Counterterrorism Sunday

While the U.S. government is ostensibly shut down, its special forces engaged in two very aggressive counterterrorism operations this weekend.

First, in Libya, U.S. forces captured Anas al-Liby, an al Qaeda operative who has been on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list since 2001 for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  Specifically, he conducted surveillance in Nairobi, Kenya -- on the U.S. embassy and other potential targets -- in preparation for the ultimate attack on the U.S. embassy.  In 2000, al-Liby was indicted in the U.S. for his role in that bombing; the FBI offered a reward of up to $5 million for his capture.

Flash forward to this Saturday, when U.S. forces captured al-Liby in the early morning hours on the streets of Tripoli.  U.S. officials have stated that al-Liby is in a secure location and will ultimately face trial.  Some of the fallout has focused on the extent of Libyan knowledge or acceptance of the U.S. operation:

A senior American official said the Libyan government had been apprised of the operation and provided assistance, but it was unclear in what capacity. An assistant to the prime minister of the Libyan transitional government said the government had been unaware of any operation or of Abu Anas’s capture. Asked if American forces had ever conducted raids inside Libya or collaborated with Libyan forces, Mehmoud Abu Bahia, assistant to the defense minister, replied, “Absolutely not.”

Legally speaking -- with respect to international law, that is -- Libyan involvement matters.  If a host state grants permission for a foreign military action within its borders, there is no breach of its territorial sovereignty (scholarly articles discussing the connection between international law and military action with a host state's cooperation can be found here and here).  Of course, even if the Libyan government did permit and/or cooperate with the U.S. operation, the public denial would not be unprecedented.  Indeed, for years, Pakistan criticized U.S. drone strikes in that country; in 2011, however, its very public announcement regarding the CIA departing an air base implicitly acknowledged that the U.S. had been launching drone strikes from air bases inside Pakistan.  Thus, do not be surprised if time reveals Libyan knowledge and/or approval of the U.S. operation.

Second, in Somalia, a U.S. attack targeted the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group.  Al-Shabaab, which controls substantial swaths of territory in Somalia, recently claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack and hostage-taking crisis at a Kenyan shopping mall.  Information continues to be released about that attack; indeed, just today, Kenyan officials released information about several of the militants.  Reports indicate that the U.S. operation this weekend was aborted early, and that the fate of the intended target remains unknown.

Ultimately, while the government shutdown and looming debt ceiling continue to dominate the news, the significance of these two attacks should not be underestimated.  Indeed, the capture of al-Liby on the streets of Tripoli may evoke comparisons to the now-infamous abduction of a terror suspect from the streets of Milan.  The chief difference, at least at this point, is that the U.S. intends to try al-Liby in court.  As far as what these attacks portend for U.S. foreign policy in northern Africa, it is far too early to tell.  If one were to ask whether this represents a "shift" to an African focus, I would simply reply: we've been there for awhile.

Meanwhile, in other nation-building news...

While the world remains focused on developments in the Syrian chemical weapon stockpile saga, the European Union unveiled an aid package of roughly $2.4 billion to the fragile Somali government -- dubbed a "new deal for Somalia."  The EU aid seeks to "sustain the gains made by the government and support the reconstruction of the country after two decades of civil war."  While the al Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab terrorist group still controls much of Somalia, key cities such as Mogadishu are in government control.  That government, which has been in power for one year, is buttressed by African Union and Ethiopian troops. Somali and affiliated forces have made important gains -- notably in port cities -- and the Somali president Hassan Mohamud hopes that the funds can prompt further progress:

For Mohamud, there were four key priorities among many -- security, legal reform, public finances and economic recovery. 

"The New Deal must deliver on the ground soon," he told delegates. After years of suffering, "expectations from our people are understandably high. We must not let them down."

As for U.S. involvement, much of it has been behind-the-scenes training of African Union troops.  Of course, there are also the untold number of covert drone strikes targeting al-Shabaab and other militants in Somalia.  The planned withdraw of Ethiopian troops from certain areas, meanwhile, raises fresh concerns about the African Union's ability to maintain Somali government control in large areas of land.

In short, while both sides are firmly entrenched and the civil war rages on, the Somali government currently has momentum; the EU aid package constitutes a large part of President Mohamud's efforts to maintain that momentum.  Stay tuned to see whether the coming months show any serious shifts in the country's balance of power.

