Singapore became self-governing in 1959 and gained full independence in 1965 after a brief period as part of Malaysia. Over the ensuing decades, Singapore transformed from a small port in Asia to the seventh largest GDP per capita. With little to no resources or even land area - there are only 19 smaller nations - Singapore is often hailed as a model of success, arguably leading the Asian Tigers, which also include South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
But between 1959 and 1990, Singapore was led, all-but autocratically, by a single man - Lee Kuan Yew, whose funeral was held Sunday after passing away one week ago. Also since 1959, a single party has controlled Singaporean politics, the People's Action Party. The eldest son of Lee Kuan Yew, Lee Hsien Loong, has led Singapore since 2004. These are not the typical politics of an economic and international paragon. In fact, if you take away the economic success, Singapore looks more like the typical pariah state than a vanguard.
Nonetheless, Singapore has clearly been an economic success story. World leaders turned out for Lee Kuan Yew's funeral. Singapore is often seen as a model that other nations can scale. China has emulated some of its policies and tactics. But does the model truly scale? Can "soft authoritarianism" that was effective in a an area characterized by its limited geography and alternative opportunity prosper on a grander scale? That question remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the Singapore experiment continues to demonstrate what could be possible, if political and economic dreams can be massaged into sound and equitable policies.
Monday, March 30, 2015
Sunday, March 8, 2015
Boko Haram: A New Beginning?
Boko Haram, whose name loosely translates to "Western education is a sin," has been operating in Nigeria since the early 2000's. It was not designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States Department of State until 2013, although there was likely sufficient evidence to make the designation earlier. During those ten years, as Boko Haram and its influence grew, it was sometimes difficult to grasp the organization's potential longevity, though time itself should have been an indicating factor over the years.
(Boko Haram attacks, BBC)
This week, Boko Haram leaders pledged allegiance to ISIS, a move that could reflect a new beginning for the terrorist group. Evidence that ISIS has been influencing Boko Haram has existed for the past few months. It could also simply demonstrate the reach and dominance of ISIS. All in all, the full impact of this 'bayat' are not entirely clear. Increased coordination between different organizations is certainly of concern, reminding nations of similar coordination under the al-Qaeda umbrella. At the same time, Boko Haram could simply be jumping on the ISIS bandwagon.
Monday, March 2, 2015
Battling ISIS - A Short Update
Despite the numerous groups battling ISIS, there has been arguably minimal organized support from Western governments, who are most equipped, militarily speaking. Nonetheless, alongside the flow of individuals from Western nations to fight for ISIS, there has been a smaller flow of individuals from Western nations fighting against ISIS. Many of these individuals have little affiliation with the Middle East. Some have military training, some do not.
Meanwhile, in the closing days of February, Ashley Johnston, an Australian, died fighting ISIS. He is believed to be the first Westerner to die fighting with the numerous groups battling ISIS. Seemingly immediately after his death, Australia made it a crime to be Australian and exist in Mosul, with few exceptions. Although the law has good intentions, it almost feels like a stopgap measure. What does it accomplish? How will it be proven that you were in Mosul? Will it really prevent Australians who want to be there from being there?
Perhaps some thought should be given not necessarily as to how the government can directly support or oppose individual efforts, but how to stop the movement overall - how to defeat ISIS entirely.
Meanwhile, in the closing days of February, Ashley Johnston, an Australian, died fighting ISIS. He is believed to be the first Westerner to die fighting with the numerous groups battling ISIS. Seemingly immediately after his death, Australia made it a crime to be Australian and exist in Mosul, with few exceptions. Although the law has good intentions, it almost feels like a stopgap measure. What does it accomplish? How will it be proven that you were in Mosul? Will it really prevent Australians who want to be there from being there?
Perhaps some thought should be given not necessarily as to how the government can directly support or oppose individual efforts, but how to stop the movement overall - how to defeat ISIS entirely.
