Homebrew: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

Growing out of the chaos of Middle Eastern insurgencies, the al Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has built its presence and spread fear throughout the region. Often viewed as one of the more violent terrorist groups in the Middle East, ISIL has taken over towns in Iraq - the first time insurgents have controlled these towns since 2003 - and is contributing to infighting among opposition fighters in Syria.

ISIL fighters have been careful, focusing on political aims to establish themselves, only to later identify with more fundamental positions. When necessary, socioeconomic and political arguments are employed to attempt to garner support among the locals. Once established, their strength limits the options to opponents, both civilian and military, as is the case in Syria. In a sense, entrenched positions are difficult to change.

ISIL's origins remain somewhat shrouded, and its role in the region has become unclear. Some reports suggest that ISIL is linked to Bashar al-Assad, Syria's President, as an attempt to fracture and debase the opposition. Others suggest that ISIL is little more than a concept Syria developed to change the face of its civil war. The BBC, though, has ISIL's formation pinned down to April 2013 as an independent terrorist organization. Analysts tend to tie it to insurgents previously known as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which may be best described as an evolutionary step in that organization's history. There is much information floating around, but most of it only lightly touches on why there was an outgrowth across borders. Why did the influx of fighters into the regional coalesce into much more coherent organizations than previously? Why are they more successful now? (apart from the withdrawal from Iraq, for that can't be the reason for everything)

Countries in the region continue to grow wary. Jordan has gone so far as to note that ISIL does not operate within its borders and that the terrorist group is "no threat." This is a surprising statement given ISIL's operations in two of Jordan's neighbors. Meanwhile, ISIL has threatened to attack Turkish cities over a disputed closed border crossing. It seems that ISIL's reach may yet expand.

Looking ahead, the horizon for ISIL is unclear. Expansion opens up new fronts, builds enemies, and attracts attention. Showing its face in Syria has increased its exposure and has proven of little benefit. At the same time, there is concern for a large lawless region in northwest Syria controlled by ISIL turning into another Afghanistan. Regional powers are keen to get it all under control though, and it is unlikely for a large power vacuum to redevelop, given recent history. This homegrown movement may not get much bigger, but might redouble its efforts where it already controls the land.

Instagram the News: Sochi Edition

Instagram is the latest source of news, apparently.

Ramzan Kadyrov, Russia's hand-picked President of Chechnya, posted on his Instagram account last week that Doku Umarov had been killed by Russian special forces. Umarov, also known as Russia's "Osama bin Laden" led insurgents in the Caucasus region who had carried out attacks throughout Russia, including in Moscow. Apart from making the claim, Kadyrov offered no evidence to support his statement, fueling speculation. In the past, there have been premature reports of Umarov's death; however, there is growing confirmation amongst others in the region (on both sides) that this time it is real. Umarov had called for attacks on the 2014 Winter Olympics in the nearby Russian city of Sochi, scheduled to begin in February. The games will be the first held in Russia since the Soviet Union staged the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.

Umarov's death will require insurgents in the region to look for new leadership, though whether it will impact Sochi remains unclear. While there is certainly evidence to support that eliminating the leadership of a terrorist group limits that group's impact, the short-run longitudinal effect is questionable. Kadyrov states that the threat to Sochi is now 'groundless', but security experts are certainly concerned by at least one 'Black Widow' suspect, if not more. Russia has a mixed history with 'Black Widow' terrorists, particularly suicide bombers emanating from the turbulent Caucasus region. Today, Russia is anxious to host an Olympics without incident (the 1980 games were boycotted by the United States) and revive its international presence, but with the games being compared to a military base, any attack will be railed as a failure on Russia's part.

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If you enjoyed that Instagram led the news, you can take a look at Kadyrov's account, or review Foreign Policy's 11 favorite Kadyrov posts. Here's an example:

(Source: Instagram, via Foreign Policy)

Libya's East Side Story

Flying under the radar in late 2013, leaders in the eastern half of Libya, which holds 60% of the nation's oil production, declared an autonomous government. Libya has the world's ninth largest oil reserves, and other energy resources aplenty. This declaration came about two years after Libya's Civil War ended, which also ended the 42-year reign of Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi's dictatorship largely held in check a nation that had a history of regional autonomy. The political subdivisions throughout Libya's history are Tripolitania, Cyernaica, and Fezzan, with most of the population residing in Tripoliatania and Cyernaica.

