Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIL) militants not far from Erbil, Iraq. Friday's limited strikes resulted in limited damage, but also intend to send a warning message. However, without clearer objectives - what do the strikes intend to do? - the strikes will fail to resonate. In fact, they could spur the militants to redouble efforts or even drag American forces into a protracted, albeit likely arms-length, engagement.
Is the United States concerned with the exploding humanitarian disaster in Iraq? Among other minorities being displaced, both as refugees and internally, the Yazidis have gained special attention due to being surrounded by IS fighters (see map below). American aircraft dropped humanitarian supplies - water and food - to the besieged minority. Was this a tactical move? How does this specific situation differ from what IS militants have done elsewhere in Iraq, or Syria for that matter? The "why now" question is one that American officials would be hard-pressed to have a good answer for. There is a humanitarian disaster throughout the Middle East, perhaps one of unprecedented scale, that the United States and much of the West has thoroughly ignored.
On the other hand, is the collapsing political situation the greater worry? IS controls a large share of Iraq today and atrocities perpetrated by its rank and file are making for gory headlines. The map below offers a glimpse into the scale the Iraqi government is faced with.
(Source: Associated Press via Wall Street Journal)
Recent reports express concern over IS control over the Mosul Dam, which could wreak havoc downriver if compromised. Such control over water in the delicate region could impact IS' primary target - Baghdad. The complications multiply very quickly. Whether limited air strikes will do anything to change the situation on the ground is questionable. In 1999, the United States conducted a 78-day air campaign to make an impact on the ground in Kosovo. Are a few missiles and bombs here and there going to change much?
Is the United States simply grasping at straws to ensure its legacy? Should IS continue its advance into Kurdistan, will the United States assist, or abandon the Kurds as it has in the past? These are all critical questions that help answer the larger question - what is the objective here?
Thursday, July 31, 2014
Argentina: Return from Debt Mountain
Back in 2013, we provided a somewhat in-depth look at the ongoing legal battle between Argentina and debtors who declined to participate in its post-default restructuring plan.
So first, to recap: Back in 2001-2002, Argentina defaulted on its debt. More than 90% of bondholders participated in one of the two restructurings that took place (2005 and 2010), accepting a repayment structure that would pay them a fraction of their original holdings. Argentina steadfastly refused to make any payments to the holdout bondholders (which Argentina describes as "vulture funds"). The holdout bondholders, meanwhile, took Argentina to federal court for the full payments (the original bond agreements gave U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over any disputes). The federal district court had ruled in the bondholders' favor in November 2012 -- mandating that Argentina pay the holdout bondholders in full if it make any payment on the restructured bonds -- but the opinion had been stayed pending appeal to the Second Circuit by Argentina.
Flash forward to August 2013: The Second Circuit upheld the district court's opinion, rejecting arguments put forth by Argentina (and the U.S. government, siding with Argentina) with respect to both the bond contract interpretation as well as sovereign immunity. Specifically, the Second Circuit ruled that Argentina must pay the holdout bondholders in full before it makes any payments on the restructured bonds. Importantly, it also held that anyone helping Argentina make payments on the restructured bonds in defiance of its ruling could be held in contempt of court:
A poster in Argentina decries the "vulture funds" of the U.S. (Source: Yahoo News)
Today, Argentina was found to be in "technical default" because its payments to restructured bondholders were thwarted by the court-issued injunction preventing payments on the restructured bonds unaccompanied by payments to the holdout bondholders. Markets in both Argentina and the U.S. dropped today, after last-minute talks collapsed. Argentina, meanwhile, denies that it is in default, asking restructured bondholders to demand payment from the U.S. federal court system while its chief cabinet member cried conspiracy:
So first, to recap: Back in 2001-2002, Argentina defaulted on its debt. More than 90% of bondholders participated in one of the two restructurings that took place (2005 and 2010), accepting a repayment structure that would pay them a fraction of their original holdings. Argentina steadfastly refused to make any payments to the holdout bondholders (which Argentina describes as "vulture funds"). The holdout bondholders, meanwhile, took Argentina to federal court for the full payments (the original bond agreements gave U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over any disputes). The federal district court had ruled in the bondholders' favor in November 2012 -- mandating that Argentina pay the holdout bondholders in full if it make any payment on the restructured bonds -- but the opinion had been stayed pending appeal to the Second Circuit by Argentina.
Flash forward to August 2013: The Second Circuit upheld the district court's opinion, rejecting arguments put forth by Argentina (and the U.S. government, siding with Argentina) with respect to both the bond contract interpretation as well as sovereign immunity. Specifically, the Second Circuit ruled that Argentina must pay the holdout bondholders in full before it makes any payments on the restructured bonds. Importantly, it also held that anyone helping Argentina make payments on the restructured bonds in defiance of its ruling could be held in contempt of court:
Argentina could simply ignore the ruling and continue to make payments on the restructured bonds while ignoring the other ones.
But the court also made it clear that it would view anyone who helped Argentina make such payments as “assisting in a violation of the injunction.” It directly ordered Bank of New York Mellon, the trustee for the restructured bonds, not to make the payments to bondholders if Argentina sends it the money. And it warned that others not named in the case might face legal problems if they helped Argentina.Argentina expected the case would be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. In June, the Court declined -- without comment -- to heart the case.
Today, Argentina was found to be in "technical default" because its payments to restructured bondholders were thwarted by the court-issued injunction preventing payments on the restructured bonds unaccompanied by payments to the holdout bondholders. Markets in both Argentina and the U.S. dropped today, after last-minute talks collapsed. Argentina, meanwhile, denies that it is in default, asking restructured bondholders to demand payment from the U.S. federal court system while its chief cabinet member cried conspiracy:
“The credit rating agencies, the financial agents and opinionators who are trying to say that Argentina is in a supposed technical default are playing an absurd hoax that is aimed at destroying the restructuring process of Argentina debt,” he said.He further went on to accuse the federal judge and the negotiations mediator of complicity in the supposed default conspiracy:
"If there's a judge who's an agent of these speculative funds, if the mediator is their agent, what is this justice you're talking about? There's a responsibility of the state here, of the United States, to create the conditions for the unconditional respect of other countries' sovereignty," he said.Investors remain hopeful that some sort of deal will be reached in the coming weeks. Argentina, meanwhile, must at some point backtrack from its anti-capitalist populism. Such rhetoric is sometimes necessary in South American politics, but it is unhelpful when your country is in the midst of its second debt default in 13 years. Argentina was able to successfully restructure the large majority of its defaulted debt. The remaining 7% has remained a political football in Argentina, used by politicians to burnish their populist credentials. Throughout the holdout bondholder litigation, meanwhile, Argentina has expressed indignation at the notion that the holdouts would prevail in U.S. courts (especially when the U.S. government itself sided with Argentina). Furthermore, it has time and again expressed its lack of respect for the federal judge in charge of the case and expressed its intentions to not abide by U.S. court rulings. This is certainly Argentina's right as a sovereign nation, unless of course it wishes to utilize the U.S. financial system to develop its economy. If that's the case, then Argentina should meet its debt default with serious answers rather than conspiracy-laden propaganda.
Saturday, July 26, 2014
Building on Trust: Why the US Isn't Getting Very Far in Israel
Israel and Hamas are, by all accounts, at war in Gaza. US Secretary of State John Kerry is in the Middle East, frantically working with Israelis and Egyptians to nail down some sort of halt to hostilities, since the United States cannot work directly with Hamas - a designated terrorist organization. He's not getting very far and it's not entirely surprising.
(Source: Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images via The National Post)
Kerry next travels to France, where anti-Semitic rioting has flared in recent days, to attempt to gain support for a ceasefire among European leaders. Earlier, the Israeli cabinet rejected Kerry's ceasefire proposal, which the US has since downplayed as a disagreement on final wording - that no proposal was formally put forth. Part of that rejection involves Israel asserting its objective to continue to destroy tunnels during any ongoing ceasefire. Nonetheless, Israel and Hamas have agreed to a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire, beginning at 8 AM local time.