Thursday, February 12, 2015
No Consequences, Just Lies
Early this morning, news broke that a ceasefire was reached in the nearly year-long conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The four-party talks in Minsk, Belarus involved Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France, but not the United States. While the agreement is certainly welcome news, it will still take time to uncover whether it has any true substance.
Many observers are concerned that the agreement is solely on paper and that action, particularly on the Russian side, may not follow. Previous agreements to stem the war have failed and the conflict reignited.
Of interest is the clause that arms and troops will be withdrawn to a distance from the area of dispute. As recently as late January, however, Russia denied that its troops were in Ukraine. One can dispute official troops as opposed to other forms of military presence, but Russia's role in that military presence is widely accepted, despite Russia's consistent claims to the contrary. Despite the realities on the ground and their acceptance inherent within the agreement, there are no consequences for these past statements.
Russia has, of course, made the news in other ways this week that do little to help the overall situation and sense of mistrust, including claiming that it will be leasing military bases in Cyprus , which is in the European Union but not part of NATO, and denying a request by Ukraine to restructure that country's debt to Russia.
While the situation in Ukraine is not resolved by any account, there remains the possibility that this ceasefire may lead toward peace. At the same time, past statements that fail to accurately describe intentions on purpose do reflect what the future may have in store.
Many observers are concerned that the agreement is solely on paper and that action, particularly on the Russian side, may not follow. Previous agreements to stem the war have failed and the conflict reignited.
Of interest is the clause that arms and troops will be withdrawn to a distance from the area of dispute. As recently as late January, however, Russia denied that its troops were in Ukraine. One can dispute official troops as opposed to other forms of military presence, but Russia's role in that military presence is widely accepted, despite Russia's consistent claims to the contrary. Despite the realities on the ground and their acceptance inherent within the agreement, there are no consequences for these past statements.
Russia has, of course, made the news in other ways this week that do little to help the overall situation and sense of mistrust, including claiming that it will be leasing military bases in Cyprus , which is in the European Union but not part of NATO, and denying a request by Ukraine to restructure that country's debt to Russia.
While the situation in Ukraine is not resolved by any account, there remains the possibility that this ceasefire may lead toward peace. At the same time, past statements that fail to accurately describe intentions on purpose do reflect what the future may have in store.
(Ukraine Crisis Map from National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine via Business Insider Australia)
Note: A neat interactive map of the crisis is also available.
Sunday, January 11, 2015
New Series: The Changing World of Territorial Sovereignty (ISIS Edition)
Welcome to a new series on the Changing World of Territorial Sovereignty, where Illexum will explore the ways in which the traditional views of territorial sovereignty have transformed or eroded. When discussing threats to traditional statehood, the focus is usually on globalization and other new developments that decrease the functions of the traditional state. However, less attention is paid to the erosion of the traditional view of territorial sovereignty -- in other words, the ways in which states, media, scholars, and public opinion view and analyze territorial sovereignty.
To say that this issue is broad and lends itself to a wide array of sub-topics is an understatement; such topics include direct state-on-state military action, state-on-nonstate action, prolonged military activity vs. limited military strikes, the extent to which states can permit other states to engage in extensive military operations against their own non-state actors, and the extent to which active support from one state toward non-state actors of another states infringes upon the latter's sovereignty. This is far from an exhaustive list, but it merely underscores the difficulty in analyzing the topic. Illexum will, of course, place a higher degree of focus on examples from today's news. We will include some historical analyses as well, however, because those are also instructive on how we will view territorial sovereignty going forward.
The first topic that we will explore is ISIS - specifically, how U.S. military action against ISIS (and other groups, such as al-Nusra) affects traditional notions of territorial sovereignty. ISIS is a good example of the erosion of territorial sovereignty, given that it currently controls territory in both Syria and Iraq. Thus, from the outset, the challenge of containing or rolling back ISIS necessarily involves a different approach to the issue of territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the nation-states in which ISIS operates have very different relationships with the United States. While the Iraqi government invites U.S. military assistance in fighting ISIS, the Syria's President Bashar al-Assad is not so eager to invite U.S. military involvement.
