[Our 2014 posts did slow to a trickle and disappear, but we are returning in 2015, with new posts and insights]
Boko Haram has been around for years, they kidnapped 200 Nigerian girls, quasi-sort-of-not-really released them after significant public outcry but little international action, and are now posing trouble again, kidnapping villagers and attacking bases. But is anyone outside of Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin listening?
While not helping may have consequences for the region, not listening may have broader consequences. Terrorist groups, which is a category Boko Haram falls under, seek to incite fear. They are certainly inciting localized or regional fear, but on the international arena, stories about Boko Haram incidents fall below the fold, for now. Perhaps some more attention, at the diplomatic and even military level, may reign in Boko Haram and return the fear.
Showing posts with label Africa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Africa. Show all posts
Monday, January 5, 2015
Sunday, October 6, 2013
Counterterrorism Sunday
While the U.S. government is ostensibly shut down, its special forces engaged in two very aggressive counterterrorism operations this weekend.
First, in Libya, U.S. forces captured Anas al-Liby, an al Qaeda operative who has been on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list since 2001 for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Specifically, he conducted surveillance in Nairobi, Kenya -- on the U.S. embassy and other potential targets -- in preparation for the ultimate attack on the U.S. embassy. In 2000, al-Liby was indicted in the U.S. for his role in that bombing; the FBI offered a reward of up to $5 million for his capture.
Flash forward to this Saturday, when U.S. forces captured al-Liby in the early morning hours on the streets of Tripoli. U.S. officials have stated that al-Liby is in a secure location and will ultimately face trial. Some of the fallout has focused on the extent of Libyan knowledge or acceptance of the U.S. operation:
Second, in Somalia, a U.S. attack targeted the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group. Al-Shabaab, which controls substantial swaths of territory in Somalia, recently claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack and hostage-taking crisis at a Kenyan shopping mall. Information continues to be released about that attack; indeed, just today, Kenyan officials released information about several of the militants. Reports indicate that the U.S. operation this weekend was aborted early, and that the fate of the intended target remains unknown.
Ultimately, while the government shutdown and looming debt ceiling continue to dominate the news, the significance of these two attacks should not be underestimated. Indeed, the capture of al-Liby on the streets of Tripoli may evoke comparisons to the now-infamous abduction of a terror suspect from the streets of Milan. The chief difference, at least at this point, is that the U.S. intends to try al-Liby in court. As far as what these attacks portend for U.S. foreign policy in northern Africa, it is far too early to tell. If one were to ask whether this represents a "shift" to an African focus, I would simply reply: we've been there for awhile.
First, in Libya, U.S. forces captured Anas al-Liby, an al Qaeda operative who has been on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list since 2001 for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Specifically, he conducted surveillance in Nairobi, Kenya -- on the U.S. embassy and other potential targets -- in preparation for the ultimate attack on the U.S. embassy. In 2000, al-Liby was indicted in the U.S. for his role in that bombing; the FBI offered a reward of up to $5 million for his capture.
Flash forward to this Saturday, when U.S. forces captured al-Liby in the early morning hours on the streets of Tripoli. U.S. officials have stated that al-Liby is in a secure location and will ultimately face trial. Some of the fallout has focused on the extent of Libyan knowledge or acceptance of the U.S. operation:
A senior American official said the Libyan government had been apprised of the operation and provided assistance, but it was unclear in what capacity. An assistant to the prime minister of the Libyan transitional government said the government had been unaware of any operation or of Abu Anas’s capture. Asked if American forces had ever conducted raids inside Libya or collaborated with Libyan forces, Mehmoud Abu Bahia, assistant to the defense minister, replied, “Absolutely not.”Legally speaking -- with respect to international law, that is -- Libyan involvement matters. If a host state grants permission for a foreign military action within its borders, there is no breach of its territorial sovereignty (scholarly articles discussing the connection between international law and military action with a host state's cooperation can be found here and here). Of course, even if the Libyan government did permit and/or cooperate with the U.S. operation, the public denial would not be unprecedented. Indeed, for years, Pakistan criticized U.S. drone strikes in that country; in 2011, however, its very public announcement regarding the CIA departing an air base implicitly acknowledged that the U.S. had been launching drone strikes from air bases inside Pakistan. Thus, do not be surprised if time reveals Libyan knowledge and/or approval of the U.S. operation.
