Instagram the News: Sochi Edition

Instagram is the latest source of news, apparently.

Ramzan Kadyrov, Russia's hand-picked President of Chechnya, posted on his Instagram account last week that Doku Umarov had been killed by Russian special forces. Umarov, also known as Russia's "Osama bin Laden" led insurgents in the Caucasus region who had carried out attacks throughout Russia, including in Moscow. Apart from making the claim, Kadyrov offered no evidence to support his statement, fueling speculation. In the past, there have been premature reports of Umarov's death; however, there is growing confirmation amongst others in the region (on both sides) that this time it is real. Umarov had called for attacks on the 2014 Winter Olympics in the nearby Russian city of Sochi, scheduled to begin in February. The games will be the first held in Russia since the Soviet Union staged the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.

Umarov's death will require insurgents in the region to look for new leadership, though whether it will impact Sochi remains unclear. While there is certainly evidence to support that eliminating the leadership of a terrorist group limits that group's impact, the short-run longitudinal effect is questionable. Kadyrov states that the threat to Sochi is now 'groundless', but security experts are certainly concerned by at least one 'Black Widow' suspect, if not more. Russia has a mixed history with 'Black Widow' terrorists, particularly suicide bombers emanating from the turbulent Caucasus region. Today, Russia is anxious to host an Olympics without incident (the 1980 games were boycotted by the United States) and revive its international presence, but with the games being compared to a military base, any attack will be railed as a failure on Russia's part.

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If you enjoyed that Instagram led the news, you can take a look at Kadyrov's account, or review Foreign Policy's 11 favorite Kadyrov posts. Here's an example:

(Source: Instagram, via Foreign Policy)

Sochi's Inevitable Conversation: Security

As each successive Olympic games approach, several threads dominate the conversation, and they largely stray from the athletics. The first is the overall cost of the games (as well as whether the return on that investment brings equal benefit to the host city and country). The second is the security of the games, and how much that security costs. This second conversation has seemingly been driving the first one over the last several Olympics.

Security has particularly been a sore point in recent games. The cost of security has been around or over $1 billion in Beijing in 2008, Vancouver in 2010, and London in 2012. Vancouver had initially budgeted under $200 million for the Olympics, while London budgeted around $500 million. None of those estimates were met and were in fact shattered when final tallies came in. In London, even with the massive security budget, actual security was inadequate, requiring the government to use military support. At over $50 billion, the Socihi Olympic games are projected to be the most expensive ever.. That figure may come with an asterisk though as up to $30 billion of that may have been stolen and diverted. Nonetheless, security can be expected to be a significant chunk of that budget, and that may not even include military operations meant to support the Sochi Olympics. Brazil is already working with Interpol to reinforce security for the 2016 Olympic games.

Sochi is an even more precarious position than previous hosts. Though the terrain is mountainous and challenging, Russia's most violent and unstable region is less than 400 miles away. Nonetheless, terrorist groups from Russia's Caucasus have struck across Russia in the past. Recent operations in the region are not winning any points with its oppressed populations. Russia has been waging a war in the region since the 1990's and it could be debated even earlier.

A recent suicide bombing of a bus in Volgograd illustrated that regional terrorists can strike well outside their home area of operations. Sochi, though it may feel a world way is very accessible. A new generation of suicide bombers, who, unlike previous Black Widows, lack the typical markings of loss and personal grievance, can be an even larger headache to identify for Russian authorities. It could just turn up that the connections of this particular suicide bomber have simply not yet been identified or are not as direct as in the past.

It seems that Russia recognizes the concern and the international stage. Planned security is extensive and makes any successful attack unlikely. There is little doubt though, that threats to Sochi are real. Will Russia thwart them? Will the anti-terrorism operations be successful? Most importantly, will Russia keep it all out of the public eye and leave the focus to its transformation of Sochi? Sochi is the culmination of Russia's about-face to the world. Failure is not an option.

Approaching High Noon in Sochi

Much controversy has been stirred over Russia's anti-gay law with the approaching 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The potential penalties and repercussions of Russia's new legal minefield are extensive. In a lot of senses, almost anything one does can get them arrested under these laws.

All of this makes what the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) did all the more impressive. On October 11, the USOC updated its non-discrimination policy to include sexual orientation. While the fact that the policy did not already have this statement is unfortunate, its impact could be broad. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) does not have such a clause but is investigating adding similar language to the IOC Charter. The USOC is pushing for this change.

Even Bode Miller has called the existing Russian laws embarrassing. This Bode Miller.

As can be imagined, such a policy would fly directly in the face of new Russian laws and would inject politics into the coming Olympics unlike any time in the recent past. A proposed boycott is unlikely as it produces little tangible result. Nonetheless, Sochi could be very interesting when it opens on February 7, 2014.

Opposing Soft Diplomacy

The Economist makes the case this week (Nul points: http://www.economist.com/node/21555919) against overlooking domestic oppression in the selection of international contests. While Eurovision is at the heart of the argument, the article also touches on the upcoming EURO 2012 championship, which a number of European leaders have pledged to not attend in light of Ukraine's treatment of its former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who is jailed under dubious charges.

It seems funny that this, albeit short, article fails to mention international contests that cross European borders. For instance, the 2018 FIFA World Cup was awarded to Russia, a bastion of regression towards authoritarianism and international malaise over the past decade. 2022 was awarded to Qatar, which recognizes neither gay rights nor Israel. Brazil, home of the 2014 Cup, is little better, having improved democratically in recent years, but continues to undermine human rights by forcibly removing settled populations for construction and aesthetics. Another event subject to controversy is the Formula One Grand Prix, most recently in Bahrain, where human rights concerns have been raised regarding the government response to protesters. Even the biggest international contest of them all is no stranger. The 2008 Summer Games were held in China. 2016 - Brazil. 2014 Winter Games - Russia.

One aspect nearly all of these contests have in common is the fact that they are awarded by committee. The sole exception is Eurovision, which automatically transfers from country to country based on the victor. Perhaps that unique aspect of Eurovision gives it some semblance of fairness that other international contest selections lack. Instead, countries should not only pledge to politically boycott awarded games, but sometimes a more thorough boycott is needed. For example, how would Ukraine have responded under threat to move the games out of Ukraine (Poland's neighbor Germany seems to have some recently-built soccer stadiums). Despite claims, politics and sports are not separate. Sport is often used to divert attention, build loyalty, and promote populism. Does it do more to make international contests seem inclusive, so long as one has the ability to fund them, whether that funding comes from economic success or economic subjugation, or does it do more to make international contests exclusive, reserved for only those nations who agree on certain basic principles, such as human rights and representative government?