Do We Really Need an Arms Trade Treaty?

In a word: no.

Most people don't know that the next big treaty on the United Nations' horizon is an Arms Trade Treaty.  This summer, diplomats, scholars, NGO representatives, and other interested parties, will descend upon the Big Apple to hammer out a multilateral treaty that will (in theory) regulate the international trade of conventional weapons.  While it is always good to promote ideals and advance the rule of law, the most likely outcome of this treaty will be millions of dollars wasted and an ineffective human rights-promoting institution.

So, what exactly are we talking about when we say "arms trade"?  The arms trade includes conventional weaponry -- mostly consisting of firearms, assault rifles, rocket and grenade launchers, artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-ship missiles, tanks, helicopters, and aircraft.  Meanwhile, the term excludes WMD -- nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.  Conventional weapons arms trade is massive.  Because a great amount is unreported, underreported, and/or illicit, the exact amount is unknown.  The best estimate, though a few years old, puts conventional arms trade at approximately $55 billion per year.

In addition to providing states with finished weaponry, arms exports may assist states that are in the process of developing their own weapons systems.  China, for example, imported parts from Canadian, British, Italian, French, and German companies while developing a new attack helicopter.  Furthermore, China could export those finished attack helicopters to a state like Sudan that has a record of human rights violations.

So, at first glance, the notion of an arms trade treaty seems like a great idea.  However, when looking at the practices of the biggest arms-exporting countries, one might find reason to pause.

The United States, for example, sells billions of dollars of weapons per year and is the single biggest exporter of conventional weapons.  At the same time, the U.S. has an extremely robust arms control regime.  In considering arms exports, the U.S. considers its own national security interests, potential effects on the recipient state and region, and the possibility of re-transfer to third-party states (22 U.S.C. § 2751).  As far as process is concerned, the State Department reviews most sales and Congress has the power to express disapproval for export sales over $1 million; preferential treatment and streamlined approval is given to NATO members and other close allies (22 U.S.C. § 2776).  For various reasons, including state sponsorship of terrorism, U.S. regulations restrict sales to certain state and sub-state actors (including, for example, Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, and Syria).  The U.S. export regime also closely analyzes sales of dual-use items (commercial items that might have military purposes).

While the U.S. arms export regime is considered by many to be the "gold standard," other states and organizations are not always so careful.  The EU's arms export program has some similarities to that of the U.S., but less strict in certain areas -- for example, EU states export hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of weapons per year to China.  Germany also exports arms to Iran, Libya, and Syria.  Russia, meanwhile, has sold billions of dollars' worth of weapons to Iran.  China sells weapons to Sudan, Nepal, Burma, Chad, and Tanzania.  China claims that its arms sales are "cautious and responsible," but it does not participate in any multilateral arms export treaties seeking to prevent the use of exported arms to human rights-violating states.

For those states already desiring to restrict arms sales to certain states, there are several international bodies attempting to address the serious issues.  For example, the U.N. Security Council maintains embargoes against Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, North Korea, Somalia, al Qaeda and the Taliban, nongovernmental forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, nongovernmental forces in Iraq, nongovernmental forces in Lebanon, nongovernmental forces in Rwanda, nongovernmental forces in Sierra Leone, and the Darfur region of Sudan.  These arms embargoes are regularly violated, however.  While widespread violations of Security Council embargoes could well serve as an indicator of an arms trade treaty's ineffectiveness, NGOs actually (and disingenuously) use the embargoes' ineffectiveness to argue for an arms trade treaty.

There are also voluntary multilateral institutions like the Wassenar Arrangement, which promote best practices in arms export control among member states.  Such arrangements are voluntary and non-binding, and thus contain no system for determining or punishing violations of the Arrangement's principles.  At the same time, the Arrangement has the flexibility to allow member states to participate how they see fit; such flexibility and voluntary participation are perhaps the best indicia of states' desire to engage in responsible arms export practices.

Meanwhile, over the last five years, support for an arms trade treaty has increased amongst NGOs, the U.N., and states.  The common theme is that a binding, multilateral treaty would codify the "highest possible common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms" (this language appears in multiple U.N. General Assembly resolutions).

While the final makeup of an arms trade treaty is unclear, draft resolutions acknowledge "the right of all States to manufacture, import, export, transfer and retain conventional arms for self-defence and security needs and in order to participate in peace support operation."  The treaty will also probably set a base level of standards with which states should comply before exporting arms.  The U.S. insists that states should be able to unilaterally set higher arms control standards, but it remains unclear how this principle would be reconciled with the right of states to import conventional weapons.

Furthermore, setting aside the politically questionable issue of state ratification, one must question the extent to which an arms trade treaty would affect state behavior.  Without U.S. support, the treaty would not include the vast majority of arms export sales.  Meanwhile, Russia and China abstained on the vote for the latest U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for an arms trade treaty.  This is particularly important, as these two states are major arms exporters as well as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.  This leaves both states well-positioned to block Security Council arms embargoes, block any Security Council action against Russia or China for violating already-existing arms embargoes, and circumvent the provisions of an arms trade treaty without consequence.

What should one think, meanwhile, of the numerous states that support an arms trade treaty but currently do not employ rigorous export controls?  There is already ample evidence of states (even developed European states) permitting arms exports to states with dubious human rights and/or retransfer practices.  Will an arms trade treaty affect their behavior?  Scholars and NGOs supporting an arms trade treaty appear to think so.  They point to violations of an EU embargo on sales to China as evidence of the need for a multilateral treaty.  If a 27-member institution of developed states cannot control its own export practices, however, what is the expected efficacy of a much broader treaty with a much more diverse polity?

Take China, for example.  Faced with China’s dubious export practices, Amnesty International pushes hard for an arms trade treaty and calls upon China to participate in that treaty process.  The countervailing strategy that Amnesty implicitly rejects is strengthened political pressure from other states.  Of course, this might reflect the simple reality that other states are ill-positioned to coerce a state with the world’s largest population, third-largest economy, and a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.  Regardless of how one views China's arms export practices, the very dubious likelihood of China and other states changing their arms control practices calls into question the great need for an arms trade treaty.

While we do not know what the arms trade treaty will look like in its final form, it will not likely solve many of the problems its proponents cite as justification for the treaty.  Regional and international structures exist – notably the Wassenaar Arrangement, on the international scale – for those states interested in developing better arms export practices.  Those states currently not interested in setting high arms export standards would not likely care to develop them after an arms trade treaty.  Rather, like human rights treaties, states would likely comply when there are low costs of compliance or when faced with non-treaty coercive pressure.

The United States, in particular, should view the development toward an arms trade treaty with caution.  It should make sure that, regardless of whether it ratifies the treaty, such a treaty embraces high standards of export control and permits states to surpass those standards.  A failure to do so could allow the treaty process to be hijacked by states seeking to set low standards or simply embarrass the United States by forcing it to accept low standards or not sign the treaty at all.  Because the arms trade treaty would not likely solve the problems it identifies, greater attention should be paid to already-existing agreements amongst those states truly seeking to set high standards for export control.  If states earnestly tried to address arms trade problems through those agreements and still found those agreements unavailing, then it might be time to seriously consider an arms trade treaty.


Further reading:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/
http://www.state.gov/t/us/136849.htm
http://armstradetreaty.blogspot.com/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_Trade_Treaty
http://www.oxfam.org/en/category/freetags/arms-trade-treaty
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/08/the-uns-arms-trade-treaty-a-dangerous-multilateral-mistake-in-the-making