Brief Background: U.S. Military Action Against ISIS
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the first U.S. action against ISIS took place in Iraq. First, on August 7, 2014, the U.S. dropped aid packages to displaced Iraqis who had been forced to evacuate to the mountainside in light of ISIS advances. Specifically, the U.S. launched airstrikes on August 8, 2014, against ISIS artillery that was being used to attack Kurdish forces. The humanitarian aid drops continued throughout August, as did the airstrikes against ISIS.
The two questions that plagued the United States political and military leadership, however, were 1) whether the U.S. would put troops on the ground and 2) whether military operations would expand to the civil war-ravaged Syria. As to the first question, President Obama initially declared (in early August 2014) that the United States would not be sending troops back to Iraq to fight ISIS;
As to the second question, the United States did indeed expand its war against ISIS to Syria, launching airstrikes within Syria's borders in September. Incidentally, the strikes were not limited to ISIS; in September, the U.S. launched strikes against the shadowy Khorosan Group and in November, it attacked the al Qaeda splinter group Jabbat al-Nusra. Of course, some analysts say that the Khorosan Group is merely a subset of al-Nusra, and that the Obama administration played up the Khorosan Group in order to build up public support for its military action in Syria. The strikes against ISIS have continued into the new year, with the U.S. launching strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria just this past weekend.
Implications for the Erosion of Territorial Sovereignty
The traditional notions of territorial sovereignty have eroded in recent years, especially in those regions where borders or entire regions are out of government control. Over the last twenty years, this has been especially pronounced in the context of U.S. counter-terrorism. Airstrikes have been a go-to American response to terrorism, whether it be a response to the 1998 embassy bombings or the prolonged drone war in Pakistan.
There are two common scenarios for drone strikes against militants (though, of course, one can certainly imagine other situations) - those in which the host state expressly or implicitly condones the military action, and those in which the host state opposes such action. How, one might ask, does such military action fit within the international legal framework for military action? The United Nations charter prohibits military action that violates territorial sovereignty: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." The notable exceptions to the use of force against another state are Security Council-authorized actions and "individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." Typically, the United States presents its military actions as self-defense in response to the armed attack of 9-11 (or, in the case of Iraq, anticipatory self-defense). Moreover, in those cases where a state invites U.S. action as part of its own counter-terrorism efforts, one might legitimately describe such action as "collective self-defense." What is unclear in this scenario is whether such a country must formally request assistance in self-defense, or whether secret, behind-the-scenes discussions suffice. For example, current U.S. military action in Iraq is done with the knowledge and cooperation of the Iraqi government. The U.S. drone war in Pakistan, meanwhile, was done behind closed doors; Pakistan would often openly condemn U.S. strikes while secretly providing intelligence and targeting information to the U.S. for those very strikes.
When a state openly opposes military operations by a third party within its borders, the legal basis for such action becomes unclear. In Syria, for example, the United States has taken action against ISIS and al-Nusra. It has not taken open military action against President al-Assad's forces, although it has provided weaponry, training, and other support for anti-Assad forces. What presents the United States with a distinct legal challenge, however, is how to justify its invasion of sovereign territory by airstikes and special forces operations. There is no collective self-defense, as can be argued in Iraq and potentially in Pakistan. The claim of self-defense is a stretch, given that the U.S. has had to make the dubious claim that ISIS is part of al Qaeda in order to justify such action under the AUMF and the theory that 9-11 constituted an armed attack against which the United States is still engaged in self-defense. Another theory that has found its way into legal scholarship is that states that cannot control their own borders, or engage in atrocities against their own people, "waive" any claim to territorial sovereignty. This theory, known as "involuntary sovereignty waiver," has been put forth to justify military action in Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999.
