A Grip on Egypt

An interesting dynamic is unfolding in Egypt between the armed forces and the newly-minted president. Following the conclusion of the presidential election on June 17th, it took the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) about a week to declare Mohamed Morsi the winner, even though the Muslim Brotherhood declared their candidate the winner as early as the morning of June 18th and it was fairly clear to most observers who had won. Internationally, rumors swirled that SCAF was not willing to cede power to an Islamist candidate. Meanwhile, SCAF dissolved parliament and reverted its powers back to SCAF.


Clearly, a careful game of chess is being played that will determine who truly controls the new Egypt. The world is watching to see whether Egypt will regress to military-style authoritarianism, progress to some middle-ground of democracy, or shift toward religious autocracy. But doesn't Turkey already represent a regional model where the armed forces continue to wield great power even with relative democracy? Turkey surely has had a different history, but has, in recent years, worked to include religious parties into government. The issue may truly be then the stability of those armed forces, perhaps not in terms of political stability, as both Turkey and Egypt have strong militaries, but in terms of funding.

Both Turkey and Egypt have been recipients of significant U.S. military aid. Direct grants to Turkey largely stopped in the late 1990s, though Turkey does continue to receive aid in other forms. Egypt continues to receive direct military aid to this day. Taking an example, Turkey received received several hundred million dollars in 1998, out of a military budget of $7.2 billion USD. Meanwhile, in 2010, Egypt was the third largest recipient of military assistance, outpaced by only Afghanistan and Israel. Egypt received $1.3 billion in military aid that year. Egypt's military budget meanwhile, has seemingly dropped from around $4.6 billion in 2010 to closer to $4 billion in 2011, likely more than partly due to the Arab Spring. All this means an increasing reliance on US military aid, which makes up more than a quarter of the military's source of funds now.

US military aid to Egypt is largely based on its ability to maintain stability in the region. From a US perspective, that stability is directly tied to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979, a treaty that has always rested on shaky ground in Egypt, but has maintained its status under authoritarian leadership. This is the same treaty that Mr. Morsi has said he would "reconsider." No peace treaty. No military aid. No military. Therefore, it is clearly in the military's best interests to maintain the peace treaty. It ensures continued aid from the US, which helps secure SCAF's power within Egypt.


So who then has the grip on power in Egypt? Is it the military, who need the US? Is it Mr. Morsi, who risks being vulnerable without the military? Or is it the US, who keeps the aid flowing? Clearly, the US role in Egypt's future is more prominent than either Egypt or the US would like to admit. Perhaps a better balancing of aid, between military and other forms, would give the parties jostling over Egypt's future the right incentives to full, long-term democracy.