Return to the Concept of a Three-State Solution in Iraq

Any "defeat" of ISIS, however one defines it, would certainly include re-taking ISIS-controlled areas of Iraq and holding them.  Part of the problem is that, similar to the "Anbar awakening" in 2007, such a strategy necessarily involves a serious and committed effort by local Sunnis to expel a distasteful group.  There is one key difference, this time.  In 2007, the U.S. military paid local Sunni groups to fight and expel al Qaeda.  This time, the Iraqi government is nominally in control of ground operations and put simply, there is little Sunni appetite to participate with a Shia-led government that has turned a blind eye to atrocities against Sunnis, used violence to break up Sunni protest camps, and has directly participated in the political disenfranchisement of Sunnis.  While many Sunnis bravely risk their lives to oppose ISIS control of their lands, there is a very understandable reticence to work side by side with the government that has spent much of its time oppressing and vilifying them.

Iraqis flee the city of Ramadi as ISIS forces take over after an 18-month fight with the Iraqi military (Source: CNN)

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In short, Sunnis need to be invested in the future of their government.  They are certainly not invested in the current form of Iraqi government, and its history since the U.S. departure has suggested that they don't have much reason to support and be invested in such a government.  The Obama administration acknowledges that there must be meaningful Sunni participation in any Iraqi government.  However, that was already the plan when the United States was deeply involved in developing Iraq's governmental structure.  The plan was for a Sunni vice president and protections of Sunni citizens.  Obviously, that plan has not transpired, with the Sunni vice president arrested and expelled from the government soon after the U.S. departure.

How does one rebuild trust in a participatory Iraqi government?  One step in the right direction was the ouster of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, whose name toward the end of his tenure had become synonymous with Sunni oppression.  However, the changing of the guard has not translated to better relations between Sunni and Shia; rather, Shia militia rage through Sunni areas unabated, committing atrocities.

There has been a little discussion lately -- but not much -- of a three-state solution or some autonomy-heavy federalism in Iraq.  Indeed, the timing of such a discussion might seem ludicrous as ISIS controls vast swathes of what would be a Sunni state.  However, a few things should be kept in mind.  First, a three-state solution or heavily decentralized state was more widely discussed during the early years of the insurgency in Iraq.  The very reason is the same that warrants discussing it now: getting Sunnis invested in their own future.  Second, there is no reason that a discussion of a three-state solution must concede ISIS control over northwestern Iraq.  One could suggest, for example, that a northwestern Iraq referendum on independence or decentralized government occur only after Iraqi forces retake ISIS-controlled territory.

For those worried about the possibility of a Sunni state becoming a haven for terrorism: keep in mind that ISIS already controls much of the territory, and that the inability of Iraq's Shias and Sunnis to make political peace has in large part led to the lack of a united front to combat ISIS.  Indeed, so long as Iraq's Shia leaders fail to include and indeed openly oppress the Sunni, there is no incentive for Sunni to fight for such leaders.  Fighting for their own state, or own self-controlled region within a partitioned state, might give more Sunnis a real reason to expel ISIS and hold any territory it takes from the terrorist organization.

Of course, the political partition of Iraq needn't necessarily be a "three-state" solution.  One possibility, for example, is a two-state solution: an independent Kurdish state and a "federal" Sunni-Shia state with a weak central government and significant autonomy to the two federal regions.

Any type of devolution or partitioning of Iraq would involve the tricky issue of oil revenues.  Indeed, some people see oil revenue as overriding other concerns and thereby necessitating a strong central government.  Ultimately, however, any central government in Iraq is doomed if it is not ready to cede significant political autonomy to Sunni regions.  Moreover, control over their own future might be the only incentive significant enough to bring Sunnis to the fore of the fight against ISIS.

The French Really Are Invading...

To briefly update the previous piece on French support to repel Islamist rebels in Mali, it turns out that the French have sent in significant, though irregular, ground forces, including paratroopers and helicopter gunships. Meanwhile, France has also raised its national alert level as Islamist forces have threatened to attack France itself. With estimates of 100 adversaries killed out of a force that likely numbers below 1,000, it will be interesting to see how long French President Hollande sticks to the statement in his speech: This operation will last as long as is necessary. This is a very vague and dangerous estimate, given the nature of insurgency and irregular warfare. It is not likely that France will be unable to root out the rebels entirely, but at what point will it feel the mission complete? The current effort seems to be focusing on reversing rebel gains in central Mali around the town of Konna. However, northern Mali, with its vast size and empty, dangerous landscape, is an different war entirely and could not be won by such a small force.

In addition to Mali, French troops went into Somalia, where at least two French troops lost their lives in a rescue attempt on a French citizen. The rescue attempt was ultimately unsuccessful.

Also to update, AFRICOM Combatant Commander General Carter Ham, who is visiting Niger, did imply that the US would be willing to provide some limited hands-off support, possibly in the form of drones or satellites. At the same time, General Ham has noted that a clearer plan for Mali would need to be in place prior to any US intervention. In a sense, the US could help, but wants to be sure the result is going to be effective, something it has had trouble with throughout the Middle East and Africa.

A quick overview of recent French intervention in Africa (which I was looking for the other day) can be found on the Washington Post.