Second, in Somalia, a U.S. attack targeted the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group. Al-Shabaab, which controls substantial swaths of territory in Somalia, recently claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack and hostage-taking crisis at a Kenyan shopping mall. Information continues to be released about that attack; indeed, just today, Kenyan officials released information about several of the militants. Reports indicate that the U.S. operation this weekend was aborted early, and that the fate of the intended target remains unknown.
Ultimately, while the government shutdown and looming debt ceiling continue to dominate the news, the significance of these two attacks should not be underestimated. Indeed, the capture of al-Liby on the streets of Tripoli may evoke comparisons to the now-infamous abduction of a terror suspect from the streets of Milan. The chief difference, at least at this point, is that the U.S. intends to try al-Liby in court. As far as what these attacks portend for U.S. foreign policy in northern Africa, it is far too early to tell. If one were to ask whether this represents a "shift" to an African focus, I would simply reply: we've been there for awhile.
Labels:
Africa,
AFRICOM,
Al Shabaab,
Al-Qaeda,
al-Shabaab,
Anas al-Liby,
counter-terrorism,
counterterrorism,
drone war,
drones,
Libya,
Somalia
Friday, January 18, 2013
Counterterrorism in North Africa: A Tale of Two Crises
Previous posts have addressed the French military intervention in Mali. In the meantime, to the very near northeast, another former French colony has grabbed the world's attention since militants took hostages at an Algerian gas field Wednesday. Widespread confusion has ensued, with reports Thursday suggesting some or most hostages escaped.
Today, we've learned more information -- namely, that an Algerian military operation has freed hundreds of hostages while at least 12 have died and approximately 30 remain unaccounted for (update: that number appears to now be 7 hostages still being held). The hostage crisis and the French intervention in Mali are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, early reports indicated that the terrorists in Algeria cited French intervention in Mali as cause for their actions, demanding that French and other Western countries cease operations in Mali.
The hostages at the gas field, many of them workers at the facility, hail from all over the world. Most were Algerian nationals, but among the hostages are British, French, American, Japanese, Belgian, Irish, Romanian, Malaysian, Filipino, and more. Clearly, the sheer number of countries' nationals involved in this tragedy demand a global reaction that will continue beyond the hostage crisis, but the exact nature of that reaction remains to be seen. Some people will suggest a policy of disengagement and/or containment, where these countries are left to their own devices. Recent history has shown us the price of failed states, however, both as a power vacuum for internal strife and a haven for outside terror and militant groups. As the Malian government faces a threat from internal militants, the French have opted for a strong armed force to buttress Malian forces and address the threat. This raises an interesting (and unclear) legal question, namely: under international law, what are the principles under which French or other forces might legitimately intervene and/or provide assistance to the Malian military junta?
Deborah Pearlstein over at OpinioJuris suggests the most logical legal principle would be consent from Mali, which raises its own web of complications:
One possible example from recent history is U.S. involvement in Yemen. A (hopefully) brief digression: When looking at a legal basis for U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, one would likely look to the 2002 AUMF as justification under domestic law. Under international law, however, the situation is trickier. While one might claim that U.S. action in Pakistan is a logical geographic extension of action in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said of Yemen. Rather, the most likely source of justification under international law is consent and collective self-defense. Let me be more specific: by permitting the U.S. to engage in military actions within its borders, Yemen relinquishes its territorial sovereignty. This doesn't solve the issue entirely, however; if Yemen's permission was all that was needed to permit U.S. drone strikes within Yemen's borders, then Yemen could theoretically permit action by the U.S. that it would not be allowed to legally commit on its own. Instead, the U.S. must be engaging in some sort of permitted military action under international law -- in this case, Yemen's self-defense against militants in a non-international armed conflict. Military action in Yemen has indeed shown Yemeni forces severely battling Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP. Although much of the U.S. involvement has been covert, enough has surfaced to indicate that U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has reached new peaks over the past year and has proven effective at targeting terrorists in the region.