It's not shocking to see Israel and the US disagree lately; there's very little substance to the US-Israel relationship under the Obama administration. In fact, it could be argued that there's likely no trust at all among leadership in the two countries. Just this past week, Kerry was caught criticizing the Israeli operation in Gaza. In backtracking, Kerry could only come up with the something trite: "...war is tough. We defend Israel's right to do what it is doing..." Well, of course. In 2011, at the G20 meeting, President Obama was also caught making an offhand remark about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, suggesting that he was "fed up with him" and perhaps even agreeing with then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Netanyahu was a liar. Earlier in 2011, Obama rebuffed meeting Netanyahu in the US, a surprise given the close US-Israel relationship in the past. The two have met as recently as this past March, with Netanyahu clearly stating that he would do nothing that would hinder Israeli national security. The two have spent more time attempting to lecture one another than to truly discuss options for peace.
The nonexistence of any legitimate relationship clearly undermines cooperative efforts to bring peace to the region. The damage done to the relationship may prove to solely be superficial - something a change in leadership on either side (or likely both sides) may correct. At the same time, the failure to secure any significant gains, not only in Israel, but in the greater Middle East as a whole, is a legacy that the Obama administration does not desire. In addition to the current Israeli-Hamas war, there are wars, on one level or another, in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Mali and political strife in Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Bahrain, and Iran (I'm sure I missed some). The toll in Syria alone may be as high as 160,000, not something that history or the administration can (continue to) easily brush aside.
The only options that remain during Obama's final few years in office are to make significant and serious decisions. The Washington Post suggests disarming Hamas; after all, how many political parties typically have a military wing (though it is important to note that some have in the past, including Israeli ones). Such bold action will not be easy, but any easy solutions have long since passed. It is time to make difficult decisions that bring change. Only with change can there be peace.
Wednesday, July 9, 2014
Bahrain Expels U.S. Diplomat
Earlier this week, Bahrain, which has been criticized for its response to demonstrations during the Arab Spring, ordered the expulsion of U.S. diplomat Tom Malinowski after he dared to meet with an opposition political party. Ironically, Bahrain attempted to reaffirm its relationship with the U.S. at the same time, while the U.S. Department of State rebuked Bahrain's position and request.
This incident is an opportunity for the U.S. to reaffirm its commitments to human rights and the political process in all countries, even those that may be strategic or military allies. In agreement with the Washington Post editorial, failing to make policy positions clear could encourage other nations to challenge U.S. priorities. Otherwise, the U.S. should just as well and give up on the moral high ground that it sometimes claim to lead.
This incident is an opportunity for the U.S. to reaffirm its commitments to human rights and the political process in all countries, even those that may be strategic or military allies. In agreement with the Washington Post editorial, failing to make policy positions clear could encourage other nations to challenge U.S. priorities. Otherwise, the U.S. should just as well and give up on the moral high ground that it sometimes claim to lead.
Monday, June 9, 2014
Not (Yet) Safe: The Karachi Airport
The details remain sketchy and the perpetrators remain mysterious, but the terrorist attack has been rebutted and the intent is clear: ten terrorists attempted to take over the Karachi, Pakistan airport. All ten are now (supposedly) dead (interesting to note that hospitals remain on high alert in the area); however, the attack once again raises concerns about safety and security in Pakistan. Up to 13 others were killed, including security forces and airline staff, in an attack that took upwards of five hours to subdue.
Jinnah International Airport in Karachi is Pakistan's largest and busiest airline hub for both passengers and cargo. Gunmen stormed past security, possibly by might, possibly by deception, possibly both, through the cargo section of the airport, which is housed in the old terminal complex.
The attack, though unsuccessful, brings to light the precarious security situation in Pakistan. How could an airport in a city of over 20 million and a country with strong military and security apparatuses come under such brazen attack by a detachment of ten? With airport security high on the list, reviews of cargo operations and security deficits in outdated terminals will undoubtedly become prioritized around the world.
At the same time, Pakistani military operations to flush out Taliban terrorists from Waziristan may intensify as part of a tit-for-tat game that has been ongoing for years. In fact, the military had warned of a possible attack in response to its own recent incursion. Moving forward, will Pakistan choose retribution, or will the nation's leaders opt to take a page out of Sri Lanka's book, and end the strife once and for all, regardless of the political, economic, and social costs? Neither option is particularly pleasant.
(Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, Pakistan, Source: Wikipedia)
Jinnah International Airport in Karachi is Pakistan's largest and busiest airline hub for both passengers and cargo. Gunmen stormed past security, possibly by might, possibly by deception, possibly both, through the cargo section of the airport, which is housed in the old terminal complex.
The attack, though unsuccessful, brings to light the precarious security situation in Pakistan. How could an airport in a city of over 20 million and a country with strong military and security apparatuses come under such brazen attack by a detachment of ten? With airport security high on the list, reviews of cargo operations and security deficits in outdated terminals will undoubtedly become prioritized around the world.
At the same time, Pakistani military operations to flush out Taliban terrorists from Waziristan may intensify as part of a tit-for-tat game that has been ongoing for years. In fact, the military had warned of a possible attack in response to its own recent incursion. Moving forward, will Pakistan choose retribution, or will the nation's leaders opt to take a page out of Sri Lanka's book, and end the strife once and for all, regardless of the political, economic, and social costs? Neither option is particularly pleasant.
Thursday, May 29, 2014
The (not so) Little Conflict That Everyone's Ignoring
The conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) continues to fester with most nations choosing to ignore that it even exists. Sadly, a timeline of the conflict fails to identify a clear beginning. Does it start with the overthrow of François Bozize in March 2013 or does it go back much further?
About the only clarity in the conflict is the spiraling violence, fed by deteriorating conditions and ever-divisive religious tones. The most recent spate of violence is representative of these conditions. Arbitrary rule by religious-minded military leaders in the recent past has only served to exacerbate tensions.
A little geography helps put into perspective why a conflict in CAR can be politically dangerous:
About the only clarity in the conflict is the spiraling violence, fed by deteriorating conditions and ever-divisive religious tones. The most recent spate of violence is representative of these conditions. Arbitrary rule by religious-minded military leaders in the recent past has only served to exacerbate tensions.
A little geography helps put into perspective why a conflict in CAR can be politically dangerous:
(Source: Encyclopedia Britannica)
Many of the countries bordering CAR are only now beginning to heal from decades of war. A return to ethno-religious conflict in the region, coupled with anarchy and lawlessness, could signal darker days ahead if not addressed. Moreover, there are increasing concerns that CAR may spiral toward genocide, a fear because the outside world cannot afford to overlook another such conflict. The domino effect in the region could strain the resources of the international community.
The United States has made token concessions to protect civilians in CAR and attempt to restore some semblance of functioning government, but those efforts have proven fruitless. If the CAR government fails to protect its population, who becomes responsible for completing the task that has gone unfinished and, to an extent, not even started? While CAR may be important to regional security, the burden can become enormous for any single entity to handle.
Tuesday, April 29, 2014
The Us vs. Them Mentality
Last Friday (April 25), the Washington Post published an opinion piece by Ian Morris, a Stanford professor, titled In the long run, wars make us safer and richer. As you can tell, the article, which appears to be a broad summary of Morris' book, War! What is it good for?: Conflict and the progress of civilization from primates to robots, has already generated quite a number of comments in response. If one were to judge by the comments and Amazon reviews, readers are none too impressed so far.
The opinion piece outlines how the likelihood of a person's demise by violent means, namely war, has declined as wars have consolidated populations into communities and governments, growing ever larger over human history. In one way, war has made society safer and that safety has allowed society to focus on trade, which has made society and the individuals within society richer.
But the entire perspective of the article is focused on the winners of history. Those societies that won the wars have been made safer and richer. It can be argued that some of the conflicts in the 20th century benefited both winners and losers as wars over ideals and ideas supplanted those over religion, land, and gold, but that is only an argument. Over time, not everyone has equally benefited from wars - some populations became safer and others became more dangerous; some became richer and others became poorer.