US Admits Helping French Forces...in Somalia

News came out earlier today that US jets entered Somali airspace in assistance to the failed French attempt to free a hostage. No actual engagement took place. It is interesting that the US chose to help the French in an attempted hostage rescue, but has yet to aid any against rebel forces/AQIM in Mali.

Separately, can a country's airspace be violated if said country has "no" government?

The French Really Are Invading...

To briefly update the previous piece on French support to repel Islamist rebels in Mali, it turns out that the French have sent in significant, though irregular, ground forces, including paratroopers and helicopter gunships. Meanwhile, France has also raised its national alert level as Islamist forces have threatened to attack France itself. With estimates of 100 adversaries killed out of a force that likely numbers below 1,000, it will be interesting to see how long French President Hollande sticks to the statement in his speech: This operation will last as long as is necessary. This is a very vague and dangerous estimate, given the nature of insurgency and irregular warfare. It is not likely that France will be unable to root out the rebels entirely, but at what point will it feel the mission complete? The current effort seems to be focusing on reversing rebel gains in central Mali around the town of Konna. However, northern Mali, with its vast size and empty, dangerous landscape, is an different war entirely and could not be won by such a small force.

In addition to Mali, French troops went into Somalia, where at least two French troops lost their lives in a rescue attempt on a French citizen. The rescue attempt was ultimately unsuccessful.

Also to update, AFRICOM Combatant Commander General Carter Ham, who is visiting Niger, did imply that the US would be willing to provide some limited hands-off support, possibly in the form of drones or satellites. At the same time, General Ham has noted that a clearer plan for Mali would need to be in place prior to any US intervention. In a sense, the US could help, but wants to be sure the result is going to be effective, something it has had trouble with throughout the Middle East and Africa.

A quick overview of recent French intervention in Africa (which I was looking for the other day) can be found on the Washington Post.

In a bid to stay relevant, Al Shabaab Places Bounty on Obama, Clinton

One curious item picked up by the major news outlets over the last 24 hours is the bounty placed on President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton (Click here if you haven't read it yet, though it's made yahoo's headlines since this post has been written). Clearly, the bounties are a play in a pretend tit-for-tat game with the United States. A few days prior, US officials leaked information on up to $33 million in bounties for Al Shabaab leadership (here). In return, Al Shabaab offered 10 camels for Obama and 2 camels for Clinton. The CNN article linked above mentions that the average price of a camel is $700 in Somalia, though a number of websites selling camels (likely not in Somalia) indicate that prices can be a few thousand per camel. So a guy with a $5 million dollar bounty on his head puts one of a up to a few ten thousands on his opponent.

Is the bounty price meant as an insult, or is it truly a sign of weakness? The information available so far does not indicate any insult. In fact, military strategy often notes to respect the strength of your opponent, until you can secure victory. The one exception is where an insult can lead to your opponent's position becoming unwound, none of which seems to apply here.

Let's also compare this bounty to others. There has been a $100,000 bounty on a rapper who insulted Islam and a $2.2 million bounty on the pastor who burnt the Koran, just to name a few. On the other side, a British parliamentarian supposedly offered (though later denied offering) a bounty of £10 million on President Obama. So this helps put the no more than $10,000 camel bounty placed by Al Shabaab in perspective.

At the same time, it is widely believed that Al Shabaab's power has diminished over the past year or so. Its tactics and strategies seem to be less and less effective. So much so that it has been forced to partner with Al Qaeda, which reflects on the diminishing power of both groups. It is rapidly losing territory and influence (ex: here and here). On a related note, despite there existing a lack of government, it has been argued that the Somali economy is no where near as absent as its government. This means that there should be more "money" for such a bounty. Perhaps. But many signs point to less capacity within Al Shabaab.

So what is the end goal? Al Shabaab is not capable of a tit for tat with the US, unless it is an imaginary one from the Islamist perspective wherein the small group from Somalia is fighting with the hegemon on the world stage. It's important to remember that terrorism is meant to spread an effect and any opportunity for publicity is critical. Islamist compete, much like nonprofits and politicians, for donations and funding. This is Al Shabaab's grab at a larger slice of the media pie and thereby, the funding critical for them to retain their previous power.