The United States has not directly put forth a coherent legal theory for its military action in Syria, and it may well not want to. General norms of international law disfavor unilateral or mostly-unilateral military action, which is why the U.S. is always eager to garner multinational support to buttress the legitimacy of its actions. Even where those actions are multilateral, however, the legal underpinnings for the military action remain the same. The only difference is the political distinction between the world's sole superpower engaging in unilateral military action and that same superpower working with other states to thwart the spread of ISIS. Like most other international norms, the sanctity of territorial sovereignty is often the product of the prevailing political viewpoints -- or whatever the current military and political realities dictate. The United States does not want to be perceived as engaging in numerous military actions that violate territorial sovereignty. At the same time, its words and actions have made it clear that the United States views territorial sovereignty as subservient to its own defense needs, whether those needs be real or perceived. The very notion of a "global war on terror," by its very name, suggests that territorial sovereignty is not as resolute or finite as it was once perceived to be.
As the United States gets dragged into yet another military conflict on foreign soil, however, one must ask -- if Syria doesn't want us there, and the country is in the midst of a devastating civil war, what will further military engagement in the area accomplish? Will the United States continue its mission creep and deploy forces (either alone or in concert with Iraqi, Kurdish, or other military forces) ever closer to the Syrian border? Will we engage in ground operations in Syria, and if so, will we have the logistical base to do so? This is what happens when you engage in military action in a hostile country, and why the violation of territorial sovereignty matters -- what sort of environment does the United States expect to find, in such a deeply divided country? It would face enemies on multiple fronts, and its scarce allies hold very little territory right now. If the United States deepens its military involvement, it risks getting to the point where the only way to protect its own forces would be a large-scale deployment - something the country hardly has the stomach for.
To say that this issue is broad and lends itself to a wide array of sub-topics is an understatement; such topics include direct state-on-state military action, state-on-nonstate action, prolonged military activity vs. limited military strikes, the extent to which states can permit other states to engage in extensive military operations against their own non-state actors, and the extent to which active support from one state toward non-state actors of another states infringes upon the latter's sovereignty. This is far from an exhaustive list, but it merely underscores the difficulty in analyzing the topic. Illexum will, of course, place a higher degree of focus on examples from today's news. We will include some historical analyses as well, however, because those are also instructive on how we will view territorial sovereignty going forward.
The first topic that we will explore is ISIS - specifically, how U.S. military action against ISIS (and other groups, such as al-Nusra) affects traditional notions of territorial sovereignty. ISIS is a good example of the erosion of territorial sovereignty, given that it currently controls territory in both Syria and Iraq. Thus, from the outset, the challenge of containing or rolling back ISIS necessarily involves a different approach to the issue of territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the nation-states in which ISIS operates have very different relationships with the United States. While the Iraqi government invites U.S. military assistance in fighting ISIS, the Syria's President Bashar al-Assad is not so eager to invite U.S. military involvement.
Brief Background: U.S. Military Action Against ISIS
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the first U.S. action against ISIS took place in Iraq. First, on August 7, 2014, the U.S. dropped aid packages to displaced Iraqis who had been forced to evacuate to the mountainside in light of ISIS advances. Specifically, the U.S. launched airstrikes on August 8, 2014, against ISIS artillery that was being used to attack Kurdish forces. The humanitarian aid drops continued throughout August, as did the airstrikes against ISIS.
The two questions that plagued the United States political and military leadership, however, were 1) whether the U.S. would put troops on the ground and 2) whether military operations would expand to the civil war-ravaged Syria. As to the first question, President Obama initially declared (in early August 2014) that the United States would not be sending troops back to Iraq to fight ISIS;
As Commander in Chief, I will not allow the United States to be dragged into fighting another war in Iraq, so as we support Iraqis as they take the fight to these terrorists, American combat troops will not be returning to fight in Iraq because there is no American military solution to the larger crisis in Iraq,Of course, a few hundred American troops already had started returning to Iraq in June 2014, albeit as "advisers" to Iraqi and Kurdish military forces. As the airstrikes ramped up in August 2014, the U.S. sent 150 more advisers to Iraq, with Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel emphasizing that this was not a "combat boots on the ground" type situation. In November 2014, President Obama authorized sending a total of 3,100 troops to Iraq - still, he claimed, in an advisory and training capacity. The latest update is that President Obama will soon request authorization from Congress for military action against ISIS (despite claiming that the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) already gives it the authority to engage in action against ISIS).