U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has mostly come in the form of intelligence-sharing, aid, and U.S. drone strikes at areas Yemeni forces cannot reach themselves. Obviously, the French involvement in Mali is a stark contrast in many respects, with over 1,000 French troops committed in Mali. There are lessons to be learned from U.S. military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen (and, even Pakistan, once upon a time, when it used to provide the U.S. with airfields and intel for drone strikes). Those lessons can include proper levels of engagement, proper division of labor between domestic and foreign military actions, and navigating the murky waters of cooperation with a not-always-ideal domestic government. In this case, France (and to the extent it becomes involved, the U.S.) can learn from the complex U.S. involvement in Pakistan. The U.S. and Pakistan did not often see eye to eye, and indeed the relationship has become increasingly strained over the past two years. However, even in the face of stark disagreements (especially over hardly-secret Pakistani military aid to Afghan Taliban forces), the U.S. and Pakistan teamed up to target Pakistani Taliban forces -- an area of overlapping interests. Similarly, to the extent the U.S. considers involvement in Mali -- a country with whose government the U.S. has expressed serious reservations -- it might look for limited engagement in areas of shared interest. Of course, the downside to such involvement will be that, once again, the U.S. will risk calls of hypocrisy for supporting a non-democratic government. The alternative of extremists gaining a stronger foothold, on the other hand, is something that is in nobody's interest.
Today, we've learned more information -- namely, that an Algerian military operation has freed hundreds of hostages while at least 12 have died and approximately 30 remain unaccounted for (update: that number appears to now be 7 hostages still being held). The hostage crisis and the French intervention in Mali are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, early reports indicated that the terrorists in Algeria cited French intervention in Mali as cause for their actions, demanding that French and other Western countries cease operations in Mali.
The hostages at the gas field, many of them workers at the facility, hail from all over the world. Most were Algerian nationals, but among the hostages are British, French, American, Japanese, Belgian, Irish, Romanian, Malaysian, Filipino, and more. Clearly, the sheer number of countries' nationals involved in this tragedy demand a global reaction that will continue beyond the hostage crisis, but the exact nature of that reaction remains to be seen. Some people will suggest a policy of disengagement and/or containment, where these countries are left to their own devices. Recent history has shown us the price of failed states, however, both as a power vacuum for internal strife and a haven for outside terror and militant groups. As the Malian government faces a threat from internal militants, the French have opted for a strong armed force to buttress Malian forces and address the threat. This raises an interesting (and unclear) legal question, namely: under international law, what are the principles under which French or other forces might legitimately intervene and/or provide assistance to the Malian military junta?
Deborah Pearlstein over at OpinioJuris suggests the most logical legal principle would be consent from Mali, which raises its own web of complications:
Attacking anything in Mali raises territorial sovereignty concerns. Is there a government there that could lawfully consent to the U.S. use of force in country such that the U.S. wouldn't risk violating UN Charter article 2 prohibitions against the use of force? Consent, best I can tell, is the only option here. There's no UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. . . . So consent it is, and it would come from, best case, a government that seized power by coup and to which we've otherwise cut off military aid. The U.S. still maintains an embassy in Mali (as does Mali in the U.S.), so perhaps consent is not legally insurmountable. But I'd wonder both what the terms of the U.S. aid cut-off were, and whether there's any precedent for this.
One possible example from recent history is U.S. involvement in Yemen. A (hopefully) brief digression: When looking at a legal basis for U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, one would likely look to the 2002 AUMF as justification under domestic law. Under international law, however, the situation is trickier. While one might claim that U.S. action in Pakistan is a logical geographic extension of action in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said of Yemen. Rather, the most likely source of justification under international law is consent and collective self-defense. Let me be more specific: by permitting the U.S. to engage in military actions within its borders, Yemen relinquishes its territorial sovereignty. This doesn't solve the issue entirely, however; if Yemen's permission was all that was needed to permit U.S. drone strikes within Yemen's borders, then Yemen could theoretically permit action by the U.S. that it would not be allowed to legally commit on its own. Instead, the U.S. must be engaging in some sort of permitted military action under international law -- in this case, Yemen's self-defense against militants in a non-international armed conflict. Military action in Yemen has indeed shown Yemeni forces severely battling Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP. Although much of the U.S. involvement has been covert, enough has surfaced to indicate that U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has reached new peaks over the past year and has proven effective at targeting terrorists in the region.