If Morris' analysis differentiated how the losers of wars have fared in comparison, it may be stronger (or weaker), but it does not seem to. Morris takes humanity as a whole, but humanity as a whole is dominated by the conquerors - an us vs. them mentality that underlies Western worldviews.
It is important to not forget that these Eurocentric perspectives lurk behind much of what we consider as "normal." A great example is the world map - there is no particular reason for it being oriented the way it is:
The opinion piece outlines how the likelihood of a person's demise by violent means, namely war, has declined as wars have consolidated populations into communities and governments, growing ever larger over human history. In one way, war has made society safer and that safety has allowed society to focus on trade, which has made society and the individuals within society richer.
But the entire perspective of the article is focused on the winners of history. Those societies that won the wars have been made safer and richer. It can be argued that some of the conflicts in the 20th century benefited both winners and losers as wars over ideals and ideas supplanted those over religion, land, and gold, but that is only an argument. Over time, not everyone has equally benefited from wars - some populations became safer and others became more dangerous; some became richer and others became poorer.
If Morris' analysis differentiated how the losers of wars have fared in comparison, it may be stronger (or weaker), but it does not seem to. Morris takes humanity as a whole, but humanity as a whole is dominated by the conquerors - an us vs. them mentality that underlies Western worldviews.
It is important to not forget that these Eurocentric perspectives lurk behind much of what we consider as "normal." A great example is the world map - there is no particular reason for it being oriented the way it is:
(Source: Flourish.org, The Upside Down Map Page)
Wednesday, April 23, 2014
Coming Elections in Syria, Sponsored Today by: Chlorine Gas
Officials claim that Syria has handed over nearly 90% of its chemical weapons stores. Percentages are easy figures when they fail to elaborate on how those numbers are derived. Intelligence has existed for some time that suggests Syria will fail to disclose its full chemical weapons stockpiles and hold on to some instead. Moreover, easily-weaponized agents could be hidden away, particularly if they are not being sought and the world believes Syria has included those in its concessions. Such concerns over dual-use components hover over rogue states like a constant fog. As long as some internal control is maintained, it isn't so hard to imagine clandestine operations of all kinds. Syria has even threatened Israel and other spillover, something that one imagines would be difficult were the government fighting to its last man and materiel for domestic control.
If (nearly) 90% of those chemical weapons are handed over, why is Syria still employing chemical weapons, as the recent chlorine gas attack indicates? Apparently, chlorine gas is not included on the list of chemical weapons Syria is giving up, although it is banned. Who knew that the agreement in Syria allowed for such leniency and compromise as to which weapons it could keep and which it must give up? At the same time, the government continues to direct blame to the rebels, who have less incentive and even less means to launch chemical weapons strikes. It just doesn't entirely add up.
Amid the conflict, al-Assad's government has set a date for new elections -June 3, 2014. That's correct - about six weeks from now, Syrians all across the country are going to go the polls to elect their new leader. That is, except for the over 150,000 people killed and millions who have fled the country as refugees - they won't be voting, but the show must go on. The United Nations has suggested to Syria that it avoid having elections during a civil war. It is unlikely there will be any significant challenger (though a puppet challenger may be brought in). Why even go through the trouble? It is not really all that possible to gloss over this kind of electoral travesty.
Monday, April 14, 2014
Playing Politics at the United Nations
Earlier this month, Iran named Hamid Aboutalebi as its United Nations ambassador, a move that quickly strained US-Iran relations that had been slowly thawing. It is alleged that Aboutalebi was intimately part of the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran, which spiraled into a 444-day hostage crisis. Aboutalebi claims he was merely a translator; however, this role does not detract his contribution to the hostage-takers objectives. Regardless of his specific role or duties, Aboutalebi participated, which makes his appointment instantly controversial and instantly problematic.
With the United Nations building in New York, it is the US who issues visas to ambassadors and staff. There doesn't seem to be a record of an ambassador being denied a visa previously, although lower-level staff have been denied and other applications have been rescinded or plans have changed. One of the higher profile incidents was Yasser Arafat being denied a visa to speak at the UN in 1998. The 1947 agreement establishing the United Nations headquarters in New York requires the US to open travel for UN purposes. However, the US has maintained its right to restrict access nonetheless, and has established the precedents that would allow it to do so. No country has previously elected to test the limits of the agreement or the repercussions.
The US has taken the first step by denying the visa for Aboutalebi on the tail of a Congressional bill that would deny Aboutalebi on national security grounds. At the same time, Iran is standing its ground and refusing to select another ambassador. Domestically, there is fairly strong consensus on the denial.
Internationally, the ramifications can be extensive. Aboutalebi, albeit a potentially minor participant, was still a participant in one of the most significant violations of diplomatic norms and laws of the twentieth century. To make a diplomatic case out of the incident, given his background, would almost be ironic. At the same time, negotiations about Iran's nuclear stores will be strained by this incident. There exists no win-win situation here - someone will need to back down.
With the United Nations building in New York, it is the US who issues visas to ambassadors and staff. There doesn't seem to be a record of an ambassador being denied a visa previously, although lower-level staff have been denied and other applications have been rescinded or plans have changed. One of the higher profile incidents was Yasser Arafat being denied a visa to speak at the UN in 1998. The 1947 agreement establishing the United Nations headquarters in New York requires the US to open travel for UN purposes. However, the US has maintained its right to restrict access nonetheless, and has established the precedents that would allow it to do so. No country has previously elected to test the limits of the agreement or the repercussions.
The US has taken the first step by denying the visa for Aboutalebi on the tail of a Congressional bill that would deny Aboutalebi on national security grounds. At the same time, Iran is standing its ground and refusing to select another ambassador. Domestically, there is fairly strong consensus on the denial.
Internationally, the ramifications can be extensive. Aboutalebi, albeit a potentially minor participant, was still a participant in one of the most significant violations of diplomatic norms and laws of the twentieth century. To make a diplomatic case out of the incident, given his background, would almost be ironic. At the same time, negotiations about Iran's nuclear stores will be strained by this incident. There exists no win-win situation here - someone will need to back down.
Wednesday, April 9, 2014
Unreliable Energy Focus: Libya's Energy
Libya hasn't exactly been a united country since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The elected government has failed to control the rebel-held eastern half of the country, but compromise may be the order of the day. The two sides reached an agreement to return four ports (two immediately) to government hands. The ports handed over, Hariga and Zueitina, are the smaller of the four. The larger two ports, Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, will likely take more time to hand over. The first two represented goodwill while the last two are the stakes. Rebel leaders continue to demand measures of autonomy, revenue sharing, and development in return for the final pieces of the agreement. With oil exports being the primary bargaining chip, it would be expected that any agreement becomes more complicated and lengthy than the text on any page.
So why is Libya even important in the energy marketplace? It has lots of it, particularly oil. While currently only producing about 150,000 barrels of oil per day (leaving the government near financial disaster, though this is denied by the government), Libya has produced upwards of 1.4 million barrels per day since the civil war and upwards of 1.8 million in the years preceding it. Overall, Libya has the ninth most oil reserves in the world, even while a significant portion of its land remains a hydrocarbon terra incognita. In addition, Libya has large natural gas reserves. The upside of Libya's energy sector remains inviting, given its size, small population, and proximity to Europe. That last benefit, a geographic one that cannot be easily overcome by competitors, is critical. Much of Libya's oil is exported to Europe and it has important natural gas pipelines connecting it to the European mainland via Italy. These energy connections may prove increasingly important as European tensions with Russia increase.
The agreement this week between the government and rebels - indicating a possible resumption of Libya's higher export levels - led to a fall in the market price of oil. However, with a ten-day window before oil flows from the ports and two to four weeks before the larger two ports may be handed over, there is little celebration elsewhere thus far; even optimists are cautious. Libya is an important cog in the international energy wheel, albeit a damaged one that has been turning for some time now. If Libya re-enters the energy scene at previous levels, it will make an impact and balance Europe's energy sources.
