Sunday, July 26, 2015

Turkey Joins Fight Against ISIS... and Possibly Kurds

Summary
The big news in counter-terrorism circles this week was that Turkey was becoming actively involved in the fight against ISIS.  In part a response to an ISIS suicide bombing on July 20th, 2015, Turkish support will include launching its own airstrikes.  More importantly, perhaps, Turkey will permit the United States to launch airstrikes from the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey.  Although prompted by an ISIS suicide bombing, Turkey's military action in the region will likely include heavy doses of anti-Kurdish activity against both Syrian and Turkish Kurds.

Brief Background
Of course, Turkey's interest in the Syrian civil war has never been straightforward.  The chief threat to Turkey's security over the past several decades has been the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group in Turkey classified as a terrorist organization by NATO and the U.S.  Like the Kurdish populations in Iraq and Syria, the PKK has attempted to create an independent Kurdish state in the region.  Turkey has always opposed these efforts but still entered into a cease-fire with the PKK in spring 2013.

In December 2014, meanwhile, the Turkish parliament authorized military action against ISIS.  At the time, it was not clear if Turkey would take immediate action against ISIS.  Turkey has been committed to toppling Bashar al-Assad and military action against ISIS could effectively keep Assad in power.

Turkish soldiers patrol the border near Syria.  (Source: Wall Street Journal)


Fast forward to early July, 2015.  Kurdish successes against ISIS in northern Syria led to the Syrian Kurdish group Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) controlling a 250-mile continuous area along the Syria-Turkey border.  Turkey did not appreciate this development, given PYD's real or perceived friendliness toward PKK.  These Kurdish gains led analysts to speculate that Turkey will join the fight in Syria -- not necessarily to topple Assad or defeat ISIS, but to prevent the development of a Kurdish proto-state.

Turkey's intervention in Syria turned from speculative to real this week following Monday's suicide bombing by ISIS in the Turkish border town of Suruc that killed 32 and injured more than 100.  On Thursday, Turkey and the United States reached an agreement in which the U.S. can use Turkey's Incirlik Air Base to launch strikes against ISIS.  On Friday and Saturday, Turkey launched strikes against ISIS in Syria but also against multiple PKK facilities in northern Iraq.

Analysis
Turkey has been uneasy about entering the Syrian civil war for multiple reasons.  While it is certainly anti-ISIS, Turkey does not want to empower Assad or the PYD and accordingly has been reluctant to enter the fray.  In short, it recognizes the very real consequences of creating a power vacuum next door.  Turkey's interests in the region transcend borders.  Indeed, Turkey's strike against PKK in Iraq's Kurdistan region is an indication that it will not be deterred by national boundaries.

Of course, while Turkey has been on the sidelines, other groups have been making advances.  Some of the most effective strikes against ISIS have been by the Peshmerga in Iraq and the PYD in Syria.  The Peshmerga's successes in a string of Iraqi military setbacks once again raised talks of a possible push for a Kurdish state.  In Syria, PYD's ability to control a continuous region has made Turkey fearful of a Kurdish-controlled region on its border.  Syrian rebels have made advances as well, though not enough to suggest they're anywhere near the most powerful force in the region.

Turkey may still be looking to hedge its bets -- hence its decision to let the U.S. use its base for U.S. air strikes.  The ISIS suicide bombing in Suruc certainly spurred Turkey into action; it needs to both actually protect its people and also be publicly seen doing so.  On the other hand, Turkey's decision to strike PKK strongholds at the same time as ISIS is an indication that it does not view the battlefront in simple terms of pro- and anti-ISIS groups.  Rather, it recognizes multiple actors that represent threats to its national security and is trying to act on multiple fronts.  This is not unlike the initial U.S. strikes in Syria, where the U.S. launched strikes against al Nusra (al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria) in addition to ISIS.  As yet another country becomes involved in Syria's civil war and the multi-state effort to destroy ISIS, the futures of Syria, Iraq, Kurdish independence movements, and ISIS all remain unclear.  If Kurdish movements continue to fight ISIS and control territory effectively, the Kurdish people of these various states will clamor even more for an independent state.  Syria and Iraq are still struggling to hold artificial states together, and those struggles will likely continue for the next several years without any clear resolution.  While this will result in countless more tragic deaths, there is nothing the U.S. can do to impose its will on the people of these countries.  It will find its use of military force most effective where its national security needs intersect with local security concerns.  ISIS currently provides a common enemy, but even military defeat of ISIS will not bring stability to a region that rarely knows peace.  In Iraq, at least, the fight against ISIS could be transformative if Sunnis had something worth fighting for.  In Syria, the fight against ISIS may benefit Assad in the short term (a consequence Turkey has long recognized).  This may be a necessary consequence, even if it's something the U.S. does not have to accept in the long-term.

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Update, 7/27/15 at 9:40am: On Monday, 7/27/15, reports emerged that Turkey was already launching strikes against Syrian Kurds.  Turkey denied that the Syrian Kurds were a target of their ongoing military operations.

