In a word: no.
Most people don't know that the
next big treaty on the United Nations' horizon is an Arms Trade Treaty.
This summer, diplomats, scholars, NGO representatives, and other
interested parties, will descend upon the Big Apple to hammer out a
multilateral treaty that will (in theory) regulate the international
trade of conventional weapons. While it is always good to promote
ideals and advance the rule of law, the most likely outcome of this
treaty will be millions of dollars wasted and an ineffective human
rights-promoting institution.
So, what exactly are we
talking about when we say "arms trade"? The arms trade includes
conventional weaponry -- mostly consisting of firearms, assault rifles,
rocket and grenade launchers, artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAM),
anti-ship missiles, tanks, helicopters, and aircraft. Meanwhile, the
term excludes WMD -- nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Conventional weapons arms trade is massive. Because a great amount is
unreported, underreported, and/or illicit, the exact amount is unknown. The
best estimate, though a few years old, puts conventional arms trade at approximately $55 billion per year.
In
addition to providing states with finished weaponry, arms exports may
assist states that are in the process of developing their own weapons
systems. China, for example, imported parts from Canadian, British,
Italian, French, and German companies while developing a new
attack helicopter. Furthermore, China could export those finished
attack helicopters to a state like Sudan that has a record of human
rights violations.
So, at first glance, the notion of
an arms trade treaty seems like a great idea. However, when looking at
the practices of the biggest arms-exporting countries, one might find
reason to pause.
The United States, for example, sells
billions of dollars of weapons per year and is the single biggest
exporter of conventional weapons. At the same time, the U.S. has an
extremely robust arms control regime. In considering arms exports, the
U.S. considers its own national security interests, potential effects on
the recipient state and region, and the possibility of re-transfer to
third-party states (22 U.S.C. § 2751). As far as process is concerned,
the State Department reviews most sales and Congress has the power to
express disapproval for export sales over $1 million; preferential
treatment and streamlined approval is given to NATO members and other
close allies (22 U.S.C. § 2776). For various reasons, including state
sponsorship of terrorism, U.S. regulations restrict sales to certain
state and sub-state actors (including, for example, Burma, China, Cuba,
Iran, and Syria). The U.S. export regime also closely analyzes sales of
dual-use items (commercial items that might have military purposes).
While
the U.S. arms export regime is considered by many to be the "gold
standard," other states and organizations are not always so careful.
The EU's arms export program has some similarities to that of the U.S.,
but less strict in certain areas -- for example, EU states
export hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of weapons per year to China. Germany also exports arms to
Iran,
Libya, and
Syria. Russia, meanwhile, has sold
billions of dollars' worth of weapons to Iran. China
sells weapons to Sudan, Nepal, Burma, Chad, and Tanzania. China
claims that its arms sales are "cautious and responsible," but it
does not participate in any multilateral arms export treaties seeking to prevent the use of exported arms to human rights-violating states.
For
those states already desiring to restrict arms sales to certain states,
there are several international bodies attempting to address the
serious issues. For example, the
U.N. Security Council maintains embargoes
against Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, North Korea, Somalia, al Qaeda and
the Taliban, nongovernmental forces in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, nongovernmental forces in Iraq, nongovernmental forces in
Lebanon, nongovernmental forces in Rwanda, nongovernmental forces in
Sierra Leone, and the Darfur region of Sudan. These arms embargoes are
regularly violated, however. While widespread violations of Security
Council embargoes could well serve as an indicator of an arms trade
treaty's ineffectiveness, NGOs actually (and disingenuously) use the
embargoes' ineffectiveness to
argue for an arms trade treaty.
There are also voluntary multilateral institutions like the
Wassenar Arrangement,
which promote best practices in arms export control among member
states. Such arrangements are voluntary and non-binding, and thus
contain no system for determining or punishing violations of the
Arrangement's principles. At the same time, the Arrangement has the
flexibility to allow member states to participate how they see fit; such
flexibility and voluntary participation are perhaps the best indicia of
states' desire to engage in responsible arms export practices.