Libya's eastern ports (Source: WorldBulletin)
So why is Libya even important in the energy marketplace? It has lots of it, particularly oil. While currently only producing about 150,000 barrels of oil per day (leaving the government near financial disaster, though this is denied by the government), Libya has produced upwards of 1.4 million barrels per day since the civil war and upwards of 1.8 million in the years preceding it. Overall, Libya has the ninth most oil reserves in the world, even while a significant portion of its land remains a hydrocarbon terra incognita. In addition, Libya has large natural gas reserves. The upside of Libya's energy sector remains inviting, given its size, small population, and proximity to Europe. That last benefit, a geographic one that cannot be easily overcome by competitors, is critical. Much of Libya's oil is exported to Europe and it has important natural gas pipelines connecting it to the European mainland via Italy. These energy connections may prove increasingly important as European tensions with Russia increase.
The agreement this week between the government and rebels - indicating a possible resumption of Libya's higher export levels - led to a fall in the market price of oil. However, with a ten-day window before oil flows from the ports and two to four weeks before the larger two ports may be handed over, there is little celebration elsewhere thus far; even optimists are cautious. Libya is an important cog in the international energy wheel, albeit a damaged one that has been turning for some time now. If Libya re-enters the energy scene at previous levels, it will make an impact and balance Europe's energy sources.
Thursday, March 27, 2014
The G7 & Russia's Nonchalant Response
So far, this blog has been fairly quiet on the topic of Russia and Crimea (though it did have several previous posts on Ukraine). This hasn't been for any intentional reason, though the topic has been covered in the news fairly thoroughly. It is not trifling to consider that the standoff between Russia and the West contains the hallmarks of future conflict.
This week, the drama entered a new phase when the G8 became the G7. Russia was essentially booted from the G8, to which it has belonged since 1998. It seems unclear whether the expulsion is a disagreement that may be temporary, or if this action is somewhat permanent. Given the severity of the infraction and the tough talk from both sides, even a temporary suspension is unlikely to be short at all. Frankly, Russia does not seem to care.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's comments are particularly telling. Lavrov didn't even really need to use words. His words echoed his actions, suggesting that Russia felt the G8 was simply an informal club to which it had experienced a temporary visit. It's not that big of a deal to leave after all.
How Russia feels is important if tensions are to calm. Russia has never felt it had an opportunity to lead in Western multilateral institutions. It has long sought to carve its own leadership role in its own institutions within spheres of influence it has much stronger control over - historically, economically, and politically. At times over the past few decades, it has sought to spread that influence, but it has always returned home. In a sense, it is a form of atavism.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has been Russia's response to NATO. Russia has reassured its allies in this bloc that they are not expected to be involved in any military action related to Ukraine. While full-scale war is far off, it would be significant. If the CSTO does not exist as an alliance, how far from the Soviet Union is it? Other Russian-led institutions continue to build influence over and connections between its former republics.
Ideally, deeper conflict will be averted and solutions to the Ukraine dilemma will be found. At this time, everyone seems to be prepared for a long, entrenched fight, though the West is not nearly as sure of its next move as Russia is. It would behoove Western nations, and the United States in particular, to give the situation some serious consideration. This kind of chess has not been played in a good while.
This week, the drama entered a new phase when the G8 became the G7. Russia was essentially booted from the G8, to which it has belonged since 1998. It seems unclear whether the expulsion is a disagreement that may be temporary, or if this action is somewhat permanent. Given the severity of the infraction and the tough talk from both sides, even a temporary suspension is unlikely to be short at all. Frankly, Russia does not seem to care.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's comments are particularly telling. Lavrov didn't even really need to use words. His words echoed his actions, suggesting that Russia felt the G8 was simply an informal club to which it had experienced a temporary visit. It's not that big of a deal to leave after all.
How Russia feels is important if tensions are to calm. Russia has never felt it had an opportunity to lead in Western multilateral institutions. It has long sought to carve its own leadership role in its own institutions within spheres of influence it has much stronger control over - historically, economically, and politically. At times over the past few decades, it has sought to spread that influence, but it has always returned home. In a sense, it is a form of atavism.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has been Russia's response to NATO. Russia has reassured its allies in this bloc that they are not expected to be involved in any military action related to Ukraine. While full-scale war is far off, it would be significant. If the CSTO does not exist as an alliance, how far from the Soviet Union is it? Other Russian-led institutions continue to build influence over and connections between its former republics.
Ideally, deeper conflict will be averted and solutions to the Ukraine dilemma will be found. At this time, everyone seems to be prepared for a long, entrenched fight, though the West is not nearly as sure of its next move as Russia is. It would behoove Western nations, and the United States in particular, to give the situation some serious consideration. This kind of chess has not been played in a good while.
Monday, March 17, 2014
Libya Update, Part II
Overnight, moves were taken to secure Libyan unity. United States Navy Seals boarded and took control of the oil tanker - Morning Glory - that had escaped the naval blockade of Libya's eastern, rebel-held ports. The tanker is now on its way back to Libya to an undisclosed, government-held port. This action underlines American support for Libya's government and greatly undermines the actions of the rebel government. Moreover, it emphasizes the willingness of action upon necessity, including appropriate military response.
In related news, two Israeli nationals and a Senegalese were detained upon suspicion of attempting to purchase oil from the tanker off the coast of Cyprus. They were released and it is, at this time, unclear if there is any suspicion remaining, if their actions were pure opportunism, or if they were part of any premeditated plan with the tanker's crew.
In related news, two Israeli nationals and a Senegalese were detained upon suspicion of attempting to purchase oil from the tanker off the coast of Cyprus. They were released and it is, at this time, unclear if there is any suspicion remaining, if their actions were pure opportunism, or if they were part of any premeditated plan with the tanker's crew.
Sunday, March 16, 2014
A Divided Libya in the Backlog of International News
International events seem to be ablaze right now. Between the fear of Crimea seceding to the frantic search for Malaysia Airlines flight 370, there's just not much else that is getting more than a byline these days.
Libya seems to be one of those stories being pushed below the fold. There remains a lack of unity between the eastern and western sections of the country. The 2011 Libyan Civil War may have freed the country from Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorial chains, but they have not mended social, political, and economic divisions since. As with many resource-based economies, some of the most potent underlying resentment stems from regions where resources are found and extracted and the capital, where they are often spent. Eastern Libya has been, by many definitions, operating as an autonomous region of Libya for over a year now.
The rebel government recently tested its autonomy. Just over a week ago, an oil tanker - Morning Glory - docked in Sidra, breaking the blockade of eastern ports held by the rebel government. The rebel government quickly began to load the tanker with oil. Somewhat ironically, the tanker is flying the flag of North Korea. Initially, Libya threatened to bomb the tanker were it to load oil and attempt to leave, having previously fired warning shots at other tankers near ports. The tanker ended up loading 234,000 barrels of oil, evading the naval blockade after being fired on for two days, and is now in the Mediterranean Sea, though the rebels claim it has reached its final destination.
(Morning Glory, from marinetraffic.com via RT.com)
For what it's worth, North Korea denied involvement and claimed to revoke the tanker's registration. It is unlikely that any countries within so few sailing days are willing to risk strained relations with Libya; it's last recorded position seems to be off the coast of India, but that was prior to reaching Libya. It also may have truly been under the Liberian flag.
Nonetheless, any evidence of associations between Libyan rebels and North Korea are bound to strain relations further. The weakness of Libya's government in stopping the tanker led to Prime Minister Ali Zeidan being voted out of office, which doesn't exactly help strengthen faith in government. Around the world, there exists a fear that oil will prove to be Libya's undoing and lead to a second and more violent iteration of the Civil War. It seems that, for the time being, Libya is stuck between the possibility of further war and the Iraq-Kurdistan model of resource-based autonomy, which has not fared so well either. It couldn't hurt to suggest that oil revenues be used wisely, with perhaps technical assistance and planning from some experienced Western powers. Libya's population of just over six million is not so far from Norway's five million, after all.
Libya seems to be one of those stories being pushed below the fold. There remains a lack of unity between the eastern and western sections of the country. The 2011 Libyan Civil War may have freed the country from Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorial chains, but they have not mended social, political, and economic divisions since. As with many resource-based economies, some of the most potent underlying resentment stems from regions where resources are found and extracted and the capital, where they are often spent. Eastern Libya has been, by many definitions, operating as an autonomous region of Libya for over a year now.