U.S. military cooperation with Yemen has mostly come in the form of intelligence-sharing, aid, and U.S. drone strikes at areas Yemeni forces cannot reach themselves. Obviously, the French involvement in Mali is a stark contrast in many respects, with over 1,000 French troops committed in Mali. There are lessons to be learned from U.S. military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen (and, even Pakistan, once upon a time, when it used to provide the U.S. with airfields and intel for drone strikes). Those lessons can include proper levels of engagement, proper division of labor between domestic and foreign military actions, and navigating the murky waters of cooperation with a not-always-ideal domestic government. In this case, France (and to the extent it becomes involved, the U.S.) can learn from the complex U.S. involvement in Pakistan. The U.S. and Pakistan did not often see eye to eye, and indeed the relationship has become increasingly strained over the past two years. However, even in the face of stark disagreements (especially over hardly-secret Pakistani military aid to Afghan Taliban forces), the U.S. and Pakistan teamed up to target Pakistani Taliban forces -- an area of overlapping interests. Similarly, to the extent the U.S. considers involvement in Mali -- a country with whose government the U.S. has expressed serious reservations -- it might look for limited engagement in areas of shared interest. Of course, the downside to such involvement will be that, once again, the U.S. will risk calls of hypocrisy for supporting a non-democratic government. The alternative of extremists gaining a stronger foothold, on the other hand, is something that is in nobody's interest.
Friday, January 11, 2013
The French are Invading! (Sort of)
Well, not exactly. Or at least it's not clear yet what they're doing, apart from some form of military "support" with the troops organization by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to repel rebellious forces aligned with al-Qaeda. It's not even clear if French involvement is limited to air support, which is sorely needed, or also actively includes ground forces stationed in the region. Mali has been spiraling down a black hole for a while, and it has been particularly bad for at least six months.
Nonetheless, everyone seems happy with the party, so long as they don't have to participate. The United Kingdom, European Union, and the United States all extended support for the mission and French involvement. None hinted at physical support, even though some weapons in the hands of the rebels may be the result of those made available to Libyan rebels and in the wake of Libya's rebellion. The United Nations, having urged an African-led counter to the rebels in UNSC 2071 (October) and reaffirmed it in UNSC 2085 (December), is also pleased that the Security Council does not seem inept.
However, does any of this really have to do with any of these countries or pan-national bodies? Mali was under French colonial power until its independence in 1960. Since the waves of independence in Africa, France has consistently displayed a willingness to use military force to support post-independence governments. Although France is using Security Council resolutions to back its participation, there is little question that French forces would have otherwise assisted. The French have spent the past half-century attempting to use military force to attempt to fix substantive flaws in colonial administration that led to much post-independence violence, hatred, and bickering.
So while France continues to show its role in Africa, a role that it wants to have given the still potential impact of African countries and economies on trade, energy, and precious mineral availability, the United States is missing an opportunity. Wasn't AFRICOM created for specifically this purpose? Instead, AFRICOM seems to be sitting quietly in Germany, watching at best.
It remains to be seen what will come of this military intervention. Will the rebels be driven back, or will it falter? The only given so far is who is sitting this one out.
Nonetheless, everyone seems happy with the party, so long as they don't have to participate. The United Kingdom, European Union, and the United States all extended support for the mission and French involvement. None hinted at physical support, even though some weapons in the hands of the rebels may be the result of those made available to Libyan rebels and in the wake of Libya's rebellion. The United Nations, having urged an African-led counter to the rebels in UNSC 2071 (October) and reaffirmed it in UNSC 2085 (December), is also pleased that the Security Council does not seem inept.
However, does any of this really have to do with any of these countries or pan-national bodies? Mali was under French colonial power until its independence in 1960. Since the waves of independence in Africa, France has consistently displayed a willingness to use military force to support post-independence governments. Although France is using Security Council resolutions to back its participation, there is little question that French forces would have otherwise assisted. The French have spent the past half-century attempting to use military force to attempt to fix substantive flaws in colonial administration that led to much post-independence violence, hatred, and bickering.
So while France continues to show its role in Africa, a role that it wants to have given the still potential impact of African countries and economies on trade, energy, and precious mineral availability, the United States is missing an opportunity. Wasn't AFRICOM created for specifically this purpose? Instead, AFRICOM seems to be sitting quietly in Germany, watching at best.
It remains to be seen what will come of this military intervention. Will the rebels be driven back, or will it falter? The only given so far is who is sitting this one out.
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