As to the second question, the United States did indeed expand its war against ISIS to Syria, launching airstrikes within Syria's borders in September. Incidentally, the strikes were not limited to ISIS; in September, the U.S. launched strikes against the shadowy Khorosan Group and in November, it attacked the al Qaeda splinter group Jabbat al-Nusra. Of course, some analysts say that the Khorosan Group is merely a subset of al-Nusra, and that the Obama administration played up the Khorosan Group in order to build up public support for its military action in Syria. The strikes against ISIS have continued into the new year, with the U.S. launching strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria just this past weekend.
 |
| Smoke rises over Kobane, Syria, after a U.S. airstrike against ISIS on December 25, 2014 (Source: The Guardian) |
Implications for the Erosion of Territorial Sovereignty
The traditional notions of territorial sovereignty have eroded in recent years, especially in those regions where borders or entire regions are out of government control. Over the last twenty years, this has been especially pronounced in the context of U.S. counter-terrorism. Airstrikes have been a go-to American response to terrorism, whether it be a response to the 1998 embassy bombings or the prolonged drone war in Pakistan.
There are two common scenarios for drone strikes against militants (though, of course, one can certainly imagine other situations) - those in which the host state expressly or implicitly condones the military action, and those in which the host state opposes such action. How, one might ask, does such military action fit within the international legal framework for military action? The United Nations charter prohibits military action that violates territorial sovereignty: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." The notable exceptions to the use of force against another state are Security Council-authorized actions and "individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." Typically, the United States presents its military actions as self-defense in response to the armed attack of 9-11 (or, in the case of Iraq, anticipatory self-defense). Moreover, in those cases where a state invites U.S. action as part of its own counter-terrorism efforts, one might legitimately describe such action as "collective self-defense." What is unclear in this scenario is whether such a country must formally request assistance in self-defense, or whether secret, behind-the-scenes discussions suffice. For example, current U.S. military action in Iraq is done with the knowledge and cooperation of the Iraqi government. The U.S. drone war in Pakistan, meanwhile, was done behind closed doors; Pakistan would often openly condemn U.S. strikes while secretly providing intelligence and targeting information to the U.S. for those very strikes.
When a state openly opposes military operations by a third party within its borders, the legal basis for such action becomes unclear. In Syria, for example, the United States has taken action against ISIS and al-Nusra. It has not taken open military action against President al-Assad's forces, although it has provided weaponry, training, and other support for anti-Assad forces. What presents the United States with a distinct legal challenge, however, is how to justify its invasion of sovereign territory by airstikes and special forces operations. There is no collective self-defense, as can be argued in Iraq and potentially in Pakistan. The claim of self-defense is a stretch, given that the U.S. has had to make the dubious claim that ISIS is part of al Qaeda in order to justify such action under the AUMF and the theory that 9-11 constituted an armed attack against which the United States is still engaged in self-defense. Another theory that has found its way into legal scholarship is that states that cannot control their own borders, or engage in atrocities against their own people, "waive" any claim to territorial sovereignty. This theory, known as "involuntary sovereignty waiver," has been put forth to justify military action in Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999.
The United States has not directly put forth a coherent legal theory for its military action in Syria, and it may well not want to. General norms of international law disfavor unilateral or mostly-unilateral military action, which is why the U.S. is always eager to garner multinational support to buttress the legitimacy of its actions. Even where those actions are multilateral, however, the legal underpinnings for the military action remain the same. The only difference is the political distinction between the world's sole superpower engaging in unilateral military action and that same superpower working with other states to thwart the spread of ISIS. Like most other international norms, the sanctity of territorial sovereignty is often the product of the prevailing political viewpoints -- or whatever the current military and political realities dictate. The United States does not want to be perceived as engaging in numerous military actions that violate territorial sovereignty. At the same time, its words and actions have made it clear that the United States views territorial sovereignty as subservient to its own defense needs, whether those needs be real or perceived. The very notion of a "global war on terror," by its very name, suggests that territorial sovereignty is not as resolute or finite as it was once perceived to be.