The rebel government recently tested its autonomy. Just over a week ago, an oil tanker - Morning Glory - docked in Sidra, breaking the blockade of eastern ports held by the rebel government. The rebel government quickly began to load the tanker with oil. Somewhat ironically, the tanker is flying the flag of North Korea. Initially, Libya threatened to bomb the tanker were it to load oil and attempt to leave, having previously fired warning shots at other tankers near ports. The tanker ended up loading 234,000 barrels of oil, evading the naval blockade after being fired on for two days, and is now in the Mediterranean Sea, though the rebels claim it has reached its final destination.
For what it's worth, North Korea denied involvement and claimed to revoke the tanker's registration. It is unlikely that any countries within so few sailing days are willing to risk strained relations with Libya; it's last recorded position seems to be off the coast of India, but that was prior to reaching Libya. It also may have truly been under the Liberian flag.
Nonetheless, any evidence of associations between Libyan rebels and North Korea are bound to strain relations further. The weakness of Libya's government in stopping the tanker led to Prime Minister Ali Zeidan being voted out of office, which doesn't exactly help strengthen faith in government. Around the world, there exists a fear that oil will prove to be Libya's undoing and lead to a second and more violent iteration of the Civil War. It seems that, for the time being, Libya is stuck between the possibility of further war and the Iraq-Kurdistan model of resource-based autonomy, which has not fared so well either. It couldn't hurt to suggest that oil revenues be used wisely, with perhaps technical assistance and planning from some experienced Western powers. Libya's population of just over six million is not so far from Norway's five million, after all.
Sunday, March 2, 2014
Qatar's Migrant Worker Problem
With much of the world media covering the Ukraine situation (latest update: Russian troops have taken over Crimea), this post will take a different tact and focus on an issue that is slowly gaining traction: the deadly exploitation of migrant workers in Qatar in the lead-up to the 2022 World Cup.
Back in September 2013, The Guardian issued a scathing article about the conditions faced by migrant workers in Qatar. That article focused primarily on the conditions of Nepalese workers. A related article quoted the International Trade Union Confederation in estimating that 4,000 migrant workers would die working on World Cup-related projects by 2022. Given that Nepal relies on its migrant workers going to Qatar, Nepal was disinclined to criticize Qatar in the wake of those reports.
Last week, the issue was raised once again as The Guardian reported that more than 500 Indian migrant workers had died in Qatar since January 2012. The downside was that the numbers, which were released from the Indian embassy pursuant to a FOIA-type request from media, did not explain the exact nature of those deaths. The Qatari government capitalized on this omission by making the dubious claim that the worker death rate was normal, given the number of Indian migrant workers in Qatar (500,000), and claiming that there was a "campaign" against Qatar.
Why, with conflict all around the world, is the situation of migrant workers in Qatar a pressing issue? Well, for one, the kafala system ingrained into Qatar's economic system is a system designed for worker exploitation. Under the kafala system, a migrant worker is sponsored by an employer; the employer then has near-total control over the migrant worker's life. The employer can take the worker's passport, withhold pay, make the worker labor long hours (in the Middle Eastern desert) without sufficient access to water, and keep the worker in squalid living conditions. If the worker wants to change jobs, there is often no recourse; the employer is supposed to provide an identification card but often doesn't, making an employee who flees an undocumented worker subject to arrest and deportation. Moreover, there is even an "exit visa" requirement whereby an employer who has a dispute with a worker can legally prevent the worker from leaving Qatar. This issue gained international attention when a professional French soccer player was denied an exit visa and was forced to stay in Qatar for a year while he negotiated a settlement with his soccer team-employer. The international soccer player's union responded to this by calling on Qatar to end the kafala system for pro soccer players because it "goes to the heart of respecting their basic human rights." The fact that a professional athlete was forcibly kept in Qatar by his employer -- and that such a practice is built into the legal system -- is emblematic of the extreme level to which employers control migrant workers' lives in Qatar.
The conditions of these workers is in itself a reason to call attention to Qatar's state-sponsored abuse of migrant workers. The fact remains, however, that this is now the world's responsibility: by accepting Qatar's assurances that it could transform itself into a host site for the World Cup, the world community must now recognize that it has implicitly blessed Qatar's massive infrastructure development. And that development is not just stadium-building. Indeed, the massive project will cost hundreds of billions of dollars and includes building an entire city from scratch. Moreover, this massive re-shaping of the country, and its attendant migrant worker abuse, is inextricably linked to the 2022 World Cup:
Back in September 2013, The Guardian issued a scathing article about the conditions faced by migrant workers in Qatar. That article focused primarily on the conditions of Nepalese workers. A related article quoted the International Trade Union Confederation in estimating that 4,000 migrant workers would die working on World Cup-related projects by 2022. Given that Nepal relies on its migrant workers going to Qatar, Nepal was disinclined to criticize Qatar in the wake of those reports.
Migrant workers in Qatar line up to take buses back to their living accommodations (Source: The Guardian)
Last week, the issue was raised once again as The Guardian reported that more than 500 Indian migrant workers had died in Qatar since January 2012. The downside was that the numbers, which were released from the Indian embassy pursuant to a FOIA-type request from media, did not explain the exact nature of those deaths. The Qatari government capitalized on this omission by making the dubious claim that the worker death rate was normal, given the number of Indian migrant workers in Qatar (500,000), and claiming that there was a "campaign" against Qatar.
Why, with conflict all around the world, is the situation of migrant workers in Qatar a pressing issue? Well, for one, the kafala system ingrained into Qatar's economic system is a system designed for worker exploitation. Under the kafala system, a migrant worker is sponsored by an employer; the employer then has near-total control over the migrant worker's life. The employer can take the worker's passport, withhold pay, make the worker labor long hours (in the Middle Eastern desert) without sufficient access to water, and keep the worker in squalid living conditions. If the worker wants to change jobs, there is often no recourse; the employer is supposed to provide an identification card but often doesn't, making an employee who flees an undocumented worker subject to arrest and deportation. Moreover, there is even an "exit visa" requirement whereby an employer who has a dispute with a worker can legally prevent the worker from leaving Qatar. This issue gained international attention when a professional French soccer player was denied an exit visa and was forced to stay in Qatar for a year while he negotiated a settlement with his soccer team-employer. The international soccer player's union responded to this by calling on Qatar to end the kafala system for pro soccer players because it "goes to the heart of respecting their basic human rights." The fact that a professional athlete was forcibly kept in Qatar by his employer -- and that such a practice is built into the legal system -- is emblematic of the extreme level to which employers control migrant workers' lives in Qatar.
The conditions of these workers is in itself a reason to call attention to Qatar's state-sponsored abuse of migrant workers. The fact remains, however, that this is now the world's responsibility: by accepting Qatar's assurances that it could transform itself into a host site for the World Cup, the world community must now recognize that it has implicitly blessed Qatar's massive infrastructure development. And that development is not just stadium-building. Indeed, the massive project will cost hundreds of billions of dollars and includes building an entire city from scratch. Moreover, this massive re-shaping of the country, and its attendant migrant worker abuse, is inextricably linked to the 2022 World Cup:
Fifa and the Qatar World Cup organising committee are now tangled in a Gordian knot. The human rights groups that have been pressuring Fifa and the Qataris demand to know whether there will be any meaningful reform to improve the welfare and safety of workers on all building projects. In Qatar itself, where politics has been described as akin to a medieval star chamber, an internal battle is raging. There are liberal forces who want to change the labour laws but are equally aware that sweeping away the kafala system that ties migrant workers to their employers would place huge question marks over its ability to fulfil its "2030 Vision" for the country.
The dizzying and unprecedented plan to spend hundreds of billions transforming the infrastructure of a country that was largely desert as recently as the 1970s can only be founded on cheap migrant labour.
Therein lies the dilemma – not only for the Qatari authorities, but for the British, German and French companies that have profited handsomely from the bonanza.