Meanwhile,
over the last five years, support for an arms trade treaty has
increased amongst NGOs, the U.N., and states. The common theme is that a
binding, multilateral treaty would codify the "highest possible
common international standards for the import, export and transfer of
conventional arms" (this language appears in multiple U.N. General
Assembly resolutions).
While the final makeup of an
arms trade treaty is unclear, draft resolutions acknowledge "the right
of all States to manufacture, import, export, transfer and retain
conventional arms for self-defence and security needs and in order
to participate in peace support operation." The treaty will also
probably set a base level of standards with which states should comply
before exporting arms. The U.S. insists that states should be able to
unilaterally set higher arms control standards, but it remains unclear
how this principle would be reconciled with the right of states to
import conventional weapons.
Furthermore, setting aside
the politically questionable issue of state ratification, one must
question the extent to which an arms trade treaty would affect state
behavior. Without U.S. support, the treaty would not include the vast
majority of arms export sales. Meanwhile, Russia and China abstained on
the vote for the latest U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for an
arms trade treaty. This is particularly important, as these two states
are major arms exporters as well as permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council. This leaves both states well-positioned to block
Security Council arms embargoes, block any Security Council action
against Russia or China for violating already-existing arms
embargoes, and circumvent the provisions of an arms trade treaty without
consequence.
What should one think, meanwhile, of the
numerous states that support an arms trade treaty but currently do not
employ rigorous export controls? There is already ample evidence of
states (even developed European states) permitting arms exports to
states with dubious human rights and/or retransfer practices. Will an
arms trade treaty affect their behavior? Scholars and NGOs supporting
an arms trade treaty appear to think so. They
point to violations
of an EU embargo on sales to China as evidence of the need for a
multilateral treaty. If a 27-member institution of developed states
cannot control its own export practices, however, what is the expected
efficacy of a much broader treaty with a much more diverse polity?
Take
China, for example. Faced with China’s dubious export practices,
Amnesty International pushes hard for an arms trade treaty and calls
upon China to participate in that treaty process. The countervailing
strategy that Amnesty implicitly rejects is strengthened political
pressure from other states. Of course, this might reflect the simple
reality that other states are ill-positioned to coerce a state with
the world’s largest population, third-largest economy, and a permanent
seat on the U.N. Security Council. Regardless of how one views China's
arms export practices, the very dubious likelihood of China and other
states changing their arms control practices calls into question the
great need for an arms trade treaty.
While we do not
know what the arms trade treaty will look like in its final form, it
will not likely solve many of the problems its proponents cite as
justification for the treaty. Regional and international structures
exist – notably the Wassenaar Arrangement, on the international scale –
for those states interested in developing better arms export practices.
Those states currently not interested in setting high arms export
standards would not likely care to develop them after an arms
trade treaty. Rather, like human rights treaties, states would likely
comply when there are low costs of compliance or when faced with
non-treaty coercive pressure.
The United States, in
particular, should view the development toward an arms trade treaty with
caution. It should make sure that, regardless of whether it ratifies
the treaty, such a treaty embraces high standards of export control and
permits states to surpass those standards. A failure to do so could
allow the treaty process to be hijacked by states seeking to set
low standards or simply embarrass the United States by forcing it to
accept low standards or not sign the treaty at all. Because the arms
trade treaty would not likely solve the problems it identifies, greater
attention should be paid to already-existing agreements amongst those
states truly seeking to set high standards for export control. If
states earnestly tried to address arms trade problems through those
agreements and still found those agreements unavailing, then it might
be time to seriously consider an arms trade treaty.
Further reading:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/
http://www.state.gov/t/us/136849.htm
http://armstradetreaty.blogspot.com/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_Trade_Treaty
http://www.oxfam.org/en/category/freetags/arms-trade-treaty
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/08/the-uns-arms-trade-treaty-a-dangerous-multilateral-mistake-in-the-making