Saturday, July 11, 2015

Rewriting History in Eastern Europe

On June 30, Russia's Prosecutor General began to investigate the legality of the Soviet Union's 1991 decision to recognize the declarations of independence of Lativa, Estonia, and Lithuania, the three Baltic countries now part of NATO. The question, raised by two members of the Duma, is whether the governmental body at the time had any constitutional power to make such a recognition. Although the Prosecutor General is required by law to investigate the inquiry, the premise itself is inflammatory.


Naturally, all three countries instantly reacted with consternation and outrage, having fought to gain independence ever since annexation in 1939. Later on July 1, the Kremlin moved to distance itself from the review, calling it a formality, but also failing to fully condemn it. Unease has existed across former Soviet bloc nations following President Vladimir Putin's comments in 2014 asserting Russia's right to intervene on behalf of Russian-speaking populations in other countries, of which there are significant numbers in the Baltic states.

Overall, this may be a non-story, a request by extreme positions in the Duma blown out of proportion by media reports. The same could be done for statements or positions of an innumerable amount of politicians in the United States. On the other hand, given Russia's recent annexation of Crimea and the simultaneous abrogation of the 1954 transfer of that land from Russia to Ukraine, the request does carry more weight than simply nationalist rhetoric.

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

Stopping Home-grown Radicalization in the Internet Age

One of our recent posts addresses the need to develop a better geo-political strategy in Iraq if one hopes to build real and lasting Sunni support in the fight against ISIS.  The threat posed by Islamic extremists, however, is not limited to the foreign battlefield.  Indeed, recent events in the U.S. and Europe have shown the potential to radicalize persons who move about freely in the U.S. or Europe.  ISIS is a media-savvy organization and, indeed, its members often spend countless hours trying to isolate and subsequently convert or radicalize Westerners.

An American in her 20s speaks with the New York Times about ISIS recruitment and conversion efforts (Source: New York Times)

ISIS is not the first Islamic terror organization to utilize the Internet to radicalize Westerners, nor will it be the last.  Indeed, this was already a well-established phenomenon by the time ISIS came on the scene.  The most prominent example was Anwar al-Awlaki, the U.S.-Yemeni dual citizen who was a senior member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) before being killed by a U.S. drone strike.  Al-Awlaki wrote on a blog, posted YouTube videos, wrote for al Qaeda's Inspire magazine, and directly communicated with individuals online, as part of AQAP recruitment and radicalization efforts.  For example, he communicated with Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan online prior to Hassan's actions; recruited the Christmas day "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in person and online; and inspired Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad's attempted car bombing in 2010.  Al-Awlaki, in a sense, paved the way for the current wave of online radicalization that includes the ISIS and/or al Qaeda-inspired Charlie Hebdo attack and the ISIS-inspired failed attack at a Mohammed cartoon contest in Texas this past May.

Internet radicalization -- either by direct communication with vulnerable persons in Western countries or by the ability of Islamic terror's message to inspire lone wolf attacks -- will continue to present a security challenge to Western countries for years to come.  This security challenge is self-apparent: it is much more difficult for a terrorist group to coordinate attacks on U.S. soil than it is for a lone-wolf U.S. citizen radicalized by such a group to carry out an attack.  This begs the question: how do we stop home-grown radicalization?

Part of the solution is tracking the communications.  This has been a touchy political subject in the United States ever since Edward Snowden leaked details of NSA data collection programs to journalists.  Still, data collected in accordance with the 2008 FISA amendments (not the Patriot Act-based surveillance program, which did not specifically authorize bulk data collection and which was ruled unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) led to, among other things, the tracking of emails by an Albanian who sent money to a Pakistani terror group and ultimately was detained trying to travel to Pakistan.  The legality of the 2008 FISA amendments will continue to be litigated even as the U.S. starts conducting its surveillance differently in accordance with the 2015 "FREEDOM Act."

Another part of the solution is stopping the radicalization itself at its roots.  Farah Pandith, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies with years of experience in the National Security Council and the State Department, strongly supports outreach efforts to counter the narrative ISIS and other Islamic extremists are presenting online:
Their narrative pits a monolithic Muslim “us” against a non-Muslim “them,” validating and valorizing the “us” under the veil of religion and purpose. Confronted by this narrative, some Muslim millennials see martyrdom as an attractive job description. Others simply support the extremist team by sporting the bumper sticker, wearing the colors; they’ll alter the cultural landscape so that everyone around them accepts extremism as the norm. 
Yes, we’re waging a military war against ISIS—a war we must win. But ISIS can’t have an army if it lacks recruits. Behind its growing physical army is a virtual army. A viable long-term strategy will devote itself to vanquishing both armies by countering the spread of the underlying ideology.
Or, put more succinctly, she notes that millennial Muslims are "having a crisis of identity [and] . . .[w]e have not flooded the marketplace with alternative narratives to move their minds."

Such efforts at combating radicalization will not be easy to quantify, and indeed, will not have such readily-identifiable benchmarks as cities recaptured or terrorists killed or detained.  However, such efforts may be just as necessary in preventing domestic terror attacks.