Abolish the culturally embedded kafala system and with it may go the mechanism for ensuring the almost absurdly ambitious plans to build cities, metro lines, roads and airports from scratch.Ultimately, Qatar may indeed be transformed into a dizzying spectacle of modernity for all the world to admire, but to do so it will rely on the age-old practice of worker exploitation. The world -- or at the very least, Fifa -- must decide how far it will go to hold Qatar accountable for these practices.
Friday, February 21, 2014
Stalled Talks, Grand Confusion in Syria
Given that this story is a few days old, this post will be fairly brief.
The Syrian peace talks have not exactly been going splendidly. Neither side seems to be at the talks for the same reasons and the fighting continues all the while. The talks are practically an exercise in futility.
UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi recently blamed the al-Assad regime for hampering the talks for refusing to discuss a transition of power. This should really come as no surprise. The government came to the talks indicating that it would refuse to discuss regime change. The opposition came only for that reason. It seems as if the talks were doomed from the start. Apart from discussing Syria's future, the talks have never even been on the same page.
It will be impressive if the UN, as well as the two sides who are backed by their respective world powers, can re-energize the talks to really begin to talk about facts on the ground and move toward some sort of path toward resolution and peace, however slow that may be.
The Syrian peace talks have not exactly been going splendidly. Neither side seems to be at the talks for the same reasons and the fighting continues all the while. The talks are practically an exercise in futility.
UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi recently blamed the al-Assad regime for hampering the talks for refusing to discuss a transition of power. This should really come as no surprise. The government came to the talks indicating that it would refuse to discuss regime change. The opposition came only for that reason. It seems as if the talks were doomed from the start. Apart from discussing Syria's future, the talks have never even been on the same page.
It will be impressive if the UN, as well as the two sides who are backed by their respective world powers, can re-energize the talks to really begin to talk about facts on the ground and move toward some sort of path toward resolution and peace, however slow that may be.
Thursday, February 6, 2014
A Fundamentalist Divide: Al Qaeda Separates Itself from ISIL
It seems you can be "too much," even for al Qaeda. On Monday, the terrorist group formally cut off its relationship with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). This declaration follows al Qaeda's demand that ISIL remain separate from the al Nusra Front, al Qaeda's branch in Syria, which ISIL has attempted to consolidate into itself over the past year. In fact, it is apparent that ISIL and al Qaeda have been at odds for several years, dating to the mid 2000s. While it is unlikely that the two groups will become equal rivals, it is, at the same time, clear that they may view themselves that way in the near future. In the ongoing infighting of Syria's opposition forces, al Qaeda has propped up its links to the al Nusra Front and ISIL signed a truce with Suqour al Sham. Consolidation in the region could mean less infighting, but could also lead to a severely split opposition, making it more difficult for outside powers to support either side.
(Map of ISIL operations, Source: Red24)
Critically, al Qaeda's declaration may reflect which battle it now envisions as more winnable - Syria or Iraq. While it has made occasional gains in Iraq, al Qaeda forces, by and large, have been continually beaten back. Moreover, the continued presence of American troops and related support hinder operations in Iraq. Syria, meanwhile, has limited Western interference while it collapses - The Economist's "The Death of a Country" piece ran nearly a year ago - leaving a potential vacuum of power in all but al Assad's western strongholds. In the end, this could make Syria's near term future only more violent, a fact that is difficult to imagine given the United Nations' February 4 report detailing the violence there today.
Monday, February 3, 2014
Stifling Dissent and Thwarting Protests in Post-Revolution States
Protests in Ukraine
The protests in Ukraine have received extensive media coverage in recent weeks. These protests, which began as an almost spontaneous reaction to President Victor Yanukovych's decision to scuttle a trade deal with the EU at the last minute, have transformed into a massive expression of widespread discontent with the current regime. (The trade deal was more of a spark that ignited protests for myriad underlying reasons. For a more in-depth treatment of those underlying reasons, see this previous post from early December 2013).
The Yanukovych government's reactions to the protests have varied greatly; the common thread has been their lack of success. First, three days after the iconic toppling of the Lenin statue in Kiev, the government tried cracking down by forcibly removing protest barricades. When this proved unavailing, in mid-December the government suggested it would soon sign the trade deal with the EU after all. It soon went in the complete opposite direction, negotiating a shadowy deal with Russia on December 17th involving a $15 billion loan and large cuts in natural gas prices amounting to approximately a 1/3 drop in prices. Details of that deal remain unclear, but protesters were suspicious. In fact, the protests were re-energized in late December 2013.
The government's next move was to pass new laws in mid-January greatly restricting the right to protest and sending individuals who slandered government officials to one year of "corrective labor." Protesters were undeterred, clashed with riot police, and even took over some government buildings. Yanukovych then offered the prime ministership and top government posts to opposition leaders, which they rejected. This past Tuesday, the prime minster and his cabinet resigned and the government repealed the anti-protest laws it had passed in mid-January. The government also passed an amnesty law for the protesters which was conditioned on the fact that they stop protesting within two weeks; the protesters rejected this measure.
Protests in Egypt
In Egypt, the military government has similarly found itself the target of resilient protests. Its response has escalated and been even harsher than Ukraine's. Outlawing participation in protests generally and the Muslim Brotherhood specifically failed to end anti-government protests. The government then labeled the group a terrorist organization and made mere participation in the Brotherhood an offense punishable by five years' imprisonment. The protests, as well as arrests for them, have continued into the new year.
In 2013, the government also clamped down on freedom of the press. It shut down media it deemed to harbor pro-Brotherhood sympathies, with the notable exception of al Jazeera. The seeming exception for al Jazeera has proven illusory, as the government previously imprisoned several of the media organization's employees and just recently indicted 20 al Jazeera reporters -- eight are in custody while the rest were declared fugitives -- for creating "false" portrayals of the Brotherhood's protests.
The Bottom Line
Ukraine and Egypt are both deeply divided countries struggling to forge their respective post-revolution identities. In Ukraine, the pro-Western movement saw its 2004 Orange Revolution gains dissipate as Victor Yanukovych -- the standardbearer of pre-revolution, pro-Russian policies -- came to power. Yet Yanukovych himself took steps toward European integration, and the current crisis is a result of his backtracking on those steps. In Egypt, meanwhile, the 2011 revolution that led to Mubarak's ouster also led to the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and, after a year of rule under Mohammed Morsi, a return to military rule after a protest-inspired military coup. That military government is now struggling to clamp down the persistent protests of the ousted Brotherhood. In Ukraine, the deep split is over pro-Europe and pro-Russian sentiments (and the split is itself largely divided along geographic lines), whereas in Egypt the split is between secularism and Islamism. In both countries, however, the current crises of legitimacy stem from the governing group's inability to satisfactorily address that divide.
While the narrative of a deeply divided country is hardly unique, and indeed can be found in many countries throughout the world, what is unique to Egypt and Ukraine in current world affairs is the months-long persistence of protests aimed at bringing down a post-revolution regime. While many people imagine slow steps forward following a pro-democratic revolution, both of these countries have addressed the protests by clamping down on freedoms of protest and the press. This strategy might have prevailed in the pre-social media days or even today in a tightly-controlled country ala North Korea, but it has proven grossly ineffective in both countries. As part of their growing pains, the current regimes will have to learn that to govern means to be criticized; to govern effectively, moreover, might even mean listening to your critics.
Previous Illexum Posts
Ukraine: Overlooked, Underreported
Ukraine Protests Grow, Government Wavers, World Begins to Take Notice
Egypt Update: Muslim Brotherhood Declared Terrorist Organization
The protests in Ukraine have received extensive media coverage in recent weeks. These protests, which began as an almost spontaneous reaction to President Victor Yanukovych's decision to scuttle a trade deal with the EU at the last minute, have transformed into a massive expression of widespread discontent with the current regime. (The trade deal was more of a spark that ignited protests for myriad underlying reasons. For a more in-depth treatment of those underlying reasons, see this previous post from early December 2013).
