U.S. Role in Afghanistan Post-2014

In early October, prospects for a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan post-2014 looked bleak.  If the U.S. and Afghanistan could not negotiate an agreement soon, the U.S. would have to begin arrangements for a complete withdrawal of troops by the end of 2014.  Hoping to salvage the situation, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Afghanistan.  In mid-October, Kerry and Afghan president Hamid Karzai negotiated the terms of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan post-2014.  The chief sticking point had been whether alleged crimes committed by U.S. soldiers would fall under U.S. or Afghan jurisdiction.  The BSA gave the U.S. jurisdiction over these alleged crimes, a term that Karzai had opposed.  When the BSA was signed, Karzai said that the decision regarding jurisdiction must be made not by him but, rather, by the loya jirga -- a council of approximately 3,000 Afghan elders.

Fast forward to last week.  First, just as the loya jirga convened, President Karzai developed a new position on the BSA -- indicating that it should not be signed until after Afghanistan's April 2014 presidential elections.    After four days of deliberations, the loya jirga responded by approving the BSA and recommending that Karzai promptly sign it.  Karzai refused, indicating that he would not sign it until after the April 2014 elections and after the U.S. brought peace: "Peace is our precondition.  America should bring us peace and then we will sign it."

U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice traveled to Afghanistan to speak with Karzai.  Karzai now has a fresh set of demands that were not part of the original BSA:

Karzai told Rice that he would sign only after the United States helps his government begin peace talks with the Taliban and agrees to release all 17 Afghan citizens being held in the Guantanamo Bay detention center in Cuba, according to Afghan and U.S. officials. 

In addition to those new demands, the Afghan leader reiterated that he will not sign if “another [U.S.] soldier steps foot into an Afghan home,” Karzai spokesman Aimal Faizi said. The United States has already promised to show “restraint” in “home entries” by U.S. troops and to carry them out only in conjunction with Afghan troops, but the tactic remains a part of U.S. operations against some insurgents here.

Rice responded by noting that if the BSA was not signed by the end of the year, the U.S. would have no choice but to prepare for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops by the end of 2014.  The stakes were raised two days ago when, during a NATO strike against an insurgent, a two-year old was tragically killed and two women were injured.  The U.S. maintains that the strike targeted a mid-level Taliban commander traveling on a road, whereas Karzai and his administration maintain that the attack struck a residential home.  Both sides agree, however, that the civilians were killed during the attack.  Karzai noted that he would not sign the agreement if such "oppression" continued.

Putting aside Karzai's competing demands for the U.S. to provide peace and security while ensuring zero civilian casualties, the larger question is whether he will in fact sign the BSA by the end of the year.  Why, one might ask, can't the U.S. simply wait until April 2014 to find out whether Karzai will sign the BSA.  The answer, quite frankly, is that this is not feasible.  There are currently more than 86,000 NATO and affiliated troops in Afghanistan; 60,000 of these are American.  The logistics of transporting the troops; transporting, selling, or destroying the equipment; securing the bases; continuing to train Afghan forces; and myriad other issues, are simply staggering.  A succinct yet excellent account of the challenges posed by the logistics of the withdrawal from Afghanistan can be found here (the article, written in February 2013, anticipated that most troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2014).  In short, logistics alone -- setting politics aside for the moment -- dictate that the U.S. decide soon whether or not to withdraw troops.  While pundits may claim that the U.S. "should stay patient" and that waiting until after April to sign the BSA is acceptable, facts indicate otherwise.  If the U.S. is to keep troops in the country, for example, it cannot completely remove the infrastructure it currently has in place.

Of course, this post is simply reporting the situation with respect to ongoing negotiations as well as the pragmatic issue of logistical challenges.  Another question entirely is whether the benefits of a continued U.S. troop presence outweigh the costs in terms of lives lost (American, Afghan, and others), money, and anti-American sentiment.  That's a question we'll let you decide for yourselves.

Syrian peace talks scheduled, peace itself delayed

Amidst the surprising news from the Middle East this week was word that peace talks have been agreed upon by the two opposing sides in the Syrian civil war. Scheduled for late January in Geneva, this positive development is most certainly clouded by its more intricate details.

The first is the purported objective: transition. The opposition has consistently refused talks unless they included Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ceding power. Assad, meanwhile, has refused to cede power under any circumstances. In many ways, this is what the civil war has become all about. Although numerous reports mention that transitional government is a clear goal of the peace talks, it is curious whether both sides see that goal similarly. Assad's camp may view transition as inclusive of current government officials, while the opposition may believe it would completely exclude those currently in power. It would be unsurprising if this would become the main sticking point during the talks, if they actually take place that is.

The second is the question of who is capable of wholly leading the opposition, and, related, whether the opposition is cohesive enough to be led. More extremist groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continue to advance and take control of swathes of territory. Even less extremist groups do not accept the full authority of the political opposition, as clearly exemplified by this quote: Opposition political delegations do not have any power or influence on the Syrian street. On the whole, the Syrian National Council has foreign backing, but limited support within the opposition itself. At the same time, fighting continues in Syria, and its prevalence over the near future will be a testament to both cohesion and preparedness to peace. All of this makes one wonder: will the talks even take place?

There is little objective change in the civil war conditions of late. In fact, the United Nations seems to be spurring the peace talks based mostly on 'hope,' as opposed to more serious developments It is doubtful whether this is the best practice approach and leads to questions over whether the two opposing sides are even in agreement over what the purpose of the peace talks is. The world will know soon enough. In the meantime, it should hope.

From Albania to Norway, and everywhere in between

The saga of Syria's chemical weapons continues. It took ages to get Syria to admit to using banned weapons (though Syria never signed the ban) on its own population during the civil war. Now, with much work done, the question of how to dispose of and destroy the weapons remains unanswered.

It was originally thought that a neutral nation would allow the careful and systematic destruction of chemical weapons on its soil by a competent team of experts. Clearly, this assumption has proven naive. The NIMBY (not in my backyard) complex is extremely strong when it comes to sensitive topics such as chemical weapons. And with 1,300 tons of weapons to destroy, this is no simple or quick task.

Although a proponent of peaceful resolution in Syria and the destruction of the chemical weapons, Norway was first to say no. A flurry of other European nations have followed suit, including Germany, France, Albania, and, last but not least, Belgium. Neither Russia nor the U.S. are willing to do the dirty work (U.S. law, in fact, prohibits this). It seems, that no one may be willing.

Now, the weapons may be dismantled and destroyed at sea. This is a risky operation, though technically possible. It would involve significant precautions and security. More unsteady is the logistics of setting up this operation. Nonetheless, it may be the only option.