As the United States gets dragged into yet another military conflict on foreign soil, however, one must ask -- if Syria doesn't want us there, and the country is in the midst of a devastating civil war, what will further military engagement in the area accomplish? Will the United States continue its mission creep and deploy forces (either alone or in concert with Iraqi, Kurdish, or other military forces) ever closer to the Syrian border? Will we engage in ground operations in Syria, and if so, will we have the logistical base to do so? This is what happens when you engage in military action in a hostile country, and why the violation of territorial sovereignty matters -- what sort of environment does the United States expect to find, in such a deeply divided country? It would face enemies on multiple fronts, and its scarce allies hold very little territory right now. If the United States deepens its military involvement, it risks getting to the point where the only way to protect its own forces would be a large-scale deployment - something the country hardly has the stomach for.
Monday, January 5, 2015
Nigeria? Anyone? Anyone at all?
[Our 2014 posts did slow to a trickle and disappear, but we are returning in 2015, with new posts and insights]
Boko Haram has been around for years, they kidnapped 200 Nigerian girls, quasi-sort-of-not-really released them after significant public outcry but little international action, and are now posing trouble again, kidnapping villagers and attacking bases. But is anyone outside of Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin listening?
While not helping may have consequences for the region, not listening may have broader consequences. Terrorist groups, which is a category Boko Haram falls under, seek to incite fear. They are certainly inciting localized or regional fear, but on the international arena, stories about Boko Haram incidents fall below the fold, for now. Perhaps some more attention, at the diplomatic and even military level, may reign in Boko Haram and return the fear.
Boko Haram has been around for years, they kidnapped 200 Nigerian girls, quasi-sort-of-not-really released them after significant public outcry but little international action, and are now posing trouble again, kidnapping villagers and attacking bases. But is anyone outside of Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin listening?
While not helping may have consequences for the region, not listening may have broader consequences. Terrorist groups, which is a category Boko Haram falls under, seek to incite fear. They are certainly inciting localized or regional fear, but on the international arena, stories about Boko Haram incidents fall below the fold, for now. Perhaps some more attention, at the diplomatic and even military level, may reign in Boko Haram and return the fear.
Wednesday, October 8, 2014
Frozen (in Ukraine)
This has nothing to do with the Disney movie and everything to do with "frozen conflicts," seemingly interminable wars that change little year to year. Russia is a master of establishing them, limiting the countries in its former sphere of influence from progressing or developing without Russia having a significant role.
Russia is succeeding in establishing a new frozen front in Ukraine, complete with a cease-fire that is lightly observed and battlefield lines that spell disaster for years to come. A loss of international focus on the conditions in eastern Ukraine have allowed Russia to control more of the conflict's outcome as well as its narrative. The truce barely exists in name along anymore.
Thinking long-term, ignoring the situation in Ukraine will feel like a mistake. It will serve to embolden governments that trample international norms and human rights. It will limit the progress of democratic movements where they are needed most, in the confines of nations struggling to transform from tyranny and kelptocracy to semblances of democracy.
Russia is succeeding in establishing a new frozen front in Ukraine, complete with a cease-fire that is lightly observed and battlefield lines that spell disaster for years to come. A loss of international focus on the conditions in eastern Ukraine have allowed Russia to control more of the conflict's outcome as well as its narrative. The truce barely exists in name along anymore.
Thinking long-term, ignoring the situation in Ukraine will feel like a mistake. It will serve to embolden governments that trample international norms and human rights. It will limit the progress of democratic movements where they are needed most, in the confines of nations struggling to transform from tyranny and kelptocracy to semblances of democracy.
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