The Yanukovych government's reactions to the protests have varied greatly; the common thread has been their lack of success. First, three days after the iconic toppling of the Lenin statue in Kiev, the government tried cracking down by forcibly removing protest barricades. When this proved unavailing, in mid-December the government suggested it would soon sign the trade deal with the EU after all. It soon went in the complete opposite direction, negotiating a shadowy deal with Russia on December 17th involving a $15 billion loan and large cuts in natural gas prices amounting to approximately a 1/3 drop in prices. Details of that deal remain unclear, but protesters were suspicious. In fact, the protests were re-energized in late December 2013.
 |
| January 25, 2014: Protesters clash with riot police in Kiev, Ukraine. (Source: Yahoo News) |
The government's next move was to pass new laws in mid-January greatly restricting the right to protest and sending individuals who slandered government officials to one year of "corrective labor." Protesters were undeterred, clashed with riot police, and even took over some government buildings. Yanukovych then offered the prime ministership and top government posts to opposition leaders, which they rejected. This past Tuesday, the prime minster and his cabinet resigned and the government repealed the anti-protest laws it had passed in mid-January. The government also passed an amnesty law for the protesters which was conditioned on the fact that they stop protesting within two weeks; the protesters rejected this measure.
Protests in Egypt
In Egypt, the military government has similarly found itself the target of resilient protests. Its response has escalated and been even harsher than Ukraine's. Outlawing participation in protests generally and the Muslim Brotherhood specifically failed to end anti-government protests. The government then labeled the group a terrorist organization and made mere participation in the Brotherhood an offense punishable by five years' imprisonment. The protests, as well as arrests for them, have continued into the new year.
 |
| January 17, 2014: Protesters clash with riot police in Cario. (Source: CNN.com) |
In 2013, the government also clamped down on freedom of the press. It shut down media it deemed to harbor pro-Brotherhood sympathies, with the notable exception of al Jazeera. The seeming exception for al Jazeera has proven illusory, as the government previously imprisoned several of the media organization's employees and just recently indicted 20 al Jazeera reporters -- eight are in custody while the rest were declared fugitives -- for creating "false" portrayals of the Brotherhood's protests.
The Bottom Line
Ukraine and Egypt are both deeply divided countries struggling to forge their respective post-revolution identities. In Ukraine, the pro-Western movement saw its 2004 Orange Revolution gains dissipate as Victor Yanukovych -- the standardbearer of pre-revolution, pro-Russian policies -- came to power. Yet Yanukovych himself took steps toward European integration, and the current crisis is a result of his backtracking on those steps. In Egypt, meanwhile, the 2011 revolution that led to Mubarak's ouster also led to the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and, after a year of rule under Mohammed Morsi, a return to military rule after a protest-inspired military coup. That military government is now struggling to clamp down the persistent protests of the ousted Brotherhood. In Ukraine, the deep split is over pro-Europe and pro-Russian sentiments (and the split is itself largely divided along geographic lines), whereas in Egypt the split is between secularism and Islamism. In both countries, however, the current crises of legitimacy stem from the governing group's inability to satisfactorily address that divide.
While the narrative of a deeply divided country is hardly unique, and indeed can be found in many countries throughout the world, what is unique to Egypt and Ukraine in current world affairs is the months-long persistence of protests aimed at bringing down a post-revolution regime. While many people imagine slow steps forward following a pro-democratic revolution, both of these countries have addressed the protests by clamping down on freedoms of protest and the press. This strategy might have prevailed in the pre-social media days or even today in a tightly-controlled country ala North Korea, but it has proven grossly ineffective in both countries. As part of their growing pains, the current regimes will have to learn that to govern means to be criticized; to govern effectively, moreover, might even mean listening to your critics.
Previous Illexum Posts
Ukraine: Overlooked, Underreported
Ukraine Protests Grow, Government Wavers, World Begins to Take Notice
Egypt Update: Muslim Brotherhood Declared Terrorist Organization
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Homebrew: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Growing out of the chaos of Middle Eastern insurgencies, the al Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has built its presence and spread fear throughout the region. Often viewed as one of the more violent terrorist groups in the Middle East, ISIL has taken over towns in Iraq - the first time insurgents have controlled these towns since 2003 - and is contributing to infighting among opposition fighters in Syria.
ISIL fighters have been careful, focusing on political aims to establish themselves, only to later identify with more fundamental positions. When necessary, socioeconomic and political arguments are employed to attempt to garner support among the locals. Once established, their strength limits the options to opponents, both civilian and military, as is the case in Syria. In a sense, entrenched positions are difficult to change.
ISIL's origins remain somewhat shrouded, and its role in the region has become unclear. Some reports suggest that ISIL is linked to Bashar al-Assad, Syria's President, as an attempt to fracture and debase the opposition. Others suggest that ISIL is little more than a concept Syria developed to change the face of its civil war. The BBC, though, has ISIL's formation pinned down to April 2013 as an independent terrorist organization. Analysts tend to tie it to insurgents previously known as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which may be best described as an evolutionary step in that organization's history. There is much information floating around, but most of it only lightly touches on why there was an outgrowth across borders. Why did the influx of fighters into the regional coalesce into much more coherent organizations than previously? Why are they more successful now? (apart from the withdrawal from Iraq, for that can't be the reason for everything)
Countries in the region continue to grow wary. Jordan has gone so far as to note that ISIL does not operate within its borders and that the terrorist group is "no threat." This is a surprising statement given ISIL's operations in two of Jordan's neighbors. Meanwhile, ISIL has threatened to attack Turkish cities over a disputed closed border crossing. It seems that ISIL's reach may yet expand.
Looking ahead, the horizon for ISIL is unclear. Expansion opens up new fronts, builds enemies, and attracts attention. Showing its face in Syria has increased its exposure and has proven of little benefit. At the same time, there is concern for a large lawless region in northwest Syria controlled by ISIL turning into another Afghanistan. Regional powers are keen to get it all under control though, and it is unlikely for a large power vacuum to redevelop, given recent history. This homegrown movement may not get much bigger, but might redouble its efforts where it already controls the land.
ISIL fighters have been careful, focusing on political aims to establish themselves, only to later identify with more fundamental positions. When necessary, socioeconomic and political arguments are employed to attempt to garner support among the locals. Once established, their strength limits the options to opponents, both civilian and military, as is the case in Syria. In a sense, entrenched positions are difficult to change.
ISIL's origins remain somewhat shrouded, and its role in the region has become unclear. Some reports suggest that ISIL is linked to Bashar al-Assad, Syria's President, as an attempt to fracture and debase the opposition. Others suggest that ISIL is little more than a concept Syria developed to change the face of its civil war. The BBC, though, has ISIL's formation pinned down to April 2013 as an independent terrorist organization. Analysts tend to tie it to insurgents previously known as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which may be best described as an evolutionary step in that organization's history. There is much information floating around, but most of it only lightly touches on why there was an outgrowth across borders. Why did the influx of fighters into the regional coalesce into much more coherent organizations than previously? Why are they more successful now? (apart from the withdrawal from Iraq, for that can't be the reason for everything)
Countries in the region continue to grow wary. Jordan has gone so far as to note that ISIL does not operate within its borders and that the terrorist group is "no threat." This is a surprising statement given ISIL's operations in two of Jordan's neighbors. Meanwhile, ISIL has threatened to attack Turkish cities over a disputed closed border crossing. It seems that ISIL's reach may yet expand.
Looking ahead, the horizon for ISIL is unclear. Expansion opens up new fronts, builds enemies, and attracts attention. Showing its face in Syria has increased its exposure and has proven of little benefit. At the same time, there is concern for a large lawless region in northwest Syria controlled by ISIL turning into another Afghanistan. Regional powers are keen to get it all under control though, and it is unlikely for a large power vacuum to redevelop, given recent history. This homegrown movement may not get much bigger, but might redouble its efforts where it already controls the land.
Thursday, January 23, 2014
Instagram the News: Sochi Edition
Instagram is the latest source of news, apparently.