Libya's Subdivisions (Source: Fragile States Resource Center)

The recent announcement was certainly a blow to the centralized leadership in Tripoli, but reading the events carefully helps add details to the story. Proponents would like the return of the three-state Libya, last extant under King Irdis in 1951, and one that existed, at times, throughout Libya's history. Although this certainly could lead to a break-up of the country, leaders from the region did not explicitly declare independence, or even self-determination. Leaders seem to be seeking a status closer to the experience of the Kurdish region of Iraq following the Iraq War (though even that status is still debated).

Much like in Iraq, it may boil down to natural resources, regional access, and service delivery. The eastern shadow government is offering up oil to foreign buyers and is promising to open the region's energy resources under its own terms. The central government, meanwhile, has indicated that it will use force, if necessary, to prevent any circumvention of its authority. It has already fired toward a Maltese tanker in order to force it to deviate from an eastern port. Meanwhile, regional access and governmental service delivery are both hampered by protests and a burgeoning insurgency that has blocked off the region for months. These issues sound familiar and are a formula for bigger problems.

Infighting, and possibly even open warfare, will continue to be a risk unless the structure of Libya indicates more clearly how the central government will work with regional authorities. While levels of autonomy are integral to regional function in a territory as large as Libya, it is important that those levels are determined wisely and with both sides in agreement. Nonetheless, all sides must recognize that central governance, to some extent, is necessary. 

Growing Pains in Iraq: Reconciling Federalism

Few people believed that Iraq was magically reborn following the departure of the remaining U.S. troops from Iraq in late 2011. After all, that withdrawal was years in the making, both politically and militarily. Even then, there was debate over how Iraq would be shaped, in 2012 and beyond. It was surmised that a Sunni-Shia rift would continue, fueled in part by insurgents pushing the boundaries of Iraqi security forces. At the same time, concerns about Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki's (who is Shia) leadership also existed, in light of clear pro-Shia favoritism.

It seems that "messy democracy" is the favorite description of Iraq over the years; however, this description is really just an easy way to not say anything at all. It's a way to say Iraqi democracy is not the democracy of Norway (ranked #1 in the Democracy Index), but is also not the democracy of Zimbabwe (ranked #148). It is clear that Iraq is somewhere in the middle (#113 in 2012). But what direction is that democracy headed toward - Norway or Zimbabwe?

This is not a question that has an easy answer. Iraqi federalism has been discussed over and over gain. How will the country look? It has been debated whether Iraq can even hold itself together as a single unified country, given its history, colonially drawn borders, and somewhat diverse populations. What power-sharing structures will exist? That entails whether Iraq function as an open democracy where one viewpoint transitions power to another bloodlessly, or would a constitutional requirement for a constant mix of viewpoints be necessary. As well, the level of autonomy given to individual provinces - should Iraq even be a federation or a confederation? And in the end, who will fight who over what, and will that fighting be political or physical? To gain some insight into some of the issues that prevail today, from insurgent fighting in the West to Kurdish self-determination in the North, it helps to take a look at the political and religious boundaries in Iraq:

Religious makeup of Iraq (Source: NPR)

Political makeup of Iraq (Source: Wikipedia)

One province stands out in a grand manner: Al-Anbar in the West. On the one hand, al-Anbar is far larger than any other political division in Iraq, taking up as much as a third of the country. On the other hand, the province is sparsely populated and includes significant desert acreage. 

Al-Anbar is also the source of some of the worst fighting during the Iraq War, including the First Battle of Fallujah and the Second Battle of Fallujah. More recently, it is the location of Sunni protests, and the takeover of Iraqi cities (Ramadi, the capital of Al-Anbar, and, to some extent, Fallujah) by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is associated with al-Qaeda.

In the past, gerrymandering was a possibility. This likely would have been an option early on when the politics of Iraq were still up for debate. However, with a Shia-led government that seemingly continues to clamp down on Sunni politics, this idea is likely off the table, or we will end up with the worst of American democratic traditions married to military conflict.

