Libya's East Side Story

Flying under the radar in late 2013, leaders in the eastern half of Libya, which holds 60% of the nation's oil production, declared an autonomous government. Libya has the world's ninth largest oil reserves, and other energy resources aplenty. This declaration came about two years after Libya's Civil War ended, which also ended the 42-year reign of Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi's dictatorship largely held in check a nation that had a history of regional autonomy. The political subdivisions throughout Libya's history are Tripolitania, Cyernaica, and Fezzan, with most of the population residing in Tripoliatania and Cyernaica.

Libya's Subdivisions (Source: Fragile States Resource Center)

The recent announcement was certainly a blow to the centralized leadership in Tripoli, but reading the events carefully helps add details to the story. Proponents would like the return of the three-state Libya, last extant under King Irdis in 1951, and one that existed, at times, throughout Libya's history. Although this certainly could lead to a break-up of the country, leaders from the region did not explicitly declare independence, or even self-determination. Leaders seem to be seeking a status closer to the experience of the Kurdish region of Iraq following the Iraq War (though even that status is still debated).

Much like in Iraq, it may boil down to natural resources, regional access, and service delivery. The eastern shadow government is offering up oil to foreign buyers and is promising to open the region's energy resources under its own terms. The central government, meanwhile, has indicated that it will use force, if necessary, to prevent any circumvention of its authority. It has already fired toward a Maltese tanker in order to force it to deviate from an eastern port. Meanwhile, regional access and governmental service delivery are both hampered by protests and a burgeoning insurgency that has blocked off the region for months. These issues sound familiar and are a formula for bigger problems.

Infighting, and possibly even open warfare, will continue to be a risk unless the structure of Libya indicates more clearly how the central government will work with regional authorities. While levels of autonomy are integral to regional function in a territory as large as Libya, it is important that those levels are determined wisely and with both sides in agreement. Nonetheless, all sides must recognize that central governance, to some extent, is necessary. 

Growing Pains in Iraq: Reconciling Federalism

Few people believed that Iraq was magically reborn following the departure of the remaining U.S. troops from Iraq in late 2011. After all, that withdrawal was years in the making, both politically and militarily. Even then, there was debate over how Iraq would be shaped, in 2012 and beyond. It was surmised that a Sunni-Shia rift would continue, fueled in part by insurgents pushing the boundaries of Iraqi security forces. At the same time, concerns about Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki's (who is Shia) leadership also existed, in light of clear pro-Shia favoritism.

It seems that "messy democracy" is the favorite description of Iraq over the years; however, this description is really just an easy way to not say anything at all. It's a way to say Iraqi democracy is not the democracy of Norway (ranked #1 in the Democracy Index), but is also not the democracy of Zimbabwe (ranked #148). It is clear that Iraq is somewhere in the middle (#113 in 2012). But what direction is that democracy headed toward - Norway or Zimbabwe?

This is not a question that has an easy answer. Iraqi federalism has been discussed over and over gain. How will the country look? It has been debated whether Iraq can even hold itself together as a single unified country, given its history, colonially drawn borders, and somewhat diverse populations. What power-sharing structures will exist? That entails whether Iraq function as an open democracy where one viewpoint transitions power to another bloodlessly, or would a constitutional requirement for a constant mix of viewpoints be necessary. As well, the level of autonomy given to individual provinces - should Iraq even be a federation or a confederation? And in the end, who will fight who over what, and will that fighting be political or physical? To gain some insight into some of the issues that prevail today, from insurgent fighting in the West to Kurdish self-determination in the North, it helps to take a look at the political and religious boundaries in Iraq:

Religious makeup of Iraq (Source: NPR)

Political makeup of Iraq (Source: Wikipedia)

One province stands out in a grand manner: Al-Anbar in the West. On the one hand, al-Anbar is far larger than any other political division in Iraq, taking up as much as a third of the country. On the other hand, the province is sparsely populated and includes significant desert acreage. 

Al-Anbar is also the source of some of the worst fighting during the Iraq War, including the First Battle of Fallujah and the Second Battle of Fallujah. More recently, it is the location of Sunni protests, and the takeover of Iraqi cities (Ramadi, the capital of Al-Anbar, and, to some extent, Fallujah) by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is associated with al-Qaeda.

In the past, gerrymandering was a possibility. This likely would have been an option early on when the politics of Iraq were still up for debate. However, with a Shia-led government that seemingly continues to clamp down on Sunni politics, this idea is likely off the table, or we will end up with the worst of American democratic traditions married to military conflict.

Within federalism, there exists some level of equality on a national scene, at least in the sense that everyone can, at some point, attain a leadership role and participate in national politics. Without that, there is no purpose to being part of a federalist structure. Both alienating a component of the national population and simultaneously allowing the growth of their own sub-state cannot lead to a solution.

It will take crucial and careful leadership to lead Iraq out of its federalist quagmire. It can't hurt to use the American example here as well: the United States operated under the Articles of Confederation between 1777 (informally) / 1781 (formally) until 1789, when the Constitution took effect. It took years to figure out a better way for the system to operate, and it may take years in Iraq. Focusing on the politics, and the compromises that come with politics, while avoiding warfare and open conflict, are key tenets that could lead to Iraq reconciling its federalism for a lasting state.