Ramzan Kadyrov, Russia's hand-picked President of Chechnya, posted on his Instagram account last week that Doku Umarov had been killed by Russian special forces. Umarov, also known as Russia's "Osama bin Laden" led insurgents in the Caucasus region who had carried out attacks throughout Russia, including in Moscow. Apart from making the claim, Kadyrov offered no evidence to support his statement, fueling speculation. In the past, there have been premature reports of Umarov's death; however, there is growing confirmation amongst others in the region (on both sides) that this time it is real. Umarov had called for attacks on the 2014 Winter Olympics in the nearby Russian city of Sochi, scheduled to begin in February. The games will be the first held in Russia since the Soviet Union staged the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.
Umarov's death will require insurgents in the region to look for new leadership, though whether it will impact Sochi remains unclear. While there is certainly evidence to support that eliminating the leadership of a terrorist group limits that group's impact, the short-run longitudinal effect is questionable. Kadyrov states that the threat to Sochi is now 'groundless', but security experts are certainly concerned by at least one 'Black Widow' suspect, if not more. Russia has a mixed history with 'Black Widow' terrorists, particularly suicide bombers emanating from the turbulent Caucasus region. Today, Russia is anxious to host an Olympics without incident (the 1980 games were boycotted by the United States) and revive its international presence, but with the games being compared to a military base, any attack will be railed as a failure on Russia's part.
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If you enjoyed that Instagram led the news, you can take a look at Kadyrov's account, or review Foreign Policy's 11 favorite Kadyrov posts. Here's an example:
Ramzan Kadyrov, Russia's hand-picked President of Chechnya, posted on his Instagram account last week that Doku Umarov had been killed by Russian special forces. Umarov, also known as Russia's "Osama bin Laden" led insurgents in the Caucasus region who had carried out attacks throughout Russia, including in Moscow. Apart from making the claim, Kadyrov offered no evidence to support his statement, fueling speculation. In the past, there have been premature reports of Umarov's death; however, there is growing confirmation amongst others in the region (on both sides) that this time it is real. Umarov had called for attacks on the 2014 Winter Olympics in the nearby Russian city of Sochi, scheduled to begin in February. The games will be the first held in Russia since the Soviet Union staged the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.
Umarov's death will require insurgents in the region to look for new leadership, though whether it will impact Sochi remains unclear. While there is certainly evidence to support that eliminating the leadership of a terrorist group limits that group's impact, the short-run longitudinal effect is questionable. Kadyrov states that the threat to Sochi is now 'groundless', but security experts are certainly concerned by at least one 'Black Widow' suspect, if not more. Russia has a mixed history with 'Black Widow' terrorists, particularly suicide bombers emanating from the turbulent Caucasus region. Today, Russia is anxious to host an Olympics without incident (the 1980 games were boycotted by the United States) and revive its international presence, but with the games being compared to a military base, any attack will be railed as a failure on Russia's part.
------------------
If you enjoyed that Instagram led the news, you can take a look at Kadyrov's account, or review Foreign Policy's 11 favorite Kadyrov posts. Here's an example:
(Source: Instagram, via Foreign Policy)
Monday, January 13, 2014
Libya's East Side Story
Flying under the radar in late 2013, leaders in the eastern half of Libya, which holds 60% of the nation's oil production, declared an autonomous government. Libya has the world's ninth largest oil reserves, and other energy resources aplenty. This declaration came about two years after Libya's Civil War ended, which also ended the 42-year reign of Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi's dictatorship largely held in check a nation that had a history of regional autonomy. The political subdivisions throughout Libya's history are Tripolitania, Cyernaica, and Fezzan, with most of the population residing in Tripoliatania and Cyernaica.
Libya's Subdivisions (Source: Fragile States Resource Center)
The recent announcement was certainly a blow to the centralized leadership in Tripoli, but reading the events carefully helps add details to the story. Proponents would like the return of the three-state Libya, last extant under King Irdis in 1951, and one that existed, at times, throughout Libya's history. Although this certainly could lead to a break-up of the country, leaders from the region did not explicitly declare independence, or even self-determination. Leaders seem to be seeking a status closer to the experience of the Kurdish region of Iraq following the Iraq War (though even that status is still debated).
Much like in Iraq, it may boil down to natural resources, regional access, and service delivery. The eastern shadow government is offering up oil to foreign buyers and is promising to open the region's energy resources under its own terms. The central government, meanwhile, has indicated that it will use force, if necessary, to prevent any circumvention of its authority. It has already fired toward a Maltese tanker in order to force it to deviate from an eastern port. Meanwhile, regional access and governmental service delivery are both hampered by protests and a burgeoning insurgency that has blocked off the region for months. These issues sound familiar and are a formula for bigger problems.
Infighting, and possibly even open warfare, will continue to be a risk unless the structure of Libya indicates more clearly how the central government will work with regional authorities. While levels of autonomy are integral to regional function in a territory as large as Libya, it is important that those levels are determined wisely and with both sides in agreement. Nonetheless, all sides must recognize that central governance, to some extent, is necessary.
Friday, January 10, 2014
Growing Pains in Iraq: Reconciling Federalism
Few people believed that Iraq was magically reborn following the departure of the remaining U.S. troops from Iraq in late 2011. After all, that withdrawal was years in the making, both politically and militarily. Even then, there was debate over how Iraq would be shaped, in 2012 and beyond. It was surmised that a Sunni-Shia rift would continue, fueled in part by insurgents pushing the boundaries of Iraqi security forces. At the same time, concerns about Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki's (who is Shia) leadership also existed, in light of clear pro-Shia favoritism.
It seems that "messy democracy" is the favorite description of Iraq over the years; however, this description is really just an easy way to not say anything at all. It's a way to say Iraqi democracy is not the democracy of Norway (ranked #1 in the Democracy Index), but is also not the democracy of Zimbabwe (ranked #148). It is clear that Iraq is somewhere in the middle (#113 in 2012). But what direction is that democracy headed toward - Norway or Zimbabwe?
This is not a question that has an easy answer. Iraqi federalism has been discussed over and over gain. How will the country look? It has been debated whether Iraq can even hold itself together as a single unified country, given its history, colonially drawn borders, and somewhat diverse populations. What power-sharing structures will exist? That entails whether Iraq function as an open democracy where one viewpoint transitions power to another bloodlessly, or would a constitutional requirement for a constant mix of viewpoints be necessary. As well, the level of autonomy given to individual provinces - should Iraq even be a federation or a confederation? And in the end, who will fight who over what, and will that fighting be political or physical? To gain some insight into some of the issues that prevail today, from insurgent fighting in the West to Kurdish self-determination in the North, it helps to take a look at the political and religious boundaries in Iraq:
Religious makeup of Iraq (Source: NPR)
Political makeup of Iraq (Source: Wikipedia)
One province stands out in a grand manner: Al-Anbar in the West. On the one hand, al-Anbar is far larger than any other political division in Iraq, taking up as much as a third of the country. On the other hand, the province is sparsely populated and includes significant desert acreage.
Al-Anbar is also the source of some of the worst fighting during the Iraq War, including the First Battle of Fallujah and the Second Battle of Fallujah. More recently, it is the location of Sunni protests, and the takeover of Iraqi cities (Ramadi, the capital of Al-Anbar, and, to some extent, Fallujah) by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is associated with al-Qaeda.
In the past, gerrymandering was a possibility. This likely would have been an option early on when the politics of Iraq were still up for debate. However, with a Shia-led government that seemingly continues to clamp down on Sunni politics, this idea is likely off the table, or we will end up with the worst of American democratic traditions married to military conflict.
Within federalism, there exists some level of equality on a national scene, at least in the sense that everyone can, at some point, attain a leadership role and participate in national politics. Without that, there is no purpose to being part of a federalist structure. Both alienating a component of the national population and simultaneously allowing the growth of their own sub-state cannot lead to a solution.
It will take crucial and careful leadership to lead Iraq out of its federalist quagmire. It can't hurt to use the American example here as well: the United States operated under the Articles of Confederation between 1777 (informally) / 1781 (formally) until 1789, when the Constitution took effect. It took years to figure out a better way for the system to operate, and it may take years in Iraq. Focusing on the politics, and the compromises that come with politics, while avoiding warfare and open conflict, are key tenets that could lead to Iraq reconciling its federalism for a lasting state.
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