Within federalism, there exists some level of equality on a national scene, at least in the sense that everyone can, at some point, attain a leadership role and participate in national politics. Without that, there is no purpose to being part of a federalist structure. Both alienating a component of the national population and simultaneously allowing the growth of their own sub-state cannot lead to a solution.

It will take crucial and careful leadership to lead Iraq out of its federalist quagmire. It can't hurt to use the American example here as well: the United States operated under the Articles of Confederation between 1777 (informally) / 1781 (formally) until 1789, when the Constitution took effect. It took years to figure out a better way for the system to operate, and it may take years in Iraq. Focusing on the politics, and the compromises that come with politics, while avoiding warfare and open conflict, are key tenets that could lead to Iraq reconciling its federalism for a lasting state.

Unrest in al-Anbar and Iraq's Newest Crisis

You may have heard a tiny bit of news streaming out of Iraq this week (more important than the polar vortex) - there is trouble west of Baghdad. What kind of trouble? A group of insurgents, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), conveniently connected to al-Qaeda, took control of Ramadi and Fallujah in the al-Anbar province. Though the connections are tenuous and still not entirely clear, ISIL is also at the forefront of the rebellion in Syria. How far west of Baghdad? Pretty close - say 40 miles or so. Here is a map for reference to show Fallujah proximity to Baghdad:

Fallujah location (Source: Wikipedia)

The battles for Ramadi and Fallujah are remembered as some of the most entrenched, violent, and deadly of the Iraq War. That makes the towns not only strategic, falling on the road to Baghdad, but also symbolic.

Nations with deep interest in what happens in Iraq are not quite sure what to do. The United States has ruled out sending ground forces. The United Kingdom has similarly indicated that it would not send troops. Even Iran refused the idea of sending troops. All are willing to send aid to Iraq - military aid. In fact, the US is stepping up military shipments in an attempt to support the Iraqi government and avoid fighting from spreading much further. If there's a war brewing, it always helps to just arm at least someone with more weapons and better ones too.

Nonetheless, beating back the insurgents militarily presents a hypocritical dilemma both for Iraqi and American leadership, who have stood their ground on neighboring Syria, expressing the need for political rather than military solutions. Were Iraq to forego political options and resort to military ones solely, it would surely lose its legitimacy in criticizing Syria's response. It would also not look great for the United States, who is therefore simultaneously pushing for Iraq to employ political pressures through Sunni moderates.

Al-Maliki, meanwhile, is pretty much just throwing things out there to see what sticks. Although locals would surely prefer good governance and open business, tribal and religious distrust exist between those in al-Anbar and al-Maliki's Shia-led central government. For example, al-Maliki ordered Iraqi troops to not strike neighborhoods in Fallujah. Well, "neighborhoods" is certainly not easy to define, while it also provides insurgent troops clear cover and complicates urban warfare immensely. He has also urged residents to expel the insurgents, though without clarifying how they should do so, or why they should stick it out with the central government. Though these may be simply placeholder statements to stave off military options while political ones are attempted, they don't come off as too impressive.

Al-Qaeda has a vested interest in destabilizing foreign influence and bringing territory under its control, but al-Qaeda-backed insurgents don't just show up in town and everyone else suddenly becomes anti-government. There is a significant backstory here, centering on the potential consolidation of power by Iraq's president Nouri al-Maliki, who is Shia, and the central government's seeming mistreatment of Sunnis. The Sunni-Shia rift goes back ages, but recent history reflects the dominance by the Sunni minority of the Shia majority under the reign of Saddam Hussein (who was Sunni). Even more recently, al-Maliki's arrest of his Sunni vice president in 2011, and his attempted arrest of a Sunni member of parliament and removal of protest camps in al-Anbar in late 2013 directly contributed to the current crisis.

What happens now? A military conflict is inevitable, regardless of the acrid political aftertaste for Iraq and the United States. It is hopeful, though, that it will be short-lived. What is critical is that Iraq's Shia-led government begin to pay better attention and give greater care to its Sunni minority. It's hard to imagine, but democracy is not a zero-sum game and win-win results are possible. The long-term solution is all-but political and that would involve compromise with various factions and the extensive inclusion of moderates. Al-Maliki is right in encouraging the citizens to expel the insurgents, but words must be tied to actions, and the government's efforts must be tied to explaining why it would be to the benefit of those in al-Anbar to be pro-